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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

LIBERALISM, RIGHTS, AND NATURE

"Next to virtue as a general idea," observes Tocqueville,

"nothing is so beautiful as that of rights ... No man

can be great without virtue, nor any nation great without
respect for rights. 111

Tocqueville's estimate of its beauty

appears roughly commensurate with the practical power that
the idea of rights broadly conceived has manifested over
the past few centuries.

The proposition that human beings

as such possess unalienable rights not only inspired the
revolutionary movements that swept North America and western Europe in the late eighteenth century and throughout
the nineteenth, but in its original,
borne

the

fruit

of

unprecedented

liberal form,

levels

of

it has

freedom

and

prosperity, and in many cases even political stability, in
those countries

in which it has most firmly taken root.

Moreover, in conjunction with the principles of human freedom and equality, it has indeed become in our own century,
as its early friends,

enemies, and friendly critics alike

anticipated, 2 a standard of political legitimacy recognized
1 Democracy in America 1.2.6, in Mayer ed. 1969, 237-8.
2 Thus the -doctrine's great pamphleteer Thomas Paine
proclaims that "Government founded on a moral theory, on a
system of universal peace, on the indefeasible hereditary
1

2

virtually worldwide, to which even many of the world's most
despotic regimes feel compelled to proclaim their fidelity.
Against
therefore,
contempt

the

backdrop

of

its

practical

the widespread theoretical
that

the

doctrine

of

successes,

suspicion and even

natural

and

unalienable

rights has aroused from its very inception must appear all
the more striking. 3

In the contemporary literature,

the

Rights of Man, is now revolving from west to east by a
stronger impulse than the Government of the sword revolved
from east to west.
It interests not particular individuals, but Nations in its progress, and promises a new era to
the human race" ( "The Rights of Man" Part 2, in Hook ed.
1969, 227).
Cf. Burke's famous lament that "the age of
chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever·" (Reflections on the Revolution in France,
ed. Mahoney 1955, 86; see also the remarks cited by Strauss
1953, 317-318).
Tocqueville, for his part, animated as he
says by "a kind of religious dread," claims in the introduction to Democracy in America that "the gradual progress
of equality is something fated ... it is universal and permanent, it is daily passing beyond human control, and every
event and every man helps it along" (Mayer ed. 1969, 12).
3 The seminal attacks appear in the works of Rousseau
and Hume.
See, respectively, Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality, passim, On the Social Contract,
especially 1.6-8, 2.3-4, 2.7, and Treatise of Human Nature
3.1.1.
In his Treatise, Hume supplies what has been taken
commonly as the basis for the general charge that natural
law doctrines as such are untenable, resting on one or
another variant of the "naturalistic fallacy."
Thus he
observes that "In every system of morality, which I have
hitherto met with ... the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of
a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when
of a sudden I am surpriz 'd to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or
an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the
same time that a reason should be given, for what seems

3

clearest indication of this theoretical suspicion and contempt appears
tion,

in the prevailing intellectual disinclina-

evident especially in the most widely discussed and

in many respects most ambitious recent reformulations of
liberal

theory,

to engage arguments about

level of their natural

foundations. 4

rights on the

A similar tendency

prevails in much of the mass of post-World War II literature concerning the concept of human rights. 5

The inevit-

altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from
it• II
4 Ronald Dworkin, for instance, takes the "abstract
right" to equal concern and respect to be "fundamental and
axiomatic" or "intuitive" ( 1977, xv, 180,182) .
In the single most widely discussed case, John Rawls presents his
principles of justice as constituting an analytically precise description of a prephilosophic "sense of justice,"
but fails, as several critics have observed, to clarify the
origin or nature of this sense (1971, 4,46,453-512; cf.
Bloom 1977, 648-649; Wolff 1977, 182; Schaefer 1979, 1218). In his more recent work (1980 and 1985), Rawls stipulates more definitely that his theory applies properly to
democratic societies alone.
Robert Nozick too admits at
least provisionally his incapacity to treat adequately the
question of justification, though he derives some comfort
from the opinion that his model Locke suffered from a similar incapacity (1974, 9).
Even Bruce Ackerman, who rejects intuitionism and presents arguments designed to lead
persons of divergent political perspectives to accept his
basic principle of neutral dialogue, ultimately confesses
that he knows of no mode of neutral argumentation sufficient to defend against all forms of authoritarianism.
Assent to his principle as well presupposes a particular
understanding of one's "place in the world" (1980, 360-361,
3 73) .
5 see the bibliography in Martin and Nickel 1978, and
the more narrowly focused critical review of the literature
in Machan 1980.
Important works of recent years include
Feinberg 1980; Finnis 1980; Gewirth 1982; Waldron ed. 1984;
Donnelly 1985; Meyers 1985; Nickel 1987; Winston ed. 1989.

4

able result, attempts at grounding rights in the principle
of human agency or autonomy notwithstanding, 6 is a wholly
conventionalist view of the origin or basis of rights.

The

essential difficulty with this view lies in the fact that
in its emphasis on the foundational character of the faculty

of

choice alone,

the

conventionalist

conception of

rights leaves unsettled not only the particular manner in
which one should choose to exercise one's rights or freedom,
limit

but also the nonprudential
one's

freedom

others' rights.

in

grounds

accordance

with

for choosing to
the

respect

of

The larger implication is that the histor-

ical success of the liberal doctrine of rights must appear
in the decisive respect accidental,

explainable by refer-

ence rather to the particular cultural circumstances of the
countries or peoples who espouse it than to any inherent
reasonableness in the doctrine itself. 7
In the remark cited above, Tocqueville unobtrusively
raises the essential questions.

In suggesting that an ap-

6 see above all Gewirth 1982, 1-8,20-30; also Hart, in
Waldron 1984, 77-78; Mackie, in Waldron 1984, 175-8.
7 see Grant 1975, 48-68, who argues ominously that "the
very decency and confidence of English-speaking politics,"
i.e. of the politics of constitutionally limited government
and rights in the English-speaking countries, "was related
to the absence of philosophy" (68).
Cf. Machan's critique
of the "non-cognitivist" theories of rights set forth by
MacDonald, Melden, Blackstone, and Feinberg, which tend to
conceive of rights as merely cultural or linguistic artifacts (1980, 103-107, 112-115).
Donnelly's account (1985,
31-43) seems to invite a similar criticism.
Cf. also Rapaczynski's expression of his early view of Locke iri particular (1987, 14).

5

preciation of human virtue provides the proper context for
praising, for seeing the virtue in, the idea of rights, he
implicitly reveals,

contrary to the contemporary reliance

on the principle of human autonomy, a grave skepticism with
respect to our attempts at asserting claims upon or against
nature without acknowledging at some point nature's claims
upon ourselves.

In accordance with that suggestion,

the

most general premise of the present study is the conviction
that,

notwithstanding the authentic perplexities that the

task involves, no serious attempt at elucidating the foundations of the principle of human rights, of political liberalism in its most successful form, can avoid a confrontation with the question of nature.

By attempting to avoid

such a confrontation, theorists of liberalism or of rights
confine their speech to those already committed to their
principles.

Explicitly or

implicitly,

they

conceive of

assent to those principles as a mere commitment, inherently
and necessarily nonrational, and thus incapable of resisting radical challenges.

We can understand clearly,

how-

ever, why powerful majorities or minorities should respect
the rights of the less powerful, only by understanding what
it is about us that merits such respect, that makes certain
rights appropriate to us--only, that is, on the basis of a
serious inquiry into the nature and natural condition of
humankind.
The present study therefore proceeds ultimately from

6

an inspiration that is at once theoretical and prescriptive.

We hope by pursuing to their theoretical grounds the

problematic relations among liberalism, rights, and nature
to gain some insight concerning both the general question
of political legitimacy and the particular question of the
legitimacy of our own form of government.
ever,

is historical.

our focus, how-

The second of our major premises is

the contention that we can best explore these problematic
relations by focusing on their treatment in the thought of
the greatest, most philosophically self-conscious exponent
of a liberal theory of natural rights, John Locke.

Though

this characterization of the core of Locke's theory is not
uncontroversial among scholarly commentators, the complexity of the issues

involved necessitates that our reasons

for viewing Locke as the paradigmatic natural rights theorist emerge mainly in the course of our exposition.

Yet in

view of the mass of existing literature on Locke's political philosophy,

it

is necessary here for us briefly to

situate the present study in the context of those that have
come before it, upon which it attempts to build.
Three general modes of interpretation are noteworthy
here. 8

According to the first, Locke is essentially not a

political philosopher,

but rather an ideologist.

In its

less narrowly reductive expressions, this approach is char8 cf. the earlier reviews of the recent literature in
Monson 1971, Aarslef 1969, zuckert 1975 and 1978. Cf. also
the more comprehensive overview in Yelton and Yelton 1985.

7

acterized by the attempt at situating Locke's thought within a prevailing intellectual climate or community of discourse. 9
Locke's

Several of its adherents focus in particular on
partisan

political

sympathies,

presenting

his

political thought as a rationalization of the interests or
sentiments of the Whigs,
after the

fact

formulated either as an apology

of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, lO or

before it as an expression of a revolutionary aspiration,
especially of the radical wing of the movement. 11

A more

narrowly reductive, materialist variant of the ideological
reading

focuses

on Locke's economic thinking,

presenting

Locke as an apologist of an emergent English bourgeoisie
and therefore of a system of class domination concealed and
9 Refraining from "systematic formal criticism," Dunn
seeks merely "to elucidate why it was that Locke said what
he said, wrote what he wrote, and published what he published in the Two Treatises of Government" (1969, x,6).
Cf. Tully's similar declaration of his intention (1980, ixx). Ashcraft introduces his reading of the historical context of the Two Treatises by offering a general definition
of a political theory as "a set of structured meanings that
are understandable only in reference to a specified context, wherein the concepts, terminology, and even the internal structure of the theory itself are viewed in relation to a comprehensive ordering of the elements of social
life" (1986, 5). Cf. Glat 1981, 20-21.
10 stephen 1876, I.114,117; Green 1967 (1879), 76; Lamprecht 1918, 3,141; Laski 1920, 29, 55; Sabine 1937, 523,
531,535,537; O'Connor 1952, 205.
See the discussion in
Laslett 1960, 58-61.
11 In recent scholarship, the most influential statement of this argument appears in Laslett 1960, 58-79.
See
also Fox Bourne 1876, I. 466 and II .166; Aaron 1955, 270274; Cranston 1957, 207-208; Gough 1973, 25-26,47-48,138149; Tully 1980, 53-55; Ashcraft 1980, 37-40, 48~53; Ashcraft 1986, 530-589.

8

legitimated by its emphasis on formal or jural equality. 12
A second mode of interpretation,

in some instances

partially overlapping the first, holds Locke to be a moreor-less traditional exponent of a

theologically grounded

natural

thesis

law theory.

variation,

Again

this

admits

of

some

deriving especially from the fact that Locke's

explication of the concept tends to obscure the traditional
distinction between natural law and divine positive law. 13
Defenders

of

the

natural

law

interpretation

argue

that

according to Locke, the principles of justice are acts of
divine legislation, carry divine sanctions, and are accessible to unassisted reason either through its apprehension
of the natural order of creation, or through its capacity
to demonstrate the authenticity of a positive revelation.
In either case, Locke is according to this view a fundamentally

Christian

writer,

grounding

his

theory

either

in

Christian revelation or in a version of natural theology
that

is substantively compatible with and ultimately in-

12 seminal in this respect is the work of C.B. MacPherson; see especially 1962, 194-2 62.
Neal Wood ( 1984) has
recently criticized MacPherson's argument as unhistorical,
without, however, rejecting its basic premise.
Wood's
Locke too is an ideologist of a rising English bourgeoisie,
a champion of an early agrarian form of capitalism.
Alan
Ryan rejects the view that Locke's political thought presents a justification of class domination, but agrees with
MacPherson in characterizing it as a "bourgeois" theory
produced by a "bourgeois mind" (1971, 105).
See also
Shapiro 1986, 128-148.
13 Lamprecht 1918, 105-109; Aaron 1955, 265-270; Von
Leyden 1954, 51-58; Gough 1973, 4-20; Rogers 1981, 146-149;
Colman 1983, 5-7; Shapiro 1986, 100-108.

9

spired by Christianity.14
Both these modes of interpretation tend to depreciate
the importance of the concept of nature in Locke's political thought.

In the ideological reading, this deprecia-

tion occurs in the context of a general abstraction from
any concern with foundational issues; if no human thought
can transcend the particular historical or cultural horizon
within which it arises, then it clearly makes little sense
to attempt to assess on its merits Locke's claim to present
transhistorical principles of justice or political legitimacy.15

A similar conclusion follows from the reading of

Locke as

a

fundamentally

Christian political

thinker,

a

political theologian elaborating the political implications
of his faith rather than a philosopher elaborating a conception of politics based upon and testable by rational
14 The most emphatic statement of this view is that of
Dunn, who argues that Locke's moral vision can be rendered
coherent, if at all, only by reference to an axiomatic,
"non-rational" but not "irrational" Christian, Calvinist
faith (1969, 249; more generally, 218-228,245-267).
See
also Ashcraft 1968, 910; Ashcraft 1969; Gough 1973, 1-26;
Johnson 1978; Parry 1978, 12; Yolton 1985, 50,91.
His
reading of Locke as a bourgeois or proto-bourgeois ideologist notwithstanding, even Wood affirms that Locke was
"unquestionably ... a sincere Christian," attempting to elaborate a "Christianized egoism" ( 1984, 77; 1983, 28,178) .
Placing greater emphasis on the grounding of Locke's
natural law in natural theology are Singh 1961, 105-118;
Aarslef 1969, 105-116; Tully 1980, 34-50; Colman 1983, 4248,138-176, 186-192.
15 see especially Wood's critique of the philosophical
approach as involving an abstraction from politics (1983,
1-7; 1984, 1-13) .

10
inquiry.

His view of the nature of things thus dismissed,

Locke could be relevant to us only insofar as we share his
faith or his historical-political circumstances. 16

More-

over, even those who appear to take more seriously Locke's
claims to lay the foundation of his political thought in a
more independently rationalist theology tend to ascribe to
Locke's treatment of the concept of nature only secondary
importance,

and therefore commonly fail to elaborate that

treatment in its full, potentially radical significance. 17
16 some scholars indeed seem to see in a demonstration
of Locke's irrelevance to us at least a partial justification of the very enterprise of writing about him.
Most
emphatic among these is Dunn, who insists on "the intimate
dependence of an extremely high proportion of Locke's arguments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on a series of theological commitments" no longer
shared by contemporary societies, with the consequence that
Dunn "simply cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of
any issue in contemporary political theory around the affirmation or negation of anything which Locke says about
political matters" (1969, x-xi).
Tully similarly seeks to
show that Locke's political thought "is fashioned within a
discourse constituted by many conventions and assumptions
we no longer share" ( 1980, x) .
Even Rapaczynski, who by
his own testimony "clearly believe(s] that Locke's ideas
are not • 'dead' and that Locke has something to ' say' to
us," seems to make a decisive concession to the thesis of
Locke's irrelevance in observing that Locke's "relevance
for us has more to do with helping to explain how we got to
where we are in our intellectual predicament than with
providing us with definitive answers to the problems we
face" ( 1987, 5) .
17 Though he devotes considerable attention to the
questions of human nature and the natural human condition
in Locke, Lamprecht seems content in the end to view
Locke's hedonism as aberrational in the context of his
ethical rationalism, or more fundamentally to observe that
Locke presents a largely novel, modern epistemology alongside an essentially traditionalist ethical and political
teaching (1918, 6,75-121). His contentment with the thesis
of Locke's inconsistency or confusion seems closely related

11
A third mode of interpretation places the question of
nature at the center of Locke's concern.

Exponents of this

reading argue that personal and pedagogical considerations
suggest to Locke the prudence of presenting his theory in a
traditional,

theological guise,

thus partially concealing

his deeper intention to present a somewhat modified, liberalized version of the hedonist natural
Hobbes. 18

In this view,

rights

theory of

much of the interpretive diffi-

cul ty of Locke's doctrine of natural law disappears once
to his distrust on principle of the notion of a natural law
(75-87).
Von Leyden displays a similar contentment, based
on a similar mistrust ( 1954, 43-60, 71-82; 1956, 26-34) .
Seliger holds that Locke is simply uninterested in explaining the grounds of his claims concerning the law of nature
(1963, 337-340).
More recently, near the end of a lengthy
and thoughtful study, Colman remarks that Locke's apparent
rejection of the notion of teleology invites a more formidable objection than does his alleged utilitarianism taken
in itself; yet Colman himself seems to treat that objection
as an afterthought, sketching the basis of a response to it
in scarcely three pages (1983, 240-242).
In claiming that
Locke's moral rationalism depends upon a "view of nature as
rational and purposive" or of "the natural world as a world
where everything has its function," Grant (1987, 38-39) is
aware of the difficulties that Locke's epistemology and his
account of the state of nature may pose for such a view,
yet seems uninterested in confronting those difficulties
exhaustively.
Her intention not to subject Locke to the
most radical challenges is perhaps indicated in the fact
that she addresses her study to "anyone who does not wish
to abandon the premise of liberal theory--human freedom ... "
( 11) .
18 see above all Strauss 1953, 165-166,202-251, and
Strauss 1959, 197-220.
See also Cox 1960; Goldwin 1972;
Zuckert 1974, 1978, and 1979; Mansfield 1979 and 1989, 185211; Wallin 1984; Pangle 1988.
As Cox points out ( 1960,
21-28), the Straussian reading of Locke as an esoteric Hobbist represents to a considerable extent a recovery and
elaboration of a view set forth by several of Locke's contemporaries, especially John Edwards, Richard West, and
Edward Stillingfleet.

12
one understands that Locke's is most basically a theory of
natural rights, and as such requires no superhuman legislator, nor any otherworldly sanction.

It claims only hypo-

thetical obligation and finds its basis in a fixed structure of natural human passions or motivations.

By virtue

of its seriousness about the concept of nature, therefore,
Locke's political thought carries potentially great relevance to contemporary concerns.

Yet there remains a diffi-

culty in conceiving of it as a viable alternative, deriving
not

from

its

rootedness

in the

realm of history or

of

faith, but from the substance of Locke's account of politically relevant nature.

In accepting the fundamentals of

Hobbesian psychology and epistemology,
view,

Locke

renders

his

according to this

thought ultimately

incapable of

resisting the radical implications of Hobbes'

principles,

namely the reduction of nature to a realm of nonteleological

necessity,

humanity
nature,

not
but

by

leaving

human

rational

rather

by

beings

conformity

rebellious,

to
with

manifest
the

willful,

their

order

of

ultimately

nihilistic assertions of autonomy.1 9
Of these three general approaches to the study of
Locke's political thought, the present study is most sympathetic and indebted to the third,

in the most fundamental

19 This implication of the "esoteric" Locke is stated
in a particularly forceful manner in Wallin 1984, especially 148-158.
Cf. Strauss 1953, 248-251; Strauss 1959,
170-173; Strauss 1983, 186-187; Caton 1983, 5-11; West
1988, 3, 21-29.

13
respect to the seriousness of its general approach to the
concept of nature, and therefore to its treatment of Locke
as a genuine philosopher, not as an ideologist or a political theologian.

In taking seriously Locke's professions

of philosophy or his conception of the aim of rational inquiry as knowledge of the nature of things, we implicitly
reject the ideological conception of thought as essentially
rooted in and bounded by its historical circumstances.

In

defense of that rejection, it suffices here for us to point
out that that conception can and must be turned upon itself
in a manner that renders absurd or arbitrary in principle
any attempt at interpretation of a historical text, or for
that matter of any kind of text or body of data.

If we

presume the ideological character of thought as such, then
we must apply that presumption to our own thought as well,
and acknowledge our own reading as no more than the projection

of

an

ultimately

against any other. 20

inscrutible

will,

indefensible

In the present context, therefore, it

seems safest to approach Locke with an attitude of openness
to the possibility that Locke is in the end justified in
his claims to insight into the nature or natural condition
of humankind,

and therefore to assess those claims on the

basis of the evidence and argumentation that he supplies in
their defense.

We might well conclude,

20 see Strauss 1959,
183.

26-27, 54-55;

upon completing

Strauss 1983,

177,

14
such an assessment, that Locke's thought is shaped in important or even decisive respects by historical influences
of which he was not fully conscious.

The point is that we

should assent to such claims as conclusions, or as the most
plausible explanations of the otherwise unaccountable presence of errors, ambiguities or omissions on Locke's part,
not as premises that

serve to

foreclose

serious

inquiry

into Locke's intention and the adequacy of his arguments. 21
The difficulty involved in the reading of Locke as at
bottom a political theologian,

on the other hand,

appears

upon consideration of the widely acknowledged inadequacy of
the arguments that he presents in defense of his ostensible
position. 22

So glaring and even curiously emphatic are the

incompleteness and inconsistency of these arguments that it
21 rn distinguishing my own from the ideological approach, in other words, I share the opinion of Ruth Grant:
" ... though it is necessary to know why an author wrote what
he did and for what audience (in order to avoid ahistorical
errors at the very least), it is also necessary to consider
whether what the author says makes sense.
Locke himself
argues for the necessity of making political and moral arguments and for the possibility of reaching the truth about
political principles on the basis- of argument.
When an
author makes his case in the form of an argument, it deserves to be considered for its cogency as an argument, and
particularly so in this case" (1987, 10). See also Tarcov:
"If ... we hope to learn something from Locke, then the verdict of confusion ought to be only our last resort and we
had better explore other avenues of interpretation" (1981,
200) .
22 For various perspectives on the difficulties in
Locke's theological arguments, see Strauss 1953, 202-226;
Strauss 1959; Cox 1960, 45-62; Laslett 1960, 92-96,101,106;
Ashcraft 1969, 203-208, 214-223; Dunn 1969, 94-95,187-194,
and 1984, 65ff, 84ff; Helm 1973; Bluhm et al 1980; Yol ton
1985, 76-91,98.

15

seems most doubtful that they proceed from mere inadverIt seems most likely that the prominence of such

tency.

arguments in the forms in which Locke presents them represents instead a rhetorical or pedagogical stratagem,
Locke

intends

them

to

point his

more

inquiring

that

readers

beyond at least the more dogmatic of his theological assertions.

We might add, however, that despite this divergence

in approach,

the focus of the present study should retain

some interest for at least some of those persuaded by the
more

traditional

natural

theology,

reading,
pursued

insofar as
to

their

Locke's
logical

appeals to
conclusion,

require supplementation by an account of the natural order
accessible to the understanding.
Yet to say that we are most sympathetic and indebted
to the reading of Locke as an esoteric Hobbesian is not
necessarily to endorse that reading without qualification,
but only to agree that it contains the deepest and most
challenging critique of Locke's political thought.

Accor-

ding to the seminal argument of Strauss in particular, the
difficulties into which Locke's Hobbesian paternity leads
him are both psychological and epistemological in character.

Locke's assent to the basic principles of Hobbesian

psychology commits him to a conception of human nature so
egoistic as to imply a natural disinclination on the part
of

individuals to perform the acts of civic devotion or

sacrifice necessary to sustain any political society.

This
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apparent disproportion between human nature and the demands
of justice at least calls into question the naturalness of
the latter. 23

still more fundamental are the epistemologOn the basis of Locke's denial of the

ical difficulties.

naturalness of ideas of species or kinds, Strauss reasons
that what Locke denominates "the law of nature" or "natural
rights" cannot be genuinely natural at all, instead representing nothing more than a mental construct,

the mind's

imposition of order upon an external world naturally or
natively experienced as disorder.

Insofar as Lockean epis-

temology

Hobbes,

is

similar

to

that

of

Locke

too

choose between reducing humanity and its works to
phantasmagoria, 1124

or

separating

strictly

his

II

must

a mere

political

theory from his epistemology and thus rendering its basis
unclear.

For these reasons, according to Strauss, Lockean

natural right as a variant of modern natural right culminates in a "crisis. 1125

Locke can hardly provide for us any

23 strauss 1953, 237,239,248.
Cf. Goldwin:
"Can the
principle of self-preservation provide the basis for the
development of patriotism, public spirit, and especially
the sense of the duty to give up wealth and even life in
defense of one's country? Locke is profound and comprehensive on the reasons for founding political society, but
those reasons turn out to be such that he is prevented by
their very character from considering in what direction
society should develop after the founding is secure" (1972,
483) .
24 strauss 1953, 230,249; Strauss 1959, 178.
See also
Cox 1982, xliii; Zuckert 197 4, 562-563; Miller 1979, 173181; Wallin 1984, 148-158.
25 strauss 1953, 252.
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positive assistance

in resolving our contemporary confu-

sions, in this view, because Locke himself is an important
progenitor of those confusions.
On the basis of a thorough consideration of Locke's
treatments of the problems raised by this formidable challenge, we attempt in the course of the following chapters
to defend a partial but significant revision of its main
conclusions.

In this

characterized

perhaps

Tarcov' s

suggestion

of

respect the
most

simply

the

present study can be
as

an

application

existence

of

a

of

"non-Lockean

Locke 1126 to Locke's treatment of foundational issues.

Our

general contention is that Locke attempts to correct the
tendency of premodern thought to contribute to political
immoderation,

while

avoiding

in

the

decisive

respect

a

surrender to the principle of willfulness that he seems to
recognize as the animating principle of pure modernity; his
assent to the principles of philosophical modernity is in
significant respects more qualified, more genuinely ambiguous,

and more prudential than his most powerful critics

26 see Tarcov 1983 and also 1984, especially 209-211.
Cf. Horwitz 1979, 153-156.
The present work bears some
similarity also to the work of Rapaczynski (1987, 113-217),
whose reading of Locke as an essentially secular thinker
whose conception of nature culminates in the principle of
moral autonomy indicates his considerable agreement with
the Straussian reading, though he rejects outright the
imputation to Locke of a Hobbesian nihilism.
I am sympathetic to Rapaczynski's attempt at uncovering a more genuinely moral foundation of Lockean politics, but skeptical
of his opinion that the modern principle of moral autonomy
or self-production can constitute such a foundation.
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have maintained.

Resisting the absorption of his thought

into that of his more

radically modern predecessors and

successors, we find that while those critics rightly call
attention to the difficulties involved in the arguments on

which Locke tends to rely in establishing his principles,
the presence of a nonexoteric, philosophically serious premodern or classical strain in Locke can nonetheless supply
the basis for a nonideological, nonprudential, rationalist
assent to the Lockean principles of natural rights. 27
The development of this argument proceeds within the
following sequence of chapters.

The second chapter repre-

sents an exercise in ground-clearing.

Its purpose is to

establish the meaning of Locke's doctrine of natural rights
and the manner in which he holds certain rights to be unalienable, and then to establish preliminarily the primacy
of the concept of nature in his political thought by identifying the difficulties inherent in the prominent alternative foundational arguments that he proposes or appears to
propose in the Second Treatise of Government.

The third

and fourth chapters address the issues raised by Locke's
account of natural

science,

as elaborated mainly

Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

The

focus

in the
of the

third is primarily epistemological, centering on the char2 7 For this thesis of the existence of a premodern,
Socratic strain in Locke's thought I am indebted to the
suggestive discussion in Pangle (1988, 265-275), although
I will argue that this Socratic strain is more central to
Locke's intention than Pangle seems to hold.
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acter and implications of Locke's critique of doctrines of
the existence of natural sorts or species and of formal and
final

causality generated by the premodern or Scholastic

teleological science.
which Locke,

The fourth addresses the extent to

in reaction against the latter view,

assents

to the more modern "corpuscularian," mechanistic or materialist view of nature as a realm of purely nonteleological
necessity.
Having argued in the preceding two chapters that a
rather flexibly empirical attention to the compilation of
"natural history" constitutes the substance of Locke's main
approach to natural science, we turn in chapters five and
six to consider in

its specifically moral

and political

relevance the account of the natural condition of humankind
that Locke constructs by means of this approach.

In chap-

ter five we attempt to show how Locke's own somewhat attenuated, modernized teleology yields an account of the state
of nature very similar to that of Hobbes.

In chapter six

we attempt to show, however, that Locke's Hobbesian account
represents a self-consciously partial account of the natural condition, that it is best understood within the context of the larger human condition of "mediocrity" or inbetweenness, upon the recognition and respect for which the
attainment and preservation of moderate, rational politics
depends.

We reconsider in conclusion the basis and extent

of Locke's divergence from the premodern,

especially Pla-
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tonic tradition of natural right,
mysteriousness

of

the

foundations

explaining the peculiar
of

Locke's

political

thought as his deliberate response to the rhetorical difficulties that he confronts in consequence of his overriding
sensitivity to the fragility of human reason.

In the end,

the manner in which Locke diverges from the Platonic tradition may well represent a one-sided identification of and
response to the enduring dangers to political rationality;
yet by laying some emphasis here on the element of that
tradition that is· preserved in Locke's thought, and therewith on the breadth of the boundaries of that thought, we
deny the theoretical,

radical character of Locke's diver-

gence, and thus avoid unnecessarily delegitimating Locke's
political thought as a context for attempts at addressing
the theoretical problems of political liberalism.

CHAPTER II
LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF NATURAL RIGHTS:
SOME PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS

In the "Preface" to the Two Treatises of Government,
Locke describes somewhat ambiguously the general character
and purpose of the work.

He claims to write in order "to

establish the Throne of our Great Restorer,

Our Present

King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the
People," and "to justifie to the World, the People of England,

whose love of their Just and Natural Rights,

with

their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it
was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine" (TT "Preface,"
171). 1

The work is then, as many commentators have argued,

1 Throughout the text, we will cite Locke's works as
follows. Of the Conduct of the Understandinq will be cited
as CU, followed by paragraph number. The Correspondence of
John Locke (Clarendon, 1976) will be cited as CJL, followed
by letter number.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
will be cited as ECHU, followed by book, chapter, and paragraph numbers.
A Letter Concerning Toleration will be
cited as LCT, followed by page number from the James Tully
edition (Hackett, 1983).
Questions Concerning the Law of
Nature will be cited as LN, followed by question and page
numbers from the edition of Robert Horwitz et al. (Cornell,
1990). On the Reasonableness of Christianity will be cited
as RC, followed by paragraph number. Some Thoughts Concerning Education will be cited as STCE, followed by paragraph
number.
The Two Tracts on Government will be cited as
either ETG (English tract) or LTG (Latin tract), followed
by page number from the Philip Abrams edition (Cambridge,
1967).
The Two Treatises of Government will be cited as
TT, followed by treatise and paragraph numbers.
The re21
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an

occasional

defend,

work.

written

in order to explain and to

and probably in large part to encourage a particu-

1ar political
that

work,

action. 2

But Locke's description implies

the Two Treatises is more than a merely occasional
To put it more precisely,

it implies that the Two

Treatises could not adequately serve its occasional purpose
without also transcending that purpose: 3

William's acces-

sion is justified insofar as it rests upon popular consent,
which in turn confers a title to govern only insofar as it
represents the English people's entrustment to William of
the care of their "Just and Natural Rights. "

The announced

purpose of the Two Treatises is thus not to "rationalize"
the events of 1688, but instead to reveal the rationality
behind the events, or to justify the events by reference to
their

conformity with rational principles.

Locke implies

that the ultimate worth of his defense of a particular set
of actions rests upon the soundness of his appeal to naturspective editions of The Works of John Locke will be cited
as works 1823, followed by volume and page numbers, or as
works 1877, followed by volume and page numbers.
All underlining indicates Locke's original emphasis, unless
otherwise noted.
2see, e.g., Lamprecht 1918, 141; Laski 1920, 29; Aaron
1955, 270ff; Cranston 1957, 208; Laslett 1960, 59ff; Gough
1973, 138-144; Ashcraft 1986, 530-591.
3Thus Aaron 1955, 270:
Locke's immediate aim of justifying the Revolution "is achieved by securing in turn a
great
and
fundamental
political principle,
true ... in
Locke's opinion, for all well regulated communities everywhere and at all times ... "
Also Seliger 1968, 32; Gough
1973, 138.
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al, transhistorical principles of justice, or to political
philosophy.

He implies that he cannot finally or adequate-

ly establish William's legitimacy without also establishing
the philosophic foundation of the theory of natural rights.
The general purpose of the present study is to take
seriously Locke's literal claim, and therefore to proceed
from his

appeal

to

nature to

investigate the extent to

which he can establish a rational foundation for that appeal.

But a

clear exposition of the theory of natural

rights must precede any assessment of its soundness.

Let

us then begin at the most general level, with the concept
of rights.

Despite its prominence in the arguments there-

in, Locke offers no explicit definition of the concept of
rights in the Two Treatises.

It is possible, however, to

extract from his discussion a
concept,
tions.

general definition of the

subsuming a number of more particular modificaIn the most general sense, Locke employs the term

"right" to refer to a morally justifiable claim of free
disposal

over person or goods.

Thus,

for instance,

the

general right of liberty in the natural, nonpolitical condition refers to the liberty of "all Men ... to order their
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions,
they think fit,

and Persons as

within the bounds of the Law of Nature,

without asking leave, or depending on the Will of any other
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Man" (II.4; also 8). 4
Descending

from

this

level

of

generality,

Locke

employs the concept of rights in various more particular
Thus rights may be wholly personal,

senses.
claims

or properties,

for

instance,

subjective

or they may

impose

relations of obligation between the bearers of rights and
others.

Understood in the former sense, a right implies no

more than the moral permissibility of a given action;

a

person has a right to perform whatever action is not wrong
to perform, though that right imposes no obligation on any
other person.

The clearest example of this form of right

appears in Locke's "strange Doctrine" that individuals in a
nonpolitical

condition may

rightfully

punish

those

they

judge to be in violation of the law of nature (II.9; also
7,8,13,16).

In such cases, the rightful character of the

act of punishment confers no obligation upon another to
submit to that punishment.

Given the equal rights of all,

of accusers and accused alike to judge the law of nature in
the state of nature, there could be no obligation to submit
to a punishment that one believed to proceed from a faulty
judgment. 5

More characteristic of Locke's account of jus-

4 see also LN I.101:
"· .. right [ius] consists in the
fact that we have a free use of something ... " Cf. Hobbes,
Leviathan XIV:
" ... RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or
to forbeare ... 11 (ed. MacPherson 1968, 189).
5 This is not to imply that according to Locke all
judgments in the state of nature concerning the law of
nature are equally valid.
Such an implication would make
nonsense of Locke's doctrine of resistance, and indeed on
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tice is a more restrictive conception of rights as engendering interpersonal obligations, as containing notions of
reciprocity and respect.

In this sense he refers to rights

"that all men may be restrained from invading" (II.7), that
is, rights that it would be morally wrong or unjust to violate.
More significantly for present purposes,
employs distinctions
their

respective

among kinds

origins.

of

In this

rights
regard,

Locke also

according to
the

crucial

distinction is between positive or conventional rights and
natural rights.

A positive or conventional right derives

from a declaration of the will of a human or divine authority.

Thus political power proper consists, for Locke, in a

"Right of making laws ... for the Publick Good,"

conferred

upon public officials by the express or tacit consent of
the governed (II.3,119,127).
"Natural right" for Locke is a somewhat more ambiguous and difficult concept, subsuming two further modificaLocke's own principle would reveal the propagation of that
doctrine to be an act of Griminal irresponsibility, in that
Locke holds the subversion of a legitimate government (i.e.
by a false allegation of its violation of the natural law)
to be "the greatest Crime ... a Man is capable of" (II.230).
The crucial point is this: Locke maintains that, though it
is in principle possible to arrive at objective judgments
concerning the application of the laws of nature, there is
nonetheless an equal right among persons to render their
own judgments.
Though some may be better judges than
others, it is nonetheless unwise, in Locke's view, to presume sufficient disinterest on the part of such persons to
justify ascribing to them a natural right, exclusive of or
superior to that of others, to judge the dictates of the
natural laws. Contrast Coby 1987, 10-13.
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In the most general sense, a right is

tions of its own.

natural in Locke's conception in that it is a property of
persons

in their natural,

nonpolitical condition.

Among

natural rights thus understood, some are alienable, their
retention being incompatible with the existence of political society; the individual right to execute the law of
nature in the state of nature once again provides an example (II.128,130).

Others appear to be unalienable, their

retention being not only compatible with, but even necessary to

the existence of political

unalienable

society proper.

An

right by definition could not be rationally

surrendered;

no

act

of

rational

consent

could oblige

a

human being to accept a condition in which he or she were
denied the exercise of the right in question.

To make such

a surrender would mean to lower oneself beneath the jural
level of humanity.

An unalienable right would be natural,

therefore,

the more restrictive

also

in

sense that

its

possession would be of the nature or essence of a human
being.
This

sort

of

right,

the

natural

and

unalienable

right, constitutes the object of the present investigation.
Locke seems throughout the Second Treatise to imply a conception of unalienable rights,

and some

such conception

would seem ultimately indispensable for his stated design
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of promoting limited,
governmental

authority

fiduciary government (II.149). 6
derives

consent of the governed,

solely

from

the

If

rational

and if that authority is in its

nature limited, it would seem to follow that there must be
some limit to the surrender or transferral of rights to
which a rational person could agree, in the act of constituting political society.

We must hasten to concede, how-

ever, that Locke never quite speaks explicitly and unambiguously of unalienable rights,
nothing of others,

and that this fact,

to say

may cause thoughtful readers to doubt

that he ultimately holds any rights to be truly unalienable. 7

It is necessary then immediately to identify and to

define the rights that constitute the core of Lockean justice, and in the process to ascertain in what sense, if at
all, Locke conceives of those rights as unalienable.
6 Locke seems to imply a theory of unalienable rights
at II.23,129,131,135,137,149,1?4,168,172.
7 In addressing the question of unalienable rights, I
will concentrate on the specific difficulties that arise in
connection with each of the rights in the Lockean triad.
It is possible also to raise the question in more general
terms, however, by calling attention to Locke's occasional
usage of the term "property" to comprehend the rights of
life, liberty, and estate, or property narrowly conceived.
Elsewhere in the Second Treatise, he defines property in a
somewhat elusive manner as that which "without a Man's own
consent ... cannot be taken from him" (193), causing the
reader to wonder whether property as such, material possessions as well as personal rights, can be surrendered by an
act of consent. What then becomes of these rights, according to Locke, upon the formation of political society? In
what respects can or must political society accommodate, as
it were in its midst, a continuation of the natural condition?
For various perspectives, see Kendall 1941, 65-79,
and Kendall 1966; Cox 1960, 106-123; Glenn 1984; Coby 1987.

THE LOCKEAN TRIAD
In

his

most

famous

and

influential

formulations,

Locke typically refers to a triad of rights, to the rights
of life, liberty, and estate or possessions, "which I call
by the general Name,

Property"

(II.123; also 135,137), as

cons ti tu ting the core of his theory of justice. 8
examine these rights
presents them.

Let us

in the order in which he typically

In the purely natural condition, the right

8 This triad may not constitute a complete enumeration
of the natural rights that Lockean governments are obliged
to preserve. At II.209, for instance, Locke mentions "perhaps" the endangerment of "Religion" along with that of
"Estates, Liberties, and Lives" as a legitimate cause for
resistance.
He suggests more definitely in A Letter Concerning Toleration that accusations against the churches as
nurseries of faction "would soon cease, if the Law of Toleration were once so setled, that all Churches were obliged
to lay down Toleration as the Foundation of their own Liberty; and teach that Liberty of Conscience is every mans
natural Right ... " (LCT 51; also 55, and Works 1823, 127).
Given the extreme difficulty of identifying what remains of
liberty in a society whose government has the authority to
compel belief concerning salvation, this statement in the
Letter must reflect Locke's genuine opinion of the existence of a natural right of conscience, alienable only to
the extent required by society's legitimate civil concerns.
His reluctance consistently to include this right among the
more prominent natural rights presented in the Second Treatise seems then to reflect an intention on his part to deemphasize religion or conscience as a primary motive or
reason for the formation of political society.
He seems
to see in the assertion of an absolute right of conscience
a threat to the preservation of civil society greater even
than that of an absolute right of self-preservation, and
therefore treats that right as merely one among the numerous possible expressions of human agency, protected insofar
as its exercise bears an essential relation to agency in
general, but not necessarily fundamental in itself to the
human pursuit of happiness.
28
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of life signifies the right of self-preservation, or, somewhat more broadly expressed, the right of an individual "to
do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself
and others within the
(II.128). 9

Moreover,

permission of

the

Law of Nature"

Locke proclaims in conjunction with

this right a correlative obligation not to take the life of
an innocent person (II.16).

Upon joining political soci-

ety, one surrenders only partially the purely natural right
or "power" of self-preservation, only "so far forth as the
preservation of himself, and the rest of society shall require" (II.128,129; also 87).

This ambiguous qualification

may appear to preserve the status of the right of life as
unalienable, at least insofar as it implies that even within the bounds of political society, where the governmental
executive power is not immediately present to defend members against acts of aggression, individual members retain
the right to judge and to defend themselves against such
acts:
... the Law, which was made for my Preservation, where
it cannot interpose to secure my Life from present
9 rt is noteworthy that throughout the Second Treatise
Locke employs both "rights" and "powers" in reference to
self-preservation and to the punishment of criminals in the
state of nature.
(Cf. paragraphs 7,8,11 with 87-88,127130, 171.)
This terminological ambiguity need signify no
more, however, than that the efficacy of rights in the
natural condition depends decisively upon the claimant's
power, thus underlining the need for conventional means to
provide more general security.
In particular, it need not
imply that the distinction between assertions of right and
assertions of power in the state of nature is in principle
meaningless. Cf. Coby 1987, 9 n.15, and passim.
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force ... permits me my own Defence, and the Right of
war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common Judge,
nor the decision of the Law, for remedy in a Case,
where the mischief may be irreparable (II .19; also
176,207) . 10
Locke's

apparent

conception of

the

right

of self-

preservation as unalienable raises, however, a potentially
serious
Locke

difficulty.

can

One

is

forced

consistently maintain

right is unalienable,

to

question whether

that this

or any

other

in view of his apparent insistence

that the advent of political society effects a fundamental
alteration of the obligations of the consenting individuals.
The great end of Mens entring into Society, being the
enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and
the great instrument and means of that being the Laws
establish'd in that Society ... the first and fundamental
natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it
self, is the Preservation of the Society. and (as far
as will consist with the publick good) of every person
in it.
(II. 34)
In constituting political society, individuals create
a powerful means for their preservation;

in a single act

they exercise and fortify their right of self-preservation.
As a necessary condition of that fortification, they oblige
themselves to preserve the society that will preserve them.
But the logic apparent in Locke's account of this process
should not obscure the fact that the individual agents are

10As

Goldwin points out, this means in effect that
states of nature and of war may commonly occur even within
the bounds of a functioning political society (1976, 126128) .
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thus effecting a radical change in their juridical condition.

In the state of nature, according to Locke's most

extreme formulation,

everyone "is bound to preserve him-

self, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like
reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition,
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind"

(II. 6).

In this

formulation,

what Locke commonly

presents as a right appears as an obligation to preserve
oneself; 11 the natural "Law of Self-Preservation" is "Fundamental,

Sacred,

and unalterable"

(II.149).

The law of

nature or reason thus appears to embody commands or precepts

radically divergent

in their substantive practical

implications, according to whether it applies to the state
of nature or to the political condition, the condition "of
all Commonwealths" (II.134).
In

considering these

apparently divergent

implica-

tions, one cannot avoid wondering how Locke's assertion of
a social obligation, an obligation to preserve society even
if it costs one's own life, can be compatible with a con11According to Pangle's reading, Locke implies in this
passage an individual obligation not to risk one's life for
the preservation of others (1988, 160). This is a possible
reading, but not the only possible reading of the text in
question. Locke maintains that individuals have an obligation not to quit their stations willfully, or arbitrarily,
but he leaves unclear precisely what it would mean to sacrifice one's life willfully or arbitrarily.
He does not
necessarily deny that in some circumstances, the sacrifice
of one's own life could be rational as opposed to willful,
and therefore does not necessarily claim that to sacrifice
one's life for the preservation of another is to · violate
the law of nature.
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ception of the fundamental natural rights as unalienable.
The

basic

objection

can

be

stated

Locke holds that the natural

briefly

as

follows.

law obligation to preserve

society encompasses a non-absolute obligation to preserve
"every person"

in society,

with the publick good"
this qualification,

only "as far as will consist

(II.134; also 159).

According to

those whose preservation is not con-

sistent with the public good have,
right to preservation.

at best,

no absolute

Now, it is evident that Locke does

not refer here to criminals as the "persons" whose preservation

is

inconsistent with the public good;

criminals,

according to Locke, by aggressing against others' property
or preservation, forfeit their unalienable rights and thus
in effect their jural status as persons. 12

He seems rather

to refer to those innocent persons who may be called upon
to sacrifice their lives for the preservation of the society as a whole.

Elsewhere in the same chapter, he insists

emphatically upon the rightfully absolute power of military
commanders over soldiers:

"the Preservation of the Army,

and in it of the whole Common-wealth, requires an absolute
12 The effect of a criminal action, according to Locke,
is to declare oneself "to quit the principles of Human
Nature," and therefore to justify one's treatment by others
as a beast. The "Criminal. .. may be destroyed as a Lyon or
a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can
have no Society nor Security" (II.10,11; also 16,172,181,
182,228).
The fact that such forfeiture may in some cases
be partial or temporary (II.24,159,178) does not alter
Locke's conclusion that cases of extreme, incorrigible
criminality entail an effectively total forfeiture of jural
personhood.
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_Qpedience to the command of every Superiour Officer, and it
is justly Death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or
unreasonable of them"

(II .139).

But would not submission

to such a power constitute a surrender of one's right to
judge the conditions of one's own preservation and to act
in such manner as to secure those conditions?

Does not

Locke's insistence on the legitimacy of such absolute power
directly contradict his assertion that the right of life is
an unalienable right?
One cannot reasonably deny that membership in political society, according to Locke, confers upon individuals
obligations that may transcend and even conflict directly
with
stood.

the

principle

of

self-preservation

narrowly

under-

Upon assuming full membership 13 in a Lockean polit-

ical society,

individuals cannot retain an absolute right

in all cases to do whatever may be necessary for their own
preservation.

Understood

right

would

of

life

in

indeed

such terms,
destroy

the

an unalienable
moral

basis

of

13 It appears that individuals must become full or
"perfect" members, i.e. through rendering their express
consent to the societal or governmental authority, in order
to acquire the strict obligation to preserve the society.
For according to Locke only the member in the strict sense
"is indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a
Subject" of the commonwealth. Those who render only their
tacit consent are subjects only insofar as they find it
"convenient to abide for some time," and would therefore
have the option of emigrating in the event of a war
(II.119-122). See also Grant 1987, 128-136.
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national defense. 14
that

From this it need not follow, however,

such membership

alienation,

or

that

unalienable rights.

strictly
Locke

requires

cannot

an

act

consistently

of

total

speak

of

The following considerations can serve

to indicate both the complexity of the issue and the extent
to which it is capable of resolution.
In first addressing this question,

we must bear in

mind above all Locke's constant insistence on the fiduciary
character of political power,

or on the

fact that,

as a

condition of governmental legitimacy, the natural law obligation to preserve society and its members
even the Legislative it self"
195,221,222).

(II .134;

II

is to govern

also 139,142,149,

Government derives its proper authority from

the act of alienation or transferral inherent in the consent of its subjects, and therefore possesses no power that
individuals may not rightfully exercise
nature (II.135).

in the state of

One ~ignificant implication of this prin-

ciple is that government,

itself in a state of nature in

relation to other governments, has no right to wage an aggressive war.

An act of aggression against another govern-

ment and community would clearly constitute an assertion of
"Power beyond Right,
(II.199).

which no Body can have a Right to"

The event of an unjust war would then raise an

1 4 The charge that Locke effects precisely such a
destruction is stated or implied by Vaughan 1925, _196ff.;
Goldwin 1972, 483-484; Pangle 1988, 211-212.
See the
discussion in Chapter VI below, pp. 338-343.
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interesting question concerning both Locke's doctrine of
resistance and by implication also his conception of the
right of self-preservation.

Notwithstanding the fact that

the aggressor government does not directly or designedly
offend its own subjects or citizens, according to Locke's
explanation of tyranny the act would appear at least in the
strict sense sufficient to dissolve the legitimacy of the
government and the obligations of the subjects. 15
Locke does not explicitly draw this conclusion.
does maintain,

of course,

that should a

He

government wage

such a war unsuccessfully, it would be subject to rightful
conquest by the offended power.

But he is quick to add

that even the authority of just conquerors is limited, if
only in the respect that it can cover only "those, who have

15 Bearing in mind, of course, that acts of resistance
or revolution require for Locke judgments of prudence as
well as of abstract right, one may well doubt that Lockean
subjects would be in many cases inclined to judge their
governments illegitimate on the sole basis of actions taken
against other communities.
Judgments of how to respond to
injustices perpetrated by one's own government must in any
event be tempered by an assessment of the likelihood of
replacing that government with another less unjust, and
especially so in the extreme case in which actions taken to
unsettle one's own government might serve only to facilitate subjection to a vengeful foreign conqueror.
Thus the
Lockean subject might commonly see the advantages of muting
his protests, of observing his obligations to the rest of
humankind, in other words, "only when his own Preservation
comes not in competition" (II. 6).
Perhaps implicit in
Locke's insistence that "a long train of Abuses" is required for the dissolution of a government, or that the
people should often bear even "Great mistakes in the ruling
part," is a recognition that the natural executive power of
the people includes a power to pardon certain criminal
actions taken by their government (225; also 210).
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actually assisted,

concurr'd,

or consented to that unjust

force ... over the rest of the People, if there were any that
consented not to the war ... he has no Power"
once again,

(II . 179 , 19 6) .

Locke fails or declines to elaborate what it

might mean for subjects or citizens to withhold consent
from an unjust war, but it is nonetheless significant that
he

even

mentions

explicitly

the

possibility.

However

forceful his insistence on the rightfully absolute power of
military commanders,

Locke quietly

calls

significant qualification of that power,

attention to a
implicit in the

unalienable right of the members of political society to
judge the

justice or injustice of a

governmental act of

war.
Moreover,

even

in the case of a

just or defensive

war, where the obligation of individuals to risk and even
to sacrifice their lives in defense of the community is not
in itself in question,

Locke's assertion of the virtually

unbounded authority of military commanders seems implicitly
to admit of a similar qualification.
natural law obligation,
fore

its

agent

the

According to its own

the legislative power--and there-

military

power--must

preserve

every

individual member of the society "as far as will consist
with the publick good," or "as much as possible" (II.134,
16; also 159).
literal

reading,

Without imposing upon Locke an excessively
it

is possible to infer from this that

there are limits to the proper authority of military com-
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manders even in the context of a just war,

and that such

authority would not comprehend the gratuitous sacrifice or
squandering of soldiers' lives.
it justify a

Nor, it would seem, could

grossly partial or unequal

distribution of

those sacrifices that are truly obligatory; the justness of
the surrender that individuals make upon entering political
society consists in part in the fact that "the other Members of the Society do the like" (II.130).
these

inferences,

we

can

conclude that

On the basis of
al though members

clearly have no categorical or absolute right, according to
Locke, to avoid sacrificing their lives in defense of the
commonwealth,

they do retain the right to

life-threatening commands are

judge whether

issued nonarbi trarily--that

is, impartially and according to reasonable military necessity.

We can conclude more generally, therefore, that the

unalienable

right

of

life

must

signify

not

an

absolute

right to preserve one's life, but rather an absolute right
to

judge whether the power that may claim disposal over

one's life is an arbitrary or a legitimate power. 16

By "a

Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men,"
the members of political society have "reserv'd that ultimate Determination to themselves ... to

judge whether they

have just cause to make their Appeal to Heaven.

16 Grant, 1987, 131-132.

And this
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Judgment they cannot part with ... " (II.168) . 17

Locke's

insistence upon the rightfully absolute power of civil government represents not an affirmation, but to the contrary
a denial that governmental power is inherently arbitrary or
without moral limit.

The foundation of Locke's doctrine of

justice is the principle that individuals possess by nature
certain unalienable rights:

"A Man ... cannot subject him-

self to the Arbitrary Power of another" (II.135) . 1 8
17 Similarly, the fact that the right to judge the
legitimacy of governmental power rests immediately with
"the People," and therefore with "the Majority" (168; also
95-99), does not imply that the individual's alienation of
rights to society or to the majority is absolute.
Locke
clearly holds that the oppression of individuals or minorities activates a right of resisting, and therefore that
majorities as well as governments are in principle capable
of injustice.
He simply doubts as a practical matter that
such resistance could be effective, if a majority (or at
least a substantial minority) fails to support it (168,
208).

18 one might object that this conclusion depends upon
an abstraction from Locke's very emphatic demand for soldiers' "absolute" or "bl ind Obedience" to even or especially "the most dangerous or unreasonable" command, on
penalty of hanging "for the least Disobedience" (II.139).
In view of the fact that such blind obedience would be simply irreconciliable with an unalienable right of judging
questions of legitimacy--upon which Locke insists with
equal emphasis--! am inclined to view the demand for unconditional military obedience as an instance of deliberate
rhetorical extremism on Locke's part, intended to underline
the absolute seriousness with which the members should regard their obligation to defend the community.
There can
be no questioning, of course, that in his acute sensitivity
both to the strength of the desire for self-preservation
(I.86,88) and to the dangerous propensity for partiality
that distorts individuals' judgments of their own cases
(II.13), Locke seeks to avoid creating the impression that
individuals are free to make minute particular calculations
as to whether their personal sacrifices would decide the
outcome of a given military engagement, or whether governmental demands for personal sacrifice fall in an absolutely
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The status of the right of life as unalienable may
yet appear questionable, however, in the light of its relation to the natural right of liberty, which Locke also presents as unalienable.
Locke explains it,
on

Earth,

"The Natural Liberty of Man,

11

as

"is to be free from any Superior Power

and not

to be under the Will

or

Legislative

Authority of Man,

but to have only the Law of Nature for

his Rule"

also 4,123).

(II.22;

The "Liberty of Man.

in

society." on the other hand, "is to be under no other Legislative Power,
Common-wealth ... "

but that established, by consent,

in the

Such liberty consists then in the lib-

erty "to follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule
[of

a

legitimately

established

legislative

power]

pre-

scribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man" (II.22).
The

practical

or

constitutional

corollary

of

this

principle of liberty is Locke's constant insistence upon
the consent of the governed as a necessary condition of
governmental legitimacy:

"And this is that, and that only,

which did, or could give beginning to any lawful Government
equal or random manner on all fit members of society.
I
believe that in this uncompromising assertion of military
obligation, Locke intends not to deny the unalienable right
to judge questions of legitimacy, but rather to guide the
manner in which that judgment is exercised.
He asserts
quite forcefully that members must accept their obligation
in circumstances of military necessity to risk or even sacrifice their lives in defense of the community, while he
indicates more quietly (in regard to this specific issue)
that no one need feel obliged to submit to the truly arbitrary, wanton, gratuitous squandering of human life.
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in the world" (II.99). 19

Locke may seem, however, to hold

onlY an extremely loose conception of consent, apparently
implying that at

least where the freedom to emigrate is

guaranteed, the mere fact of one's presence, let alone residence in a given territory is sufficient to constitute a
declaration of presumptive or tacit consent to the authority governing that territory.
And to this I say, that every Man, that hath any
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any _part of the Dominions
of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent,
and is as far forth obliged to the Obedience to the
Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any
one under it; whether this his Possession be of Land,
to him and his heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a
Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the
Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very
being of any one within the Territories of that
Government.
(II.119)
Whatever may be the

difficulties

inherent

in this

doctrine of consent, 20 they do not justify the conclusion
that,
forth

natural rights rhetoric notwithstanding,
an

ultimately

conventionalist,

account of the right of liberty.

perhaps

Locke sets
Hobbesian

The crucial test of the

unalienable character of this natural right consists in a
consideration of whether, as a practical matter, it can be
violated by government so as to activate a right of resistance on the part of subjects; it would be superfluous or
19 Also II.15,87,95,104,106,112,117,119-122,134,171,
175,192,198,227.
20 see especially Hume, "Of the Original Contract" (ed.
Aiken 1948, 356-372); also Dunn 1969, 126-147; Gough 1973,
52-79; Zvesper 1984; Grant 1987, 122-128.
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practically meaningless to speak of a natural, unalienable
right that can never be violated and therefore need never
be def ended.

Hobbes,

of course,

holds that there is no

unalienable right of liberty, and therefore that no claim
to liberty could ever serve as a sufficient justification
for an act of resistance.
his denial

that the

institution

and

The basis of this doctrine is

distinction between

commonwealth

by

commonweal th by

acquisition

carries

any

practical significance; since coercion is consistent with
consent, all governments in the world, one way or another,
govern with the consent of their subjects. 21

But unlike

Hobbes, Locke strongly denies the compatibility of coercion
with consent (especially II.176,186), and is therefore able
to hold that there is indeed a distinct right of liberty
whose violation can serve as a sufficient justification for
resistance.
One could perhaps infer this even from his account of
tacit consent, insofar as the mere presence of an individual

in a

given territory could conceivably constitute a

tacit declaration of consent only if it resulted from a
meaningful choice.

A government that denied the freedom of

emigration could not be presumed to bear the consent of its
subjects.

Would it therefore rule arbitrarily and illegit-

imately?

However that might be, the practical significance

21Leviathan,
chs.
14,19,20,21,29,
"A Review,
and
Conclusion" (ed. MacPherson 1968, 198, 239-240, 251-257,
261-270,

369-370, 718-722).
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of the right of liberty need not rest on mere inference.
In his discussion of the nature and consequences of governmental usurpation, Locke describes a pure usurpation as
kind of Domes tick Conquest, 11 which effects

II

11

a

a change only

of Persons, but not of the Forms and Rules of the Government"

(II .197).

He maintains further that such an act is

sufficient in itself to dissolve governmental legitimacy,
irrespective of whether the government

is guilty of any

actual violence against its subjects' persons or property:
Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the
Power, by other ways, than what the Laws of the
Community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed,
though the Form of the Commonwealth be still preserved;
since he is not the Person the Laws have appointed, and
consequently not the Person the People have consented
to.
(II.198; also 134,141,192,196,212,214-218).
This is not to deny that subjects may elect in some
cases not to exercise their right of resistance against a
usurper.

Rational

Lockean action is seldom a matter of

strict adherence to the theoretical doctrine of legitimacy,
but often depends in addition on prudential judgment.
jects may very well,

Sub-

and usually do, choose to legitimate

the power of a usurper, even of a conqueror, by a declaration of consent (II.20,178,192,198).

But what is primarily

significant for the present discussion is that governmental
legitimacy requires meaningful consent; that Locke provides
at least one class of examples illustrating the failure to
meet that requirement; and that in the event of such failure subjects are clearly within their rights to resist the
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power of government on the ground of liberty alone.
The implication that Locke's affirmations of an unalienable right of liberty are not merely rhetorical leads
us in turn, however,

to consider the relation between the

right of liberty and the right of life,
confront
these

in

rights

another
as

form

the question

unalienable.

and therewith to
of the status of

Understood

in

the

sense

indicated, the right of liberty as unalienable would seem
to be capable, at best, of an uneasy coexistence with that
of life.

To assert a right of liberty distinct from that

of self-preservation would mean, as illustrated above, to
assert a right to resist the power of a government held to
be illegitimate on grounds of pure (nontyrannical) usurpation.

It would thus mean to assert the right to risk one's

life in defense of one's liberty,

even in the absence of

any clear or immediate danger to one's own preservation.
The case of a pure usurpation would thus appear to render
questionable

the proposition that both

self-preservation

and liberty are natural and unalienable rights.
assume a

case in which a usurper steadfastly refused to

provide an opportunity for popular consent.
that

in

Let us

response

to

such

a

usurpation,

It would seem
subjects

could

choose to defend liberty for its own sake, thereby risking
their lives, or they could choose self-preservation, thereby failing to assert their right to free government,

to

government by the consent of the governed.

in

But how,
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such a case, could they exercise both rights simultaneously?

And if they could not, could Locke maintain that both

rights are unalienable?
constitute the

Do the rights of life and liberty

bases of alternative doctrines of natural

rights in Locke's thought, rather than elements of a single
doctrine? 22
It seems clear that Locke refuses to subordinate the
right of liberty to that of self-preservation.

At the same

time, he denies that the right of liberty can be understood
to be simply independent of the right of self-preservation.
For I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me
into his Power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased, when he had got me there, and destroy me too,
when he had a fancy to it:
for no body can desire to
have me in his Absolute Power, unless it be to compel
me by force to that, which is against the Right of my
Freedom, i.e. make me a Slave.
To be free from such
force is the only security of my Preservation:
and
reason bids me look on him, as an Enemy to my Preservation, who would take away that Freedom, which is the
Fence to it ... (II.17; also 18,23).
Locke seems thus to deny that there is an authentic tension
between the rights of self-preservation and liberty.

The

right of liberty, according to this statement, is a corollary of the right of self-preservation.

In the absence of

liberty, preservation cannot be secure.

Locke insists, in

effect, that the members of political society act according
to the suspicious, defensive presumption that, with respect
to their own well-being, the will of a nonconsensual ruler
is "inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary" (II.22), and
22 cf. Grant 1987, 88-98; Pangle 1988, 262-265.
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therefore that they regard any threat to their liberty as
containing in itself a direct threat to their preservation.
He thus resolves or avoids a tension between the two rights
not by reducing the right of liberty to the status of a
means

to

self-preservation,

but

rather by

enlarging his

conception of the latter so that it comprehends the defense
of liberty as well as that of mere life.
tion,

Self-preserva-

according to Locke, evidently means preservation of

oneself in freedom;

if it referred to the preservation of

mere, biological life, then it would be absurd to demand,
in circumstances presenting no immediate threat to their
biological survival,

that individuals risk their lives in

order to preserve them.

Such a demand appears to Locke not

as paradoxical or absurd, but to the contrary as a dictate
of rationality, only in the light of his enlarged conception of self-preservation.23
The natural

right of property requires a

bit more

elaboration, inasmuch as Locke employs the term "property"

23 rndeed Locke at one point goes so far as to suggest
somewhat ambiguously that in extreme, desperate circumstances, it may be rational not only to risk, but actually to
sacrifice one's life in the name of liberty.
Should a
slave find that "the hardship of his Slavery (note that
Locke refers specifically to the hardship of slavery, of
unfreedom, not to the merely physical hardship of labor]
out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by
resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the
Death he desires" (II.23}.
Cf. Windstrup 1981, 171-174;
Glenn 1984; Coby 1987, 8-9.
For further discussion of the
rationality, in Lockean terms, of both the acts of alienation and the assertions of unalienable rights that Locke
appears to insist upon, see chapter VI below, pp. 338-385.
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to refer,

even in its more narrow signification,

the object and the act of appropriation.

to both

Locke speaks of a

natural right of property as consisting in "a private Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind"

(II. 26), over a

particular resource in the natural, prepolitical condition.
This particularized property right derives from the act of
mixing one's labor with any portion of nature's common,
unappropriated resources,

subject to the limitations

posed by the law of nature.

im-

Everyone has by nature "a

Property in his own Person," in the "Labour of his Body,
and the Work of his Hands" (II.27).

The act of mixing that

labor with any portion of nature's commons effects an extension of the sphere of one's personal property or dominion.
In this way,
particular
basic

right

object
of

the right of property as applied to a
derives

property

from
as

and depends

appropriation,

upon a
upon

a

more
prior

right of mixing one's labor with a portion of nature. 24
One has a natural right thus to mix one's labor and appropriate, according to Locke,
sary to one's preservation.

in that such a right is necesBut Locke insists that this

appeal to self-preservation, which justifies and therefore
circumscribes the right of appropriation, must not be understood restrictively.

The law of nature does not imply

24 cf. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundation of Inequality. Part Two (ed. Masters 1964, 158).
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that appropriation is permissible only to the extent necessary to preserve mere life.

Rather, inasmuch as "preserva-

tion" in this context comprehends more broadly the "Support
and Comfort" as well as the maintenance of biological life,
the

law of nature according to Locke permits and indeed

even requires appropriation of as "much as any one can make
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils"
26,31).

(II.25,

The natural right of property "in the Beginning"

signifies most fundamentally the right to appropriate from
the natural commons whatever one can use without endangering the preservation of others (II.27,31,33,36,46).
In considering the fate of the property right in the
wake of the advent of political society, let us conceive of
property first as ownership of a particular object.

Locke

holds that the earliest, most basic function of government
with respect to this right is to settle claims "which Labour and Industry began"
date government.
erty

(II.45; 38,50), claims that pre-

But it is clear that such claims of prop-

in particular goods cannot exemplify an unalienable

right of property;

it is clearly within the proprietors'

rights to alienate such claims by consent,

whether par-

tially to government in the payment of taxes, or wholly to
others in private contractual exchanges (II.138,140). 25
25 Moreover, to read Locke's claim of an unalienable
right of property as referring only to particular properties acquired in the state of nature and carried over into
civil society would be to make nonsense of its allegedly
universal character.
For if Locke does not assume that
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What is unalienable in the natural right of property
must therefore inhere in its more basic form as a right of
appropriation.

Yet this right too seems to undergo serious

modification in the transition to civil society.
advent of civil society,

After the

the right of property or estate

can no longer derive directly from the act of laboring in
the natural commons; 26 within the bounds of an established
community, all land is either the private property of individuals or is "the joint property of this Countrey, or this
Parish"
consent,

(II.35), and therefore can be appropriated only by
or

in

conformity with the

positive law.

This

modification of the original right of appropriation applies
particularly to "some parts of the World,

(where the In-

crease of People and Stock, with the Use of Money) had made
Land scarce"

(II.45), or where "the Invention of Money ...

introduced (by Consent)
them"

(II.36).

larger Possessions, and a Right to

For this reason Locke emphasizes that only

in the past, "in the first Ages of the World," the "Law Man

everyone in the state of nature succeeds in acquiring a
significant portion of property, then such a narrow reading
of the content of this right would serve to validate C.B.
MacPherson's well-known objection that at least the Lockean
property right applies not universally but instead only to
a particular class, to the relatively few "Industrious and
Rational" acquirers (II. 34) . See MacPherson 1962, 236-251.
26 Locke does refer to "the Ocean" as "that great and
still remaining Common of Mankind" (II. 30) , implying that
the original mode of appropriation is not entirely a thing
of the past.
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was under, was rather for appropriating" (II.35,36) . 27

The

members of civil society, especially those of an advanced
or fully civilized society,

can in most cases appropriate

no longer directly from nature, but instead only by means
of contractual exchanges.

The original law of appropria-

tion "would still hold" if the invention of money had not
"introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to
them" (II.36, emphasis supplied; also 45,50,85).
This

mediation

of

the

right

of

appropriation

by

mutual consent or contract, by agreements whose validity,
interpretation,

and enforcement depend upon positive law,

clearly indicates the conventional aspect of that right in
the context of civil society.

Locke appears even to stress

this conventionalism, in declaring that "in Governments the
Laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of
land is determined by positive constitutions" (II.50; also
42,45,138).

It would be incorrect to infer, however, that

the right of appropriation in civil society is wholly or
even decisively conventional.
common ownership,

"Man

In the original condition of

(by being Master of himself,

and

Proprietor of his own Person, and the actions or Labour of
it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property"
(II.44); and notwithstanding his usage of the past tense,
27 Also II.32,37,38,44,45,46,51.
On this point, as
well as in the following general discussion of the Lockean
property right, I am indebted most heavily to the works of
Strauss and Pangle.
On the particular point, see Strauss
1953, 237-238; Pangle 1988, 161-164.
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it is evident that in Locke's view, individuals in contemporary civilized society still do have in themselves the
foundation of property,

indeed to a

than they did in the beginning.
the great foundation

much greater extent

Human labor constitutes

of property,

for Locke,

not in its

primitive expression as a gathering faculty, but rather in
its more mature, revealing expression as the faculty that
produces or creates material wealth.

Labor "makes the far

greatest part of the value of things,
World"
its

we enjoy

in this

(II.42), according to Locke, above all by virtue of

capacity,

through the

application of

"Invention and

Arts" (II.44), to multiply its own productive powers.

Thus

conceived as the power to produce value, human labor is the
fundamental property that creates all more particular forms
of property.

Irrespective, therefore, of the availability

of any natural commons--irrespective of the ultimate consequence of the liberation of individuals' acquisitive faculties,

introducing

"larger

Possessions,

and

a

Right

to

them"--everyone upon entering political society possesses
at least this property,

and at least this much is govern-

ment charged with the task of preserving.
For the preservation of Property being the end of
Government, and that for which Men enter into Society,
it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People
should have Property. without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entring into Society, which was
the end for which they entered into it, too gross an
absurdity for any Man to own (II.138; also 40).
Possessing this natural property in their own labor

51
power,

individuals become members of political society in

order to secure governmental protection for the development
and the rational disposal of that labor power.

Still, it

is necessary to consider how in this context individuals
can convert their personal property in their labor power
into

forms

of

property

preservation and comfort,

more

directly

useful

for

their

and to consider the nature of

government's obligation to promote or assist this process
of conversion.

There can be no doubt that Locke views the

contractual exchange of one's labor power for a wage as
compatible, at least in ordinary cases, with the right of
disposal over one's own person and labor. 28

"Their Persons

are free by a Native Right, and their Properties, be they
more or less, are their own. and at their own dispose ... 11
(II.194;

also

But

2,28,29,77,85).

the

question

arises

whether or to what extent this right of self-disposal is
subject to rational limitation.

In his account of human-

kind's original alteration of the natural condition of common (purely potential) ownership, Locke appears to imply an
ordinary conjunction
such as they were,
"first

Ages,"

in

of the

productive powers· of labor,

and its acquisitive powers.
other

words,

when

laboring

predominantly or exclusively in gathering,
produced and acquired in a single act.

In the
consisted

one ordinarily

But in the context

28 see the effective refutation of Tully's argument to
the contrary (1980, 135-154) by Neal Wood (1984, 73-92).
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of civil society,

this appears at least in many cases no

1onger to hold true.

The "Servant" or wage- laborer,

or

indeed anyone who is not self-employed, who is able to apply labor power only to materials owned by another,

ac-

quires not immediately in the act of producing, but instead
only mediately, with the level of acquisition in such cases
determined by the contractually established level of rent
or wages (II.194).
The

question then arises

concerning the

degree to

which Lockean justice permits persons with property only in
their own labor power to alienate their native "Title to
the product

of

[their]

honest

Industry."

In his brief

discussion in the First Treatise of the right and duty of
charity,

Locke recognizes that economic

inequalities may

give rise to relationships no less coercive in their effect
than those based on inequalities in more direct forms of
power.
As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of
his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his
Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man
a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will
keep him from extream want, where he has no means to
subsist otherwise; and a Man can no more justly make
use of another's necessity, to force him to become his
Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him
to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has
more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to
his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer
him Death or Slavery.
(TT I.42)
Locke's condemnation of the practice of thus taking advantage

of

the

necessitous

seems unmistakable,

as does

by

implication also his denial that such manipulation could
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create any obligation on the part of its object.

All the

more mysterious, then, is the immediate sequel, wherein he
appears

to minimize considerably the

He intended in the latter, he seems

preceding paragraph.
to declare now,

implication of the

only to argue that the practice of such

manipulation by the wealthy
would not prove that Propriety in Land ... gave any
Authority over the Persons of Men, but only that
Compact might;
since the Authority of the Rich
Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar
began not from the Possession of the Lord, but the
Consent of the poor Man, who preferr'd being his
Subject to starving.
(I.43; emphasis added.)
It is necessary to observe that Locke does not thus
imply a judgment of the legitimacy of such subjection, but
only that,

if it were legitimate,

that legitimacy would

derive from compact or consent, not from the prior inequality of ownership.

Nonetheless, this equivocation concern-

ing what is, in any event, a severely limited duty of charity29 compels us to question whether Locke holds all such
contracts valid and thus mutually obligatory, regardless of
the real inequalities that may underlie them.
us to question,

the ref ore,

whether the natural

property according to Locke reappears

It compels
right of

in the context of

civil society as nothing more than an absolute right of
individual

freedom

of

contract,

or

even,

as

MacPherson

29 strauss 1953, 236-237, 246-248; Tarcov 1984, 141149; Pangle 1988, 143-144, 161-162, 169.
For contrary
views,
see Dunn 1969, 204-228; Tully 1980, 131-154.
Seliger (1968, 173-179) seems to occupy a middle ground.
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charges,

as

an

ultimately

absurd

unalienable

right

to

alienate one's freedom. 3 0
In exploring the basis of this charge, one can hardly
deny that after a certain point in the evolution of civil
society, according to the account in the Second Treatise,
the natural

law command to leave enough and as good

in

common for others is in its strict sense superseded by the
advent

of

conditions

making

it

rational

to

appropriate

beyond what is of direct use for oneself and one's family.
This does not mean, however, that Locke attempts to justify
unlimited individual appropriation without regard for its
social consequences.

The spirit of the old sufficiency

limitation persists, of necessity, in the context of Lockean civil society.

It is plain in Locke's view "that Men

have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of
the Earth"

(II.50; also 36).

by definition a
claim

that

an

rational act;
irrational

Such agreement or consent is
it would make no sense to

creature

could make

a

binding

agreement, or that a rational creature could incur an obligation by an irrational agreement.

"(No] rational Creature

can be supposed to change his condition with an intention
to be worse" (II.131).

The agreement among human beings or

among "the Civiliz'd part of Mankind"
strict

sufficiency

limitation

and

(II.30) to drop the

accept

the

consequent

widening of material inequality could not be a valid agree30MacPherson 1962, 246.
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ment unless it held forth a reasonable promise of improved
conditions for all.
this promise

Locke holds that the reasonableness of

is already evident in a

conditions in his own country,
most part privately

comparison between

in which land is for the

(and unequally)

owned,

and those in

America, whose resources remain in general unimproved:

"a

King of a large fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and
is clad worse than a day Labourer in England" (II.41).
implication is that according to Locke,

The

no government or

political-economic regime can c·laim legitimacy that promotes or permits the systematic impoverishment of its members.
It

is

in

keeping

with

this

principle

that

Locke

stresses the importance, but also the limitations, of the
principle of freedom of contract as constitutive of the
property right of individuals in civil society.

The ameli-

oration of the natural condition of material scarcity or
penury depends upon the rational application of the potentially immense productive powers of human labor (II.32,4044).

But the natural condition offers at best incomplete

incentives

for

individuals

to

develop

significantly

productive powers inherent in their own labor.

the

Therefore

"the increase of lands and the right employing of them is
the great art of government;" Locke declares it proper to
the rational,

or indeed "wise and godlike" prince "by es-

tablished laws of liberty to secure protection and incour-

56
agement to the honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of power and narrownesse of Party" (II.42).

More

specifically, given that human beings are unequal in their
capacities and inclinations to labor productively,

it is

the task of a Lockean government to protect and encourage
the activity of the productive, or "Industrious and Rational" portion of humanity (II.34), and by implication to promote the enlargement of that class.

To be sure, the ful-

fillment of this task as Locke understands it will require
on the part of government a considerable respect for the
principle of freedom of contract, insofar as that principle
facilitates

the mobility and the

rational

employment of

labor and capital according to the laws of the market.

It

will require the protection of profits gained through the
productive

investment of fairly acquired capital,

but it

will require no less urgently the countervailing protection
of the individual laborer's "Title to the product of his
honest Industry" (I.42).

It will require that the contract

between laborer and employer preserve, not sunder the connection between the
powers.

The

laborer's productive and acquisitive

"spirit of capitalism" does

indeed find an

early expression in the Two Treatises, 31 provided that it
be understood as the spirit of a rationally regulated capitalism.

The power of government, as Locke repeatedly in-

31 strauss 1953, 246.
Cf. also MacPherson 1962, 194262 with Seliger 1968, 141-208.
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sists, is to be employed for "the Regulating and Preserving
of Property" (II.3, emphasis added; also 120,139). 3 2
From all this it is evident that Locke's account of
justice in political society neither requires nor permits
the total alienation of one's natural right of property or
appropriation,

whether by the fundamental social contract

or by particular agreements among the members.
the ambiguity of his discussion,
analysis

Whatever

Locke does in the final

indicate sufficiently his

insistence upon tran-

scending the bare principle of individual freedom of contract in order to effect a more meaningful guarantee of the
right of property or appropriation for all members of civil
society.

The right of nature persists within civil society

as the right to develop one's capacity for "honest industry," one's productive-acquisitive faculty, 33 and therefore
to

judge

the

legitimacy

of

government

according,

among

other criteria, to its performance in protecting the development of this faculty against its coercion, mutilation or
exploitation by others.
32 see I.41, where Locke rejects absolute monarchy as
imcompatible with the "the great Design of God, Increase
and Multiply ... " It would be unreasonable, in view of this
design, to make humankind "depend upon the Will of a Man
for their Subsistence, who should have power to destroy
them all when he pleased ... " It would seem that conformity
with the same design would require Locke to condemn as well
such relationships of absolute dependence and willfulness
when they involved not rulers and subjects, but instead
private owners and laborers in civil society.
3 3 The term is Strauss'(1953, 246).
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Seen in this light, the prominence that Locke accords
the conventional aspect of property rights in civil society
appears intended to underline the need for caution on the
part of subjects who may appeal to such rights in judging
the dissolution of governmental authority. 34

He considers

it prudent to counsel such caution in view of the consideration that,

although government is indeed obliged to pro-

mote material

improvement through the protection and en-

couragement of honest industry, the principles that govern
its attempts at fulfilling that obligation tend to be prudential and variable in nature,
governing men"

belonging to the "art of

rather than to the more theoretical

trine of governmental legitimacy. 35
subjects to suffer quietly a

doc-

Locke seems to advise

certain degree of

innocent

34 rf so, Locke's treatment of this issue could be seen
as part of a more general attempt at stressing the limited
potential of the doctrine of unalienable individual rights
for unraveling the social fabric.
Cf. note 20 above, and
also his disclaimer concerning the power of the doctrine in
cases of "manifest" but isolated "Acts of Tyranny," II.208:
"For if it reach no farther than some private Mens Cases,
though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force, what by unlawful force is taken from them;
yet the Right to do so, will not easily ingage them in a
Contest, where they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one or a few oppressed Men to disturb the Government, where the Body of the People do not think themselves
concerned in it, as for a raving mad Man, or heady Malecontent to overturn a well-settled State ... "
3511 Politics

contains two parts very different the one
from the other, the one containing the original of societies and the rise and extent of political power, the other,
the art of governing men in society" ( "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and study For a Gentleman," in Axtell, ed.,
1968, 400). See Tarcov 1984, 5-7.
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governmental bungling in economic matters, and to take as a
violation of trust only a willful, deliberate,

systematic

assault on their capacities or opportunities honestly to
improve their material conditions.
ventional,

The ultimate,

noncon-

if necessarily somewhat imprecise standard for

Lockean subjects to judge the question of legitimacy lies
in whether government acts "to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects" (II.135).

THE QUESTION OF FOUNDATIONS
Having thus defined the core triad of rights that
substantiate Locke's doctrine of justice, we can now begin
to address questions more directly pertinent to our inquiry,

questions concerning the basis of the doctrine.

How

can Locke justify his claim that justice consists in the
securing

of

life,

liberty,

possible, for all?

and property,

insofar as

is

By what virtue or by what dispensation

do human beings merit the protection of these rights?
according to Locke,

Why,

do we merit the protection of these

rights and not others?

How are we capable of knowing the

answers to these questions?

To this partial enumeration

one could add many other questions of at least equal difficulty.

It is best to beg in, however, by considering the

various suggestions that Locke makes concerning the basis
of his doctrine,

immediately upon introducing it in the

Second Treatise.
The first such suggestion appears to constitute less
an argument,

in the strict sense of the term, than a pre-

emptive proposition that no genuine argument is necessary
for

the

Locke

establishment

begins

by

of

the

presenting

the

natural

rights

principles

of

doctrine.
political

justice or legitimacy as corollaries of his understanding
of

the

natural

condition

of humankind:
60

"To understand
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political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we
must

consider

what

state

More precisely,

(II.4).

all

Men

are

naturally

•
in
... II

he presents those principles as

corollaries of the fundamental principle of natural human
freedom and equality:

11

•••

Reason ... teaches al 1 Mankind,

who will but consult it, that all being equal and independent,

no one ought to harm another in his Life,

Liberty, or Possessions"

(II.6).

Health,

Concerning the basis of

this principle of natural freedom and equality itself, he
offers the following:
there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures
of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all
the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same
faculties, should also be equal one amongst another
without Subordination or Subjection ...
(II.4)
What is initially noteworthy in this brief, ambiguous
remark is that in using the phrase "nothing more evident,"
Locke may appear to rest the principle of equal natural
rights on a self-evident proposition,
intuitively to be true.

a proposition known

That he intends at least to pre-

sent this appearance is more strongly evident in the immediate sequel, wherein he offers rhetorical support for his
claim

by

appealing

to

the

authority

of

"the

Judicious

Hooker," who according to Locke regards the principle of
natural human equality "as so evident in itself, and beyond
all question ... 11 (II. 5). 36
36 see also II.11, where Locke appears to go beyond the
principle of intuition or self-evidence to imply that knowledge of at least one of the precepts of natural right is
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The

suggestion,

however,

that

Locke's

doctrine

of

natural rights is or could be grounded in a self-evident
principle of natural equality,

or for that matter in any

self-evident moral principle, involves several insuperable
difficulties.

The first appears in the fact that, through-

out the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and especially
in its first book, Locke launches a thorough and systematic
attack on a very closely related argument.
this attack,

In the wake of

it is very difficult to see how the case for

natural rights could be sustained on the basis of an appeal
to a moral

intuition,

and similarly difficult to believe

that Locke could intend such an appeal as the basis of his
most serious argument; he nowhere offers a defense of the
principle of moral intuitionism against the arguments with
which he himself assails it.
The outlines of the relevant portions of this attack
are as follows.

The Essay's chapter entitled "Of the De-

grees of Our Knowledge" contains an explanation of the concept of self-evidence or intuition. Intuitive knowledge, in
Locke's understanding,

carries the highest degree of cer-

tainty of which the mind is capable.

It is "irresistible;"

or was innate in human beings; as the story of Cain and
Abel illustrates, in Locke's reading,-the proposition that
there is a natural right to punish or even to destroy criminals was written, at least at that time, "so plain ... in
the Hearts of all Mankind."
On innatism as the basis of
knowledge of Lockean natural right, see Laslett 1960, 9495.
On self-evidence as the basis, see Yolton 1958, 479482,487-489; White 1978, 10-59. For an argument similar to
the one presented here, see Zuckert 1987, 329-334.
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it "forces itself immediately to be perceived ... and leaves
no

room

for

4.2.1).

Hesitation,

Doubt,

or

Examination"

(ECHU

Intuitions are simply and immediately compelling.

Insofar as we are rational, we assent to them upon recognition,

as soon as we grasp the meanings of the relevant
They neither require nor allow any ratiocinative

terms.

defense or justification; a claim of intuition is in effect
a claim that a given proposition is beyond argumentation,
that one must simply recognize it and assent to it.

There-

fore, to assert that a self-evident proposition constitutes
the foundation of morality or justice would be to assert
that the foundation of morality or justice is unquestionable.
Locke argues that assertions of this kind are above
all false; useless if not false; and in any event dangerous.
the

They are false in that it is hardly absurd, but to
contrary perfectly possible

and

sensible to

inquire

concerning the reasoning underlying any moral proposition:
"I

think,

there

cannot

any one moral Rule be propos'd,

whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason:

which would

be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or
so much as self-evident" (ECHU 1.3.4; emphasis partly supplied).

From those who would yet maintain a doctrine of

unquestionable

moral

principles,

Locke

demands

a

clear

specification of the criteria whereby we could identify a
given proposition as properly intuitive or self-evident.
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rn

view

of

the

absence

of

precisely

such

criteria,

he

raises an objection fatal to the practical utility of the
doctrine of innate principles, and by implication no less
fatal to that of the doctrine of self-evident moral truths:
.•. if it be the privilege of innate Principles, to be
received upon their own Authority, without examination,
I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's
Principles can be questioned.
If they may, and ought
to be examined, and tried, I desire to know how first
and innate Principles can be tried; or at least it is
reasonable to demand the marks and characters, whereby
the genuine, innate Principles, may be distinguished
from others; that so, amidst the great variety of Pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a
point as this ... From what has been said, I think it is
past doubt, that there are no practical Principles
wherein all Men agree; and therefore none innate.
(1.3.27; also 1.3.14,20,26,27)
The absence of validating criteria points, moreover,
to the peculiar dangerousness of assertions of unquestionable moral principles, lying in their peculiar susceptibility to authoritarian abuse.

Locke is acutely sensitive in

this respect to the potential implications of both intuitionism and innatism, as applied to morality:

"Nothing can

be so dangerous, as Principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern Morality,

which

influence

Men's

Lives,

biass to all their Actions" (ECHU 4.12.4). 37
greatest

practical

importance

rationally defensible;

to

that

accord

moral

any moral

and give

a

rt is of the
principles

be

principles a

privileged exemption from the requirement of rational sup37 on the authoritarian implications of the principle
of self-evidence or intuition, see White 1978, 14-20.
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port would be to invite the degeneration of moral discourse
into sheer arbitrariness,

into a mere contest of opposing

Underlining the practical urgency of this danger,

wills.

according to Locke,

is the fact that "great numbers

are

ready at any time to seal with their Blood" the principles
they

most

cherish

(ECHU

1. 3.

27,

also

a

26):

state

of

theoretical or intellectual war tends to culminate in a
state of actual war, of war in the most literal sense.
Moreover,
tial

the difficulties inherent in Locke's ini-

suggestion extend beyond those general difficulties

that beset any claim to intuitive knowledge of moral principles.
still

An additional problem concerns his specific,
somewhat

ambiguous

natural moral equality.

assertion

of

the

principle

if
of

In his initial formulations con-

cerning the ground of his doctrine of political legitimacy,
Locke

leaves

it unclear whether he means that there

nothing more evident than the fundamental
species equality,

or instead that there

fact

is

of human

is nothing more

evident than that the principle of natural moral equality
is an

implication of that

latter be established. 38
point,

fundamental

fact,

however the

Whatever his intention on that

it is evident that the power of intuition alone is

38 cf. II.4, where Locke appears to hold that there be
"nothing more evident" than the inference of natural moral
equality from the given, more basic fact of species equality, with II.5, where Locke attributes to Hooker the more
ambiguous opinion that "This equality of Men by Nature" is
"so evident in it self, and beyond all question ... "
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insufficient to establish the truth of either proposition.
If we take for granted that there is such a thing as the
human species,

then we are indeed committed to assent to

some conception of human equality, as contained already in
But why should we take

the definition of what is human.
this

for

granted?

In

response

to the proposition that

human species equality is a self-evident truth, one might
reasonably ask:

Equal in what respects?

By what criteria,

by reference to what common properties or faculties, are we
to define what

is human?

Moreover,

even if we were in

possession of an adequate definition of the species,

the

proposition of natural human moral equality might not necessarily or self-evidently 39 follow.
to ask further:

We would be required

Of what moral significance are those com-

mon, defining properties or faculties?

How are we to de-

cide whether human beings constitute a single species,

in

the morally most decisive respects?
Surely no intuition, but instead only the most careful,

exhaustive empirical investigation can provide for us

the answers to such questions.

Locke's own somewhat cryp-

39 Locke applies the notion of intuition to all propositions whose truth or falsity is immediately perceptible;
thus it can apply not only to the first principles of
reasoned arguments, but also to any proposition appearing
anywhere in the course of a given argument, so long as it
follows immediately from its previously established premises.
"Now, in every step Reason makes in demonstrative
Knowledge. there is an intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement, it seeks, with the next intermediate
Idea, which it uses as a Proof" (ECHU 4.2.7).
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tic reference to "Creatures of the same species and rank
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature,
and the use of the same faculties"
firm this conclusion.

(II.4) appears to con-

Knowledge of those "advantages" and

"faculties" simply does not arise intuitively, but must be
acquired through empirical investigation.

In order to know

the law of nature, one must consult "Reason," or become "a
studier of that Law"

(II. 6, 12) . 40

In this way, a careful

consideration of Locke's initial suggestion of intuition or
self-evidence as the mode of knowledge proper to the principles of justice leads to the conclusion that the justification

of those principles

requires

an argument of an

altogether different order.
Almost immediately after making that initial suggestion,

Locke does indeed offer an additional and radically

different suggestion,

although in this case too he seems

initially to abstract from and yet ultimately to imply the
need for an empirically grounded account of human nature.
He indicates the main thrust of this alternative foundational argument as follows:
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent,
and infinitely Wise Maker; All the Servants of one
Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order
and about his business, they are his Property, whose
Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not
one another's Pleasure.
(II.6)
According to this argument, the status of human beings as

40 strauss 1953, 225; Colman 1983, 178.
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God's workmanship and therefore God's property imposes on
each a

set of obligations that can be summarized as the

corollaries

of

the

basic

duty to

preserve oneself

and,

subject to certain qualifications, to preserve the rest of
humankind as well (II.6).

Natural rights must then derive

from human beings' obligations as God's creatures; we can
surrender our natural

rights only to the extent that we

thereby enhance the preservation of ourselves or of society
or of the rest of humankind, because our lives and persons
are not our own property, but are only entrusted to us by
God.
This

"workmanship

thesis"

rests

apparently

upon

a

considerable body of textual evidence, 41 and in the opinion
of several scholarly commentators expresses Locke's deepest, authentic intention with respect to the foundation of
morality and justice. 42
in any other work,

Neither in the Second Treatise nor

however,

does Locke present a system-

atic, detailed elaboration of the claim that the principles
of justice derive from the status of human beings as God's
workmanship.

Instead he forces his readers to construct or

to reconstruct the relevant arguments,
possible,

out

of

the

partial

or

insofar as

fragmentary

it

is

suggestions

41 see I.30,53,86; II.6,56,79; ECHU 4.3.18, 4.13.3.
42The most elaborate statement of this argument appears in Tully 1980, especially 3-4, 34-51.
See also Laslett 1960, 106; Colman 1983, 187-190; Shapiro 1986, 96-108;
Ashcraft 1987, 35-47.
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that he scatters throughout his works.

The following are

the basic issues involved in that claim.

If Locke would

prove that divine workmanship or creation is the basis of
natural rights, then he must demonstrate not only that God
exists,

but also that God has created and legislated for

humanity, and that the securing of natural and unalienable
rights

constitutes

design. 43

the

fulfillment

of

God's

legislative

Locke must demonstrate the manner and the sub-

stance, at least with respect to the question of justice,
of God's revelation of His intentions for human beings.
In his various discussions of the matter, Locke considers two possible modes of divine revelation.

God could

reveal His intentions either directly, by a positive, immediate declaration of His will to a

particular person or

persons at a particular historical moment,

or indirectly,

through an order or logic inherent in His creation and in
principle apprehensible by rational persons at all times
and places. 44
fectly

literal

On the basis of a somewhat selective, imperreading of the Lockean corpus,

one could

receive the impression that Locke holds God's intentions to
43 see the description of the law of
I.101, V.159, VIII.211.
Cf. Strauss 1953,
Strauss 1959.

nature at LN
202-204; also

44 For Locke's discussion of positive revelation, see
especially ECHU 4.18, where he uses the term "revelation"
to refer exclusively to acts of particular, immediate,
historical revelation.
Elsewhere, however, Locke makes no
strict separation between revelation and natural knowledge; see, for instances, ECHU 4.19.4, and cu 23.
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be

adequately

either

of

revealed

these

or

possible

regard to the first,

rationally
modes

of

accessible

through

communication.

With

for instance, Locke occasionally pro-

claims the truth or the authenticity of Christianity as the
positive revelation of God's will, 45 and proclaims similarly that the New Testament contains or provides the ground
for the true morality. 46

With regard to the second, Locke

proclaims in his earlier as well as his later works that
God's intentions are indeed accessible to the mind unassisted by any positive revelation, whether through an order
manifest in his creation 47 ,

or more simply as implicit in

the related facts of the existence of an intelligent God,
and human dependence on that God.
As

several

commentators

have

observed I 48

however,

Locke fails to provide demonstrative support for either of
these claims,

despite his own insistence on the need for

such support.

With respect to the former, for instance, he

insists that revelation be subjected to the test of reason,
45 ECHU 3.9.23; RC 237,239,240; Works 4.96, 6.144-45,
356,424.
46 works 1823, 3.296; STCE 185; RC 239-245.
47 cf. LN I.95-97: "there is nothing in all this world
so unstable, so uncertain that it does not recognize authoritative and fixed laws which are suited to its own nature." Also RC 143; ECHU 1.2.25, 2.1.15, 2.7.4, 2.10.3.
48 cf. Strauss 1953, 202-226; Strauss 1959; Cox 1960,
45-62; Laslett 1960, 92-96,101,106; Ashcraft 1969, 203-208,
214-223; Dunn 1969, 94-95,187-194, and 1984, 65ff,84ff;
Helm 1973; Bluhm et al 1980; Yolton 1985, 76-91,98.
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that

it

is

both

possible

and

necessary

to

authentic from inauthentic claims to revelation:

distinguish
"Whatever

GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made
of it.

This is the proper Object of Faith:

But whether it

be a divine Revelation or no, Reason must judge ... "
4.18.10;
1954,

also

4.16.14,

275-277). ·

4.18.6,

4.19.3,10,14;

von

(ECHU
Leyden

How then can reason make this judgment?

Locke observes that "the holy Men of old, who had Revelations from GOD,

had something else besides that internal

Light of assurance in their own Minds, to testify to them,
that it was from GOD."

This "something else" consisted in

the "outward Signs," the "visible Signs" or miracles that
they were given in order to persuade themselves and others
of the authenticity of God's message (4.19.15; also Works
1823, 7.135,138).
miraculous,

How then can reason identify the truly

or distinguish authentic miracles

from other

forms of "extraordinary Signs" (4.19.16)?4 9
At this point Locke becomes quite elusive.

He breaks

off his discussion of the relation between reason and faith
without even confronting directly the question concerning
the authentication of miracles, excusing himself only with
the strikingly unhelpful addendum that he is

49 A complete discussion of the issue of miracles would
address also a prior question, namely, whether or how one
could establish confidence in the actual occurrence of an
extraordinary event, let alone in its miraculous character.
For Locke's somewhat ambiguous statements on this question,
see ECHU 4.15.6,4.16.9,10,13,14.
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far from denying, that GOD can, or doth sometimes
enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain
Truths, or excite them to Good Actions by the immediate
influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without
any extraordinary Signs accompanying it.
But in such
Cases too we have Reason and the Scripture, unerring
Rules to know whether it be from GOD or no ... Where
Reason or Scripture is express for any Opinion or
Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority ...
(4.19.16)
In other words, Locke concludes the Essay's discussion of
reason and faith by claiming either that we should simply
assume the divine authority of Scripture, that is, assume
the truth of the proposition whereof he has encouraged us
to

demand

a

reasoned

demonstration,

or

that

we

should

recognize the divine authority of any proposition for which
reason is "express," although he provides for us no satisfactory

explanation

of

how

reason

can

authenticate

the

specific claim of Scriptural revelation. 50
50 rn "A Discourse of Miracles" (1702), Locke offers a
loose or permissive definition of a miracle as "a sensible
operation, which, being above the comprehension of the
spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established
course of nature, is taken by him to be divine" (ed. Ramsey
1958, 79). He justifies the permissiveness of this definition at least in part on utilitarian grounds:
a more
strict definition of miracles as "operations contrary to
the fixed and established laws of Nature," or, stricter
yet, as "such divine operations as are in themselves beyond
the power of all created beings," would mean that "the use
of them would be lost, if not to all mankind, yet at least
to the simple and illiterate (which is the far greatest
part) ... " Since "the philosophers alone, if at least they
can pretend to determine" the (physical) laws of nature,
and no one can determine the extent of the power of the
beings created above humankind but beneath the level of
God, Locke doubts "whether any man learned or unlearned,
can in most cases be able to say of any particular operation ... that it is certainly a miracle" (86).
Against the
related objections that the more permissive definition
relativizes miracles and therefore invalidates them as
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Let us turn then to consider the basis of Locke's
alternative claim that divine revelation is accessible in
principle to all

rational

creatures through an order or

logic inherent in God's creation.

At times Locke suggests

in this vein the possibility of an apparently simple, almost entirely nonempirical deduction, holding that the bare
fact of creation by an intelligent God can suffice as the
basis of a demonstration of God's intentions (ECHU 4.3.18,
4.13.3).

We can construct or reconstruct the outlines of

this argument as follows.

Human beings possess an intui-

tive awareness of our own existence and intelligence; human
existence is not eternal,
impossible that
gent being,

but had a beginning;

intelligent could evolve

if it is

from unintelli-

then it follows ultimately that human beings

testimony of divine revelation, he contends that "the
carrying with it of a greater power than appears in opposition to it" can serve as "a sufficient inducement" to identify "any extraordinary operation" as a miracle (82).
In
cases in which miracles are alleged to attest opposing or
contradictory "missions," in other words, the truth lies
with the manifestation of the greater supernatural power.
But this response itself raises a number of difficult questions.
How are we to judge cases in which there is no
direct opposition, or none at all, between "extraordinary
operations"? In cases wherein there is such opposition, is
the mere fact of superior power sufficient to establish
divinity, or is a certain minimum degree of power required?
How does one judge precisely the degrees of power exhibited? Would not such judgment itself presuppose knowledge of
the power of nature's resistance to supernatural forces,
and thus presuppose knowledge of the laws of nature? Locke
directly addresses none of these questions, commenting only
that "perhaps" the authentication of miracles by their
apparent superior power, "as it is the plainest, so it is
also the surest way to preserve the testimony of miracles
in its due force to all sorts and degrees of people" {86).

74
must be the creatures of an eternal being of superior power
and intelligence, which we may call "God"

(4.10.2-7); be-

cause human beings are created by and dependent upon God,
human beings are God's property,

subject to his dominion

and obliged to obey His commands (I.52-54; II.56); an intelligent God could only have created intelligently, purposively;

therefore human beings are obliged to preserve

themselves and their species,

or not willfully to destroy

themselves or others (II.6).

The fundamental natural law

and right of preservation would thus derive from the fact
of God's creation.
Once again, however, one might question the completeness of this reasoning.

From the bare premise of God's

purposive creation, how much can we really infer concerning
the substance of God's purposes or commands?
ing the obligation of self-preservation,

In elaborat-

Locke

indicates

that each is bound "not to quit his Station wilfully"

(TT

II.6); but how does the principle of workmanship alone aid
us in determining what constitutes willfulness or arbitrariness in the eyes of God?

Locke's own reasoning concerning

the case of animals calls attention to the question.
is

no

less

human beings.

Creator of the

"inferior creatures"

God

than of

But Locke maintains unambiguously that human

beings may rightfully destroy any inferior creature "where
some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it"
(II.6; also I.85-87).

Is it then inconceivable that a su-
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premely intelligent and wise Creator could intend for human
beings as well some "nobler use" than their bare preservation?

The argument from the fact of purposive creation ap-

pears thus incomplete, in leaving unclear the full content
of God's intentions or commands for human beings,

or the

specific end in view of which natural rights are to be protected.
It

is perhaps

in view of this

incompleteness that

Locke immediately supplements or elaborates the workmanship
argument by calling attention again to the basis of natural
jural equality; human beings are by nature equal in rights,
Locke now states, by virtue of the unity and dignity of the
species, "being furnished with like Faculties," and "sharing all in one Community of Nature" (II.6).
prompts the

reader to ask:

He thus again

What specifically are these

"like Faculties," these "same advantages of Nature?"
does the sharing in them constitute human beings,
juridically decisive respect,
cies and rank"

(II. 4)?

Why

in the

"Creatures of the same spe-

How are God's intentions or com-

mands for human beings revealed in the order of creation,
in the nature and natural condition that God provides us?
Having reached these questions, we have travelled a
full circle, in a sense, in order to come to a preliminary
conclusion.

The initially divergent paths onto which Locke

guides his readers in the search for the basis of justice
do converge, but prematurely, short of the ultimate desti-
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nation.

Through a careful examination of the "workman-

ship" argument as well as of the apparent appeal to selfevidence, we come finally and inescapably to confront the
question of nature.
theology,
law,

Whether one begins with philosophy or

or inclines toward the primacy of rights or of

Locke renders

it

impossible fully

or adequately to

understand the substance of his theory of justice without
understanding

what,

finally,

is

the

nature

to which he

holds the rights of life, liberty, and property appropriate.51

51 cf. in this respect the work of Geraint Parry, who
argues that Locke's political theory can and must be understood apart from its "theological substructure." The basis
of this argument is the opinion that "Neither Locke's theology nor his epistemology entails his political conclusions" ( 1978, 13) .
The basis of the present attempt at
abstracting, to a considerable extent, the substance of
Lockean justice from Lockean theology is the opinion that
that very theology invites such an abstraction.
As Mansfield puts it, Locke "leaves one trail for the sceptical
and another for the pious, the latter more plainly marked
but leading in circles, so that eventually the pious will
have to follow the sceptics' trail if they wish to get anywhere" (1979, 29). See also Strauss 1953, 202-230; Strauss
1958; Zuckert 1979; Colman 1983, 6, 177-186; Pangle 1988,
131-171.

CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL SCIENCE I:
NATURE AND EMPIRICISM
We have seen how Locke's foundational suggestions in
the Second Treatise converge ultimately in an invitation to
his readers to regard human species equality as the decisive factual or empirical basis of the principle of natural
human jural equality.

In keeping with that work's charac-

teristic abstraction from any serious,
of foundational
trouble

issues,

however,

thematic treatment

Locke again declines to

its readers with any attempt at elaborating the

concept of human species equality or defending the jural
principle

that

he

derives

from

it. 1

We

are

forced

to

return to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding in order
to explore the foundations of the arguments adumbrated in
the Second Treatise.
Yet precisely herein lie the serious difficulties.
Having refused until death to acknowledge his authorship of
the Two Treatises, Locke has left us no explicit statement
of his view of the two works' relation to one another.
introducing

the

Essay.

however,

he does

claim that

In
his

1 see chapter VI below, note 118 and accompanying text.
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basic purpose of inquiring "into the Original, Certainty,
and Extent of humane Knowledge" is an essentially moderate
one:

"If we can find out, how far the Understanding can

extend its view ... we may learn to content our selves with
what is attainable by us in this State"

( 1.1. 2, 4) .

More

particularly, he claims that his account in no way implies
the

insufficiency

of

human

knowledge

for

governing

our

"great Concernments"; it in no way involves a repudiation
of the notion of natural law (1.1.5; also 1.3.13; 2.28.11).
From virtually the moment of the Essay's publication to the
present day,

critics have expressed skepticism concerning

such claims.

Commentators of widely varying interpretive

approaches have agreed,

particularly with respect to the

question of the natural law, that the relation between the
Two Treatises and the Essay is problematical.

As we have

indicated in the preceding chapter, much of this discussion
focuses on the adequacy of Locke's establishment of the
requisite

theological

surely

that

issue

works'

respective

foundations

is

no

more

treatments

for

such a

problematic
of

the

law.

than

concept

the

of

But
two

nature.

Some scholars concerned with the relationship between the
two works have argued explicitly or implicitly that the
Essay's

empiricist

epistemology

entails

a

radically

de-

structive analysis of all claims to knowledge of natural
species,

and

therewith

undermines

the

Second

Treatise'
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undefended claim to such knowledge. 2
viewed

in the

If this is true, then

light of its treatment of natural science

thus understood, it is not only unsurprising that, as again
several

commentators have

observed, 3

the

Essay

fails

to

elaborate and indeed barely mentions the concept of natural
law.

The argument of the Essay would culminate

in the

destruction not only of natural law as law, but more broadly of any doctrine of morality or justice that claims a
foundation in nature.

What Locke gives with one hand, he

seems to take away with the other.

To Peter Laslett's well

known judgment that "The Essay has no room for natural law"
(1960, 94), we would be required to add that the Essay has
no room for natural rights either.
It would be fruitless to deny that a substantial body
of textual evidence can be adduced in support of the conclusion that Locke in the Essay not only fails to defend
but indeed undermines his own doctrine of natural rights.
The aim of the present work is nonetheless to contest that
conclusion, and by reassessing the evidence and the argumentation that seem to support it,

to advance a somewhat

more sympathetic interpretation of Locke than those most
influential among contemporary scholars.

In this and the

2 strauss 1953,
230,249; Von Leyden 1956,
26-27;
Laslett 1960, 92-98; Dunn 1969, 22-26, 80-83; Miller 1979;
Wallin 1984; Pangle 1988, 206-209; West 1988, 3,21-29.
3 Lamprecht 1918,
80ff; Laslett
Leyden, 1954, 13, and 1956, 26.

1960,

94-95;

Von
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chapters that follow it, we will attempt to show that the
author of the Essay is neither a radical conventionalist
nor simply confused, but rather a proponent of a moderate,
constructive,

genuinely

empirical

epistemology

that

is

consistent with a probabilistic defense of natural rights.
As we hope also to show, however,

it is in the nature of

Locke's presentation that his ultimate moderation comes to
sight most clearly through a thorough consideration of his
apparent extremism.

In order adequately to establish our

own interpretation, therefore, it is necessary for us first
to do justice to the contrary readings by presenting the
relevant textual evidence in its most challenging forms.
We will begin by reconstructing in detail the Essay's empiricist account of natural science, especially with a view
toward elaborating the most extreme, corrosive consequences
for morality that that account could entail.

THE ESSAY'S DESTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM
In his "Epistle to the Reader," Locke announces with
notable apparent modesty 4 his intention to perform in the
Essay only a critical, preparatory task.

With considerable

emphasis, he renounces any aspiration to the attainment of
"the true Knowledge of Things," declaring himself content
instead to attempt nothing more than a preparation for true
philosophy thus understood:

"' tis Ambition enough to be

employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing ground a little,
and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to
Knowledge"

(Nidditch ed. 1975, 10).

Let us then begin at

the beginning of the work, with the most prominent piece of
ground-clearing.
an

elaboration

Locke devotes the Essay's first book to
of

its

most

famous

argument,

namely his

refutation of the doctrine of innatism according to which
"there are in the Understanding certain innate Principles;
some primary Notions ... as it were stamped upon the Mind of
Man,

which the Soul receives in its very first Being ... "

(1.2.1).

He maintains to the contrary that no notions or

principles are inborn, that the understanding is at birth
or prior to experience wholly unfurnished,
void of all Characters ... "

"white Paper,

( 2. 1. 2; also 1. 2 .15) .

In its

4 cf. Aaron 1955, 74-82; Mandelbaum 1964, 52; Wood
1983, 2,41-64; Nidditch 1985, xviii; Pangle 1988, 133,269270.
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original

unfurnishment

or unprovidedness

it

is

like the

earth as a whole, and its subsequent development, also like
that of the earth as a whole,

consists in a process of

The seeds or "materials"

cultivation.

employed in this

process of mental cultivation, the basic building-blocks of
knowledge, Locke calls "ideas."
11

idea"

Somewhat loosely defined, 5

in Locke's usage refers to "whatever is meant by

Phantasm,

Notion,

Species,

or whatever it

is,

which the

Mind can be employ'd about in thinking" (1.1.8).
According
empiricism,

to

the

fundamental

principle

of

Locke's

the human understanding can possess ideas and

hence propositions not through any kind of innate inscription,

but only through experience or acquisition.

specifically,

according to Locke,

More

the twin "Fountains of

Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring," are the mental experiences of sensation and reflection (2.1.2).
defines it,

Sensation, as Locke initially

is the perception or observation of external

objects, whereas reflection is perception of the internal
operations of one's own mind (2.1.2-5,24; also 2.9).
Yet
sensation,
Viewed

these

initial

definitions,

especially

that

of

require an immediate and crucial modification.

from

common sense,

a

perspective of epistemological

realism or

among the most arresting claims of Lockean

5 on the ambiguities in Locke's usage of this term, see
especially Ryle 1968 ( 1933), 16ff.
Cf. Greenlee 1977;
Colman 1983, 76-83.
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empiricism is the contention that we do not

immediately

perceive objects as such, but instead only collections of
discrete ideas.

What Locke calls our "substance" ideas,

our ideas of things or objects existing external to and
independent of the understanding,

are not objects of our

original or immediate perceptions (1.4.18), but instead are
mental constructions.

While we might commonly or uncritic-

ally believe that we perceive directly a human being, for
instance, what we actually perceive directly, according to
Locke,

is a number of discrete ideas:

various colors,

a certain figure,

perhaps a certain texture, the capacities

of animation and speech, and so forth.

At the root of this

contention lies Locke's crucial distinction between simple
and complex ideas.

Simple ideas in Locke's account are

truly the basic building blocks or "the Materials of all
our Knowledge"

(2.2.2).

They are "unmixed" or "uncompoun-

ded," incapable of analysis into any other, simpler ideas,
and hence incapable of definition;

the understanding can

neither create nor destroy them (2.2.1,2; also 3.4.4,7,11).
They are the only "givens," the only objects of direct perception,

the understanding's only immediate points of ac-

cess to the external world.
By means of this distinction,

Locke extends and re-

fines his analogy between the original human material and
intellectual conditions,
boring and thinking.

or between the activities of la-

Out of the basic materials of simple
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ideas, we make complex ideas:

"Ideas thus made up of sev-

eral simple ones put together, I call Complex."

Thus ac-

cording to Locke the understanding not only perceives simple ideas, but also "labors" upon them, employs its powers
of combining,

comparing,

them together,
separate them,"

and abstracting "either to unite

or to set them by one another,

or wholly

in order to make further ideas

(2 .12 .1).

By its own industry, the understanding progresses from simplicity to complexity,

from a condition of relative scar-

city to an abundance of ideas, virtually infinite in number
and endless

in variety

( 2. 12. 3;

2. 1. 2) .

"Man' s

Power, "

declares Locke, is "much-what the same in the Material and
Intellectual World" (2.12.1; also 2.2.2).
The

decisive

question

here

concerns

just

how

far

Locke wishes to extend the analogy between thinking and
laboring.

A careful

reading of the all-important

fifth

chapter of the Second Treatise reveals that the productive
power of human labor as Locke there conceives it is not
only

quantitatively

immense,

but

also

nearly

exclusive.

The activity of human laboring, the production of value out
of nature's provision, constitutes in other words a virtual
creation ex nihilo:

"Nature and the Earth furnished only

the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves"
also 32,37,38,41,42,45). 6

(II. 43;

The radically creative character

6 cf. Strauss 1953, 235-249; Goldwin 1972, 460-470;
Zuckert 1979, 71-74; Mansfield 1979, 30-32; Tully 1980,
116ff; Wood 1984, 51-67; Pangle 1988, 141-145, 161-167.
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of labor in this description indicates clearly enough what
is suggestive and troubling in this assimilation of thinkLocke readily grants,

ing to material labor.
that

just as we

of course,

"can do nothing towards the making the

least Particle of new Matter, " so too "it is not in the
Power of the most exalted Wit,

or enlarged Understanding

... to invent or frame one new simple Idea in the mind ... "
(2.2.2).

But of what significance is this concession, in

light of his insistence in the Second Treatise (37,40-43,
48)

that nature contributes to the process of production

virtually nothing of real value, that virtually everything
of value must be of human creation, must be a product of
human labor?

Precisely what is the worth of nature's pro-

vision to the human understanding?

To what extent, accord-

ing to the argument of the Essay. does the external world
depend for its orderliness upon the creative powers of the
human understanding or the human mind?

It is obvious that

a world consisting in a mere aggregation of discrete simple
ideas would be an unintelligible and therefore uninhabitable

world,

and

would

thus

correspond to

the

unimproved

material world the Second Treatise describes as

"waste."

Is this the world that, according to the Essay. the understanding originally or naturally confronts?
provide
attempts
world?

no
at

significant
rendering

guidance
an

orderly,

or

Does nature

discipline

intelligible

for

our

external
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The answer to such questions lies in Locke's account
of the process by which we construct complex ideas.
complex ideas,

in Locke's scheme,

stances, or relations.

are either modes,

All
sub-

Modes are complex ideas that refer

not to independently existing things,

but instead to the

qualities or attributes or modifications of such things.
As Locke defines them, they are "such complex Ideas, which
however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of
subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences
on, or Affections of Substances" (2.12.4).

Substance ideas

are ideas that refer to independently existing things; they
are

"such combinations of simple Ideas,

as are taken to

represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves"

(2 .12. 6).

Ideas of relation derive from the power

of the understanding to "carry any Idea, as it were, beyond
it self ... to see how it stands in conformity to any other"
(2.25.1).

Indeed Locke seems to imply that these ideas are

virtually

indistinguishable

from

the

exercise

of

that

power; ideas of relation consist in "the consideration and
comparing one Idea with another" (2.12.7).
Locke's discussion of our ideas of substances reveals
most fundamentally his estimate of the worth of the natural
provision and therefore of the true character and extent of
human knowledge.

That is to say, inasmuch as this discus-

sion above all constitutes the basis of his critique of the
notion of natural

species or kinds and therewith of the
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possibility of a strict science of nature, it underlies his
often-repeated

judgment of the

natural

and

in important

respects irremediable darkness and narrowness of the understanding.7

For the same reason, it would seem to imply his

most fundamental philosophical challenge to the theory of
natural rights.

According to Locke's argument, we form the

most general idea of substance, the idea of "pure Substance
in general"

(2.23.2),

in a kind of mental reflex,

in an

ordinarily unconscious response to our perception of discrete simple ideas.
an effect

Just as we are unable to conceive of

independent

of

a

cause,

an action or passion

independent of an agent or patient, or an adjective independent of a noun,

so also we are unable to imagine "how

these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves."
fore

"accustom

ourselves,

to

suppose

some

We thereSubstratum,

wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result ..• "
(2.23.1).

When we perceive a simple idea of color, or of

solidity, or of pleasure or pain, for instance, we find it
necessary to suppose the existence of some being or thing
that feels the pleasure or pain, or that bears the quality
of solidity or of the given color.

Similarly, in forming

complex ideas of particular substances, we commonly notice

7 Locke describes the understanding as a "dark room,"
as "not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with
only some little openings left" (2 .11. 17), as "narrow"
(2.23.28), with its reach falling "exceeding short of the
vast Extent of Things" (1.1.5), and so forth.
See also CU
43, Works IV.359,361.
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that several simple ideas seem to "go constantly together,"
to coexist over time, and we consequently suppose that such
ideas are somehow ontologically or necessarily united, that
they exist as common qualities of a single object (2.23.1).
More importantly,

we observe not only particular sets of

coexisting ideas,

but also patterns of coexistence.

"collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas,

By

as are by

Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of
to exist together,

11

we form not only ideas of particular

substances, but also ideas of "particular sorts of Substances"

(2.23.3; also 2.23.6,7,8, 2.31.6, 3.3.13, 3.6.1).

We

form ideas of spiritual substances in the same way that we
form ideas of corporeal substances (2.23.5) . 8
Locke refers to our formation of substance ideas as a
supposition,

even as a merely customary supposition.

We

make this supposition because we can only conceive of the
simple ideas in our experience in relative terms--as somehow "depending" on, or "inhering" or "resting" or "subsisting" in,

or "flowing" from,

thing else,
(e.g.

or being "produced" by some-

something more real or fundamental in nature

2.23.1,2,3,6,8).

The variety of his language not-

withstanding, it is clear that Locke is describing a causeeffect relation; we conceive of a given substance as the
seat of efficient causation, the cause of both the exist-

8 But cf. 4.3.6,
below, pp. 187-205.

and

the

discussion

in

chapter

IV
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ence and the coexistence or union of simple ideas (2.23.6).
Thus "rightly considered," simple ideas become present to
our perceptions by virtue of
inherent
(2.23.7).

in

substances

"to

"nothing but
produce

those

[the]

Powers"

Ideas

in

us"

"Power," as Locke explains,

being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the
substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert
this Power into Act, are called causes; and the Substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple
Ideas which are introduced into any Subject by the
exerting of that Power, are called Effects.
(2.22.11)
Locke uses the terms "real constitution,"
constitution,"
entity

that,

and "real essence"
as

we

suppose,

which

any

constitutes

the

existential

He allows that it

there must be some real Constitution,

Collection

depend" (3.3.15).

internal

to refer to the causal

foundation of our ideas of substances.
is "past Doubt,

11

of

simple

Ideas

co-existing,

on

must

But in order for our ideas of substances

to be truly more than mere suppositions of the existence of
"something ... !
to

identify

know not what"

the

specific

(2.23.2,15), we must be able

real

that underlie those ideas.

constitutions

or essences

We must be able to identify the

specific causal relationships that make ontologically necessary the unions of particular sets of ideas in substances
or sorts of substances
Locke,

( 2. 31. 6) .

we simply cannot do.

And this,

according to

Even if we had access to a

comprehensive accounting of all the qualities and properties of a given substance, we could not then be certain of
the status of any quality as causally "primary," and hence
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could not

acquire

knowledge

substance in question,

of

the

real

essence of the

for the simple reason that we are

incapable of knowledge of cause-effect relations.
In the brief chapter d.evoted specifically to these
relations,

Locke explains that we acquire ideas of cause

and effect as inferences from the observation "that several
particular, both Qualities, and Substances begin to exist;
and that they receive this their Existence,

from the due

Application and Operation of some other Being"
He indicates in the immediate sequel,

however,

(2.26.1).
that such

inferences are in the strictest sense illegitimate;

they

are "experimental" rather than "scientifical," insofar as
we conceive these ideas "without knowing the manner of that
Operation" whereby one being brings into existence a new
quality or substance (4.3.26; 2.26.2).

If we do not know

the manner of such operations, then for all we know, what
we are observing may be no more than accidental associations.

We are "destitute of Faculties to attain" knowledge

of "the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things"
(2.23.32), in that we are incapable of genuine knowledge of
causation.

This incapacity in itself is sufficient basis

for Locke's conclusion that a genuine science of nature is
necessarily beyond the reach of the human understanding. 9
9 cf. 4.3.29:
"The Things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we
may conclude, do act by a Law set them; but yet by a Law,
that we know not:
whereby, though Causes work steadily,
and Effects constantly flow from them, yet their Connexions
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But the
construct

difficulties we

ideas

of

confront

substances

according to patterns

and

sorts

in nature are

ignorance of causal relations.

in

attempting to
of

substances

not limited to our

Absent knowledge of their

causal cores, according to Locke, we can acquire "no other
Idea of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them"
(2.23.3).

This means

that our

necessarily "inadequate,"

ideas of substances are

in that they can never provide

more than a "partial, or incomplete representation of those
Archetypes to which they are referred"

( 2. 31. 1, 6) .

They

are necessarily inadequate in that it is simply impossible
to render a comprehensive accounting of all the qualities
or properties of any given substance; "whatever Collection
of

simple

Ideas

[the mind]

makes

of any Substance that

exists, it cannot be sure, that it exactly answers all that
are

in

that

Substance"

(2.31.13;

also

2.31.10,

3.6.19,

3.9.13, 4.6.14).
Moreover, at least in most cases they are inadequate
in a more practically troubling respect.

Locke presents

his destructive analysis of our ideas of substances with
and Dependancies [sic] being not discoverable in our Ideas,
we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them.
From
all which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are
involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that
are, that we are capable to know ... as to a perfect Science
of natural Bodies, (not to mention spiritual Beings,) we
are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing,
that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it."
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the explicit intention of discrediting the Aristotelianscholastic doctrine of natural sorts or species, 10 according

to

which

"Nature,"

not

the

human

as Locke puts it,

understanding

but

instead

"sets the Boundaries of the

species of Things," generating particular beings to partake
in one of a finite number of real essences "and so become
of

this

or

that

3.6.14,24; 4.6.4).

Species"

(3.6.30,

3.3.17;

also

3.3.9;

He insists that in order for this doc-

trine to be true, the boundaries between species of natural
beings must be perfectly clear and precise,

or in other

words, that each member of the species manifest constantly
and invariantly all the properties essential to that species:

"it is as impossible,

exactly of the same real

that two Things,

Essence,

partaking

should have different

Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real
Essence

of

(3.3.17) . 11

a

Circle,

should

have

different

Properties"

In Locke's view, the manifest difficulty with

this doctrine lies in the fact that, quite apart from the
problem of determining which among a set of shared quali-

10 on Locke's view
Gibson 1917, 182-204.

of

scholasticism,

see

especially

llcf. 2.19.4, where, in denying that thinking is the
essence rather than the action of the soul, Locke holds
that "the Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the Essences of things, are not
conceived capable of any such variation." See also 3.6.8.
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ties or powers are properties and which mere accidents, 12
many particular members of what we take to be the same
species manifest with a considerable degree of variance the
qualities or powers supposedly definitive of those species;
nature's productions very often simply do not fall within
the precise boundaries of our species ideas.
Professing,

for instance,

an intention to show the

probability that there exist "more Species of intelligent
creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material
below us," Locke offers a provocative statement or restatement13 of the traditional conception of earthly creation as
a great chain-of-being:
All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps,
and a continued series of Things, that in each remove,
differ very little one from the other.
There are
Fishes that have Wings, and are not Strangers to the
airy Region:
and there are some Birds, that are
Inhabitants of the Water ... There are Animals so near of
kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the
middle between both ... There are some Brutes, that seem
to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are
called Men: and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms, are
so nearly join'd, that if you will take the lowest of
one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be
perceived any great difference between them; and so on
12 Thus 3.9.17: 11 • • • no one can shew a Reason, why some
of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in
nature, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others
left out."
13 on Locke's employment of the concept of the great
chain of being, cf. Lovejoy 1966 (1936), especially 6798,227ff with Yolton 1970, 33, and 1985, 109ff.
Lovejoy
implies that Locke's employment of the principle of the
plenitude of creation points to the undermining of the
doctrine of natural species, while Yolton sees in it an
affirmation of natural species distinctions, the apparent
continuity of their boundaries notwithstanding.
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til we come to the lowest and the most inorganical
parts of Matter, we shall find every-where, that the
several Species are linked together, and differ but in
almost insensible degrees.
(3.6.12)
The appropriate metaphor for this conception of the
natural order would seem to be less a great chain than perhaps a braided rope of being, whose "segments" upon close
observation blend imperceptibly one into another.

Seeming-

ly with a certain eagerness, Locke describes the "frequent
Productions" of--what we commonly call, employing our conventional

species

class if ications--"Monsters,

in all

the

Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange
Issues

of

humane

Birth"

(3.3.17;

3.6.22ff,

4.4.13ff).1 4

Moreover, in illustrating the errant or anarchic character
of

nature's

processes

of

production,

emphasis on the difficulties manifest

he

places

special

in any attempt at

defining human beings by reference to some supposed natural
species or real essence.

We commonly identify human beings

14 Most commentators seem to accept Locke's earnestness
in transmitting these accounts, though some also share the
judgment of the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury that these passages
reveal an oddly 'credulous Mr. Locke' (Quoted in Harrison
and Laslett 1971, 29; cf. Mackie 1976, 87-88).
Such
stories do seem to hold a certain fascination for Locke,
but it is not clear that he assents to them quite so credulously as is commonly believed.
At 3.6.23, for instance,
he states conditionally that "if History lie not, Women
have conceived by Drills" (emphasis supplied).
And in the
immediately preceding paragraph he draws attention in a
somewhat more pointed manner to the questionable authority
of his source:
"There are Creatures, as 'tis said, (sit
fides penes Authorem, but there appears no contradiction,
that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason,
and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy
Tails ... " (3.6.22).

95

by reference both to a common shape or figure and to the
possession
rationality
4.7.16;

of

certain

(2.12.6;

4.17.1;

3.3.10;

Works 1823,

Locke these

qualities do

coexist

nature's

in

common

faculties,
3.6.3,26;

4.4.16;

4.6.15;

But according to

4.74,378).

not constantly

production.

pre-eminently

and invariantly

"There

are

Naturals

amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want Reason,
and some of them Language too" (3.6.22).

Conversely, there

are also cases of beings innately or naturally disfigured
to the point of being virtually unrecognizable as human,
yet unquestionably in possession of rationality.

Such was

the "Abbot of st. Martin, " who as a child "was very near
being excluded out of the Species of Man,
Shape,"

despite

his

possession

of

"such

barely by his
Parts,

as

made

him," upon their development, "capable to be a Dignitary in
the Church" (3.6.26).

Nor is Locke willing to concede that

we can reliably determine who or what is by nature human by
reference to the fact of generation;

"for if History lie

not," he reports, "Women have conceived by Drills; and what
real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in
Nature, will be a new Question" (3.6.23).

At times Locke

seems simply and categorically to deny that any scheme of
classification could

account neatly

for

all

of nature's

productions, leaving no particular instances to straddle or
permeate

species boundaries.

He

certainly

insists that

"there is no such thing made by Nature, and established by
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Her

amongst

boundaries.

Men,"

as

"precise

and

unmovable"

species-

The latter are "made by Man, with some lib-

erty" (3.6.27; also 3.5.9).
However commonly or even in a sense naturally we may
employ it, 15 the scholastic presumption that our ideas of
substances and species adequately represent an order inherent in nature according to this account manifests an epistemological false-consciousness.

Because the real essences

or "substantial forms" supposedly uniting members of species are in fact "wholly unintelligible" to us (3.6.10), it
is clear in Locke's view "That our distinguishing Substances into Species by Names,
real Essences" (3.6.20).

is not at all founded on their

Instead, our ideas of species can

refer intelligibly only to "nominal essences," to abstract
ideas formed of necessarily incomplete collections of coexisting simple ideas (3.6.7,9,21,24; 2.31.8,13; 3.3.9). Thus
what we may presume to be natural appears, on closer analysis,

to be primarily conventional in origin.

These ab-

stract ideas or nominal essences "are made by the Mind, and
not by Nature:

For were they Nature's Workmanship,

they

could not be so various and different in several Men,
experience tells us they are"

(3.6.26).

as

Locke's analysis

culminates in the demand that we surrender as "wholly use15Though we "know nothing" of the real essences of
things, declares Locke, yet "there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men should attribute the sorts of Things to
such Essences" (2.31.6; also 3.10.21).
Cf. Zuckert 1974,
562.
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1ess" and even pernicious our aspiration to classify things

~

according to their real, natural essences as opposed to the
nominal essences that are the products of our own understandings (3.3.17; also 2.31.8, 3.3.13, 4.6.4, 4.4.17). 16
From all this it appears that Locke's assimilation of
thinking to laboring is quite thorough indeed.

Leo Strauss

summarizes the effects of this teaching as follows:
From now on, nature furnishes only the almost worthless
materials as in themselves; the forms are supplied by
man, by man's free creation.
For there are no natural
forms, no intelligible "essences" ... There are, therefore, no natural principles of understanding:
all
knowledge is acquired; all knowledge depends on labor
and is labor.
( 1953, 249) .
Surveying the damage thus wrought by Locke's critique of
the doctrine of natural species,

one must wonder how the

Second Treatise' natural rights theory can possibly endure

16 Locke's rejection of the doctrine of natural species
may appear to rest on ontological as well as epistemological grounds.
"'Tis true, 11 he concedes, "every Substance
that exists, has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend
those sensible Qualities, and Powers, we observe in it"
(3.6.13). But this apparently refers to real constitutions
as the bases only of the attributes of particular beings,
not of the properties shared by all the members of a common
species or kind; he repeatedly affirms that "All Things,
that exist, being Particulars ... "General and Universal,
belong not to the real existence of Things; but are the
Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding" ( 3. 3. 1, 11;
also 3.3.6, 4.7.9, 4.17.8). Inasmuch, however, as he holds
that "the principium Individuationis ... is Existence it
self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular
time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same
kind" (2.27.3), it is difficult to know the extent to which
Locke takes the particularity of all things as decisive
against the possibility that nature makes things with common species essences.
A discussion of a different version
of the argument that Locke's critique is ontologically
oriented appears in chapter IV below, pp. 161-186.
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such a direct assault upon its foundations.

Eugene Miller

comments

is

more

specifically

that

"Rousseau

noted

for

having blurred the line between the human and the subhuman,
but Locke pushes at least as far as would his successor the
argument against a
(1979, 177).

natural

ground for

fixing

this

line"

How can we know human beings as the subjects

or proprietors of natural rights,

if we cannot know with

any degree of reliability what a human being by nature is?

THE DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY
In view of the foregoing critique of natural species
and natural science, we may find all the more ominous the
fact that the design of the Essay seems to indicate a deliberate attempt on Locke's part to avoid the appearance of
a

thematic

concern with

questions

concerning

It is no wonder, as John Colman observes, that

morality.
scholars

or primary

have

often

viewed

the

Essay's

discussions

of

ethical issues "as merely an intellectual by-product of the
pursuit
1). 17

of

[Locke's]

major

scientific

interests"

(1983,

For not only does Locke decline in his brief account

of the history of the Essay to disclose the fact, noted by
his friend James Tyrrell, that the "very remote" subject of
the

discussion

that

originated the

Essay

concerned

Principles of morality, and reveald Religion'
tle to the Reader,"

7;

Nidditch ed.

1975,

'the

(ECHU "Epis-

xix) , he also

organizes the work so as to indicate a virtually complete
abstraction from moral

questions.

Not a

single chapter

heading in the entire Essay announces a direct concern with
moral issues; the discussions of morality that do arise are
commonly presented as peripheral to or merely illustrative
17 similarly, Wood complains of a tendency among most
students of the Essay "to overlook the fact that Locke
wrote not only for the sake of technical philosophic analysis but also to help men act more effectively in the world
of practical affairs" (1975, 71; also 1983, 1-7).
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of the main topic under consideration. 18
In fact,

however, Locke by no means completely sub-

merges his concern with moral questions in the Essay.
its introductory chapter,

In

he corrects to some extent the

impression one might receive from its dedication and table
of contents; he admits that an intention to show that "our
Business here is not to know all Things, but those which
concern our Conduct ... was that, which gave the first Rise
to

this

Essay

concerning

the

Understanding"

(1.1.6,7).

Moreover, unquestionably cognizant of the unsettling inferences that some might draw from his epistemological arguments, he subsequently reassures his readers that the work
in no way undermines the foundations of morality.

"Morali-

ty is the proper Science. and Business of Mankind in general;

(who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their

Summum Bonum,) ... 11 (4.12.11).

Properly directed, the "Can-

dle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our
Purposes" (1.1.5).

Indeed, Locke goes so far as to insist

that the argument of the Essay not only does not destroy
the foundations of morality, but to the contrary establishes them more securely than ever before.

18 The most striking example of this appears at
2. 21. 72, where Locke expresses a hope that he "shall be
pardon'd this Digression" into the question of human librty, which occupies virtually the whole of the Essay's
single longest chapter.
See also 2.28.4-17.
Nidditch
refers to Locke's "ironic masking of his priority of concern with conduct over scientific inquisitiveness•i ( 1975,
xviii).
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... I am bold to think, that Morality is caoable of
Demonstration ..• wherein I doubt not, but from selfevident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as
incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of
right and wrong might be made out, to any one who will
apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention
to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences.
(3.11.16; 4.3.18)
Let us then explore the grounds for this remarkable
proposition.

Locke's

suggestion

of

an

analogy

between

ethics and mathematics rests decisively on the contention
that the main constituents of moral discourses are not the
ideas and names of substances, but rather those of modes,
in particular mixed modes, and relations.
To conceive rightly of Moral Actions, we must first
take notice of them, under this two-fold Consideration.
First, As they are in themselves each made up of such a
Collection of simple Ideas.
Thus Drunkenness, or Lying, signify such or such a Collection of simple Ideas,
which I cal 1 mixed Modes ... Secondly. our Actions are
considered, as Good, Bad, or Indifferent; and in this
respect, they are Relative, it being their Conformity
to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them to
be regular or irregular, Good or Bad: and so, as far as
they are compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation.
(2.28.15)
Of primary importance in this regard are the complex
ideas that Locke calls "mixed modes."

As Locke defines it,

a mixed mode (in distinction from a simple mode) is a mode
"compounded of simple Ideas of several kinds," such as, for
example, the idea of "Beauty, consisting of a certain composition

of

Colour

Beholder" (2.12.5).

and

Figure,

causing

and

in

the

Mixed modes supply "the greatest part

of the Words made use of in Divinity,
Poli ticks,

delight

several

other Sciences"

Ethicks,

Law,

( 2. 2 2. 12) .

and
Like
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ideas of substance, they are general, standing for "sorts
or Species of Things" (3.5.1).
(among

other

kinds

things)

They enable us to classify

of

actions:

" .•. Power

Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes"

and

( 2. 2 2. 12) .

They are the complex ideas by which we define such concepts
as (to use Locke's examples)

justice, sacrilege, adultery,
(See ECHO

murder, and parricide, among innumerable others.
3.5 passim.)
mixed

In addition, and in contrast to substances,

modes

Patterns,

are

or

formed

reference

"very
to

arbitrarily.

any

real

made

Existence"

without
( 3. 5. 3) .

They are formed, that is, without any necessary supposition
that their constituent ideas constantly coexist, or indeed
have

ever coexisted

in the world external to the mind.

They have "no particular foundation in Nature"
They consist in "fleeting,

(3.5.10).

and transient Combinations of

simple Ideas, which have but a short existence any where,
but in the Minds of Men" (2.22.8).

They are essentially no

more

or definitions.

than hypothetical

regard

to

the

rhetorically:

idea
11

constructs

of murder,

for

instance,

With

Locke asks

for what greater connexion in Nature, has

the Idea of a Man, than the Idea of a Sheep with Killing,
that this is made a particular Species of Action, signified
by the word Murder, and the other not? 11

(

3 . 5 . 6) .

In the

mass of ideas, or of more-or-less transient associations of
ideas

that

the

world

presents to

human perception,

the

action of killing claims many objects in addition to human
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beings

(and,

we might add,

is performed as well by many

subjects or agents other than human beings).

The formation

of the complex idea to which we refer the name "murder, "
the combining of the ideas of killing and innocence and
human being, is therefore a free act of the understanding,
an act of abstraction no more compelled by the desire to
represent faithfully an external order than would be the
formation of any of the other literally innumerable possible combinations of ideas that our experience suggests to
us.

When we frame an idea of stealing, or of murder, we

are in effect positing that if or when someone takes another's property without the latter's consent,
someone

intentionally

kills

an

innocent

or if or when

human

being,

we

will consider in combination all the simple ideas that are
constituents of such an action,

forming a

single complex

idea of that kind of action and attaching to it a single
name.
More fundamentally,

Locke argues that the fact that

"this sort of complex Ideas may be made,
have names given them,
before any one

and so a

individual

abstracted,

and

Species be constituted,

of that Species

ever existed"

puts beyond doubt the essentially arbitrary or voluntary
character of their formation (3.5.5).

For those who see in

Locke an authentic moral-political radical ism,
is of decisive significance.
character of mixed-mode

this point

The arbitrary or hypothetical

ideas

implies

that the

names

of
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mixed modes function not merely as designations of particular actions, but are in an important sense constitutive of
"in mixed Modes ... it is the Name that

particular actions:
seems

to

preserve

those

Essences,

(3.5.10, also 11). 19

lasting duration"

it in his own terminology,
Ideas

of

and

Modes,

being

give

them

their

As Locke explains

this means that our "complex

voluntary

Collections

of

simple

Ideas, which the Mind puts together, without reference to
any

real

Ideas"
not

Archetypes. . .

or

and cannot but be

adequate

Because they are themselves archetypes,

( 2 . 31. 3) .

ectypes

are,

"copies"

(2. 31.12ff.),

and

thus

are

not

intended to represent "things really existing," the distinction between real and nominal essences is irrelevant to
them (3.3.18).

Since they are nothing but products of the

understanding, mixed-mode ideas are in principle perfectly
definable (3.11.15);

indeed in a sense our definitions of

them must be perfect definitions, must be "not capable of
any Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing
but

[themselves]"

(2.30.4).

It

is

ultimately

for

this

reason, according to Locke's argument,
... that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as
Mathematicks.
For Certainty being but the Perception of
the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas; and Demonstration being nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by
the Intervention of other Ideas, or Mediums, our moral
Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes themselves, and so adequate, and complete Ideas, all the Agreement, or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will
19 cf.
178-184.

Aronson and Lewis 1970,

195-196; Miller 1979,
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produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.
(4.4.7)

To the extent that the terms of moral propositions
consist in the names of mixed modes and relations, of ideas
that are perfectly, precisely definable, it is in principle
possible to construct a deductive or demonstrative system
of ethics.

Ethical science would then involve simply the

settling of the relevant definitions,

the formulation of

rules to designate particular sorts of actions as right or
wrong, virtuous or vicious, and the judgment of individual
cases to determine the character of actions and their conformity with the relevant rules.
Furthermore, in anticipation of the objection that it
would be absurd to conceive of an ethical system without
also conceiving of the subjects of its rules, and therefore
that the presence of substance ideas in any ethical system
is unavoidable, Locke maintains that the "Names of Substances, if they be used in them, as they should, can no more
disturb Moral,

than they do Mathematical Discourses."

In

moral discourses conducted in a fully self-conscious manner, the natures or definitions of substances are "not so
much enquir'd into, as supposed."

In employing the concept

of "Man" as a being "subject to Law," for instance, Locke
argues that
We mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal Rational
Creature:
What the real Essence or other Qualities of
that Creature are in this case, is no way considered.
And therefore, whether a Child or Changeling be a Man
in a physical Sense, may amongst the Naturalists be as
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disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral
Man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unhangeable Idea. a corporeal rational Being.
(3.11.16)
we may frame arbitrarily the relevant substance idea,
other words,

merely by gathering together

in

the qualities

constitutive of moral agency or personhood, in abstraction
from whether such qualities actually characterize beings
existing in nature.

It would seem then that in an act of

resignation in the face of the impenetrable mysteriousness
of our substance ideas, Locke is forced to construct in the
Essay a doctrine of morality upon a foundation wholly different from that supposed in the Second Treatise.

Thus he

argues that the darkness or narrowness of human understanding,

however frustrating to our aspiration toward a com-

plete, genuine science of nature, constitutes in the end no
truly serious incapacity, in that it does not incapacitate
us for moral knowledge.

We might even experience a recog-

nition of this unilluminable darkness as liberating; Locke
professes to regard moral inquiries as "most suited to our
natural Capacities"

(4.12.11), as ultimately more fruitful

than discourses in "natural Philosophy" (3.11.17), precisely because they require,

according to this

argument,

no

such nonhypothetical, natural foundation. 20

20Among "the main ideological objectives of the
Essay," writes Tully, is "to prove the potential certainty
and scientific status of moral and political knowledge and
to illuminate its superiority over knowledge of the natural
world" ( 1980, 26; see in general 8-34) .
Cf. Grant 1987,
12-51.
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This suggestion of the possibility of a demonstrative
science of ethics raises questions that have troubled virtually all those who have commented on it. 21
leave

aside

for

the

moment

the

general

If we may

question of the

unity or coherence of Locke's thought, of particular importance here is the question of the foundation of the proposed mixed-mode morality.

With respect to the formation

of moral ideas and names,

Locke claims that "what liberty

Adam had at first ... the same have all Men ever since had"
(3.6.51).
mental

In principle,

state of nature,

in other words, we are all in a
a

state of "perfect Freedom"

to

frame moral ideas as we will; in stark contrast to his
apparent conception of nonhuman or physical
realm of pure determinacy,

nature as

a

Locke may seem to conceive of

the natural human condition as one of perfect freedom or of
free creativity.

But like the state of nature described in

the Second Treatise--in fact these two states of nature are
in some sense the same--this condition of perfect mental
freedom is an untenable condition.
principle,

Absent any regulating

such liberty would engender a

condition "like

21 The most common objections focus on the trifling
character of the propositions that could be generated in
such a system, on the incapacity of a purely definitional
system of ethics to provide an adequate account of moral
obligation, and, as we will see presently, on the tendency
of such a system to collapse into relativism.
Cf. Gibson
1896, 38, 50; Lamprecht 1917, 76, 78; Von Leyden 1954, 55;
Aaron 1955, 262-4; Ashcraft 1969, 210ff; Gough 1973, 8;
Parry 1978, 3; Miller 1979, 181; Milton 1981, 140; Dunn
1984, 65ff,84.
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that of Babel" (3.6.28), inevitably involving precisely the
inconveniences that move rational human beings to quit the
state of nature in the Second Treatise' account. 22

Locke

imagines an interlocutor rendering the objection as follows:
... if moral Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of
our own moral Ideas, and those, as other Modes, be of
our own making, What strange Notions will there be of
Justice and Temperance? What confusion of Vertues and
Vices, if every one may make what Ideas of them he
pleases? (4.4.9)
Mindful of the claim that our moral definitions are
in the decisive respect the products of the understanding,
made "very arbitrarily." one must ask in the spirit of the
Two Treatises:
tions?

According to what standards,

what ends,
moral

Who frames and who authorizes these defini-

are they made?

relations,

or in pursuance of

In the Essay's discussion of

Locke observes that the

"Laws that Men

generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude,

or Obliquity,

Divine Law.

2.

Reputation ... "
them here,

seem to me to be these three.

The Civil Law.
(2.28.7).

3.

1. The

The Law of Opinion or

Of the three as Locke describes

only the divine law can facilitate

judgments

concerning which actions are "in their own nature right and
wrong";

the

contents

of the others

are

in the decisive

respect relative to "the several Nations and Societies of
22cf. TT II.13,20,123,125,127,128.
Colman observes
that "much of Locke's text does leave him open" to the
objection that he "has given an account of an essentially
private language" (1983, 110; 107-137).

109
Men

in

the

World"

preserving some

notion

human

be

laws

may

Locke

(2.28.10).
of

a

measured,

true
and

thus

insists

upon

law against which all
thus

resists

endorsing

outright the relativistic proposition that there can be no
measure of right and wrong or of virtue and vice save the
various definitions proceeding from the "different Temper,
Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of different sorts
of Men ... "

(2.28.11) .23

Yet in this insistence upon the

"eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong," he may
seem merely to reproduce the conundrum with which he left
the readers of the Second Treatise.
promulgated, he repeats,
voice

of Revelation"

The "Divine Law" is

"by the light of Nature,

(2.28.8) .24

If,

or the

as we have shown

above, 25 he fails to explain how we can prove the authenticity of a claim to revelation,

and if he believes that

knowledge of nature is beyond the grasp of the human understanding, then how does he propose to defend the distinction between the rational and the actual in morality, between the true, divine or natural law and the purely human,

23 see Locke's response to this objection of Lowde,
appended as a footnote to ECHU 2.28.11, and also his letter
to Tyrrell of 8/4/90.
24 see also ECHU 4. 3 .18 and 4 .13. 3, where Locke suggests that the notion of an intelligent Creator is sufficient to serve as a first principle in a demonstration of a
nonrelative system of ethics.
25 see ch. II above, pp. 69-72.
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conventional laws? 26
Locke observes that in actuality we tend to construct
moral ideas neither wholly arbitrarily or without reason,
nor to

represent

"the truth

and

extent of Things, "

but

rather according to "the use of common Life," or to serve
our own convenience

( 3 . 5. 7 ,

2 . 2 8. 2) . 2 7

This appears to

mean no more than that in framing or acquiring such ideas
and rules, we rely upon the common usages of our respective
communities

( 2. 2. 9,

3. 5. 15) • 28

What is significant here,

however, is that Locke at times appeals to common usage not
only as the actual standard, but also as "the Rule of Propriety"

( 3. 9. 8;

also 2. 3 O. 4) ,

as the proper or rational

26 Grant appears ultimately to rest her case for the
"reasonable and serious" character of Locke's defense of
the possibility of demonstrative moral knowledge upon the
fact that we are the "workmanship of the Supreme Being"
whose will the law of nature expresses; yet she concedes
that "A great deal more would have to be said and demonstrated before Locke's position could be considered a
complete and persuasive ethical theory," and that "Locke's
theological claims particularly require further argument"
(1987, 26,48).
27 cf. Miller's observation that "Locke's position is
not far
from the view that language is
'practical
consciousness'" (1979, 181).
28 Thus Locke affirms the practical primacy of both the
civil law and the law of opinion relative to the divine
law. The civil law "no body over-looks," just as "no Body,
that has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him,
can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill
Opinion of his Familiars"; whereas the "Penal ties that
attend the breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps, most
Men seldom seriously reflect on" (2.28.9,12).
On the significance of Locke's estimate of the great power of the
desire for esteem to bind individuals to their fellows and
to their communities, see Tarcov 1984, 101-107, 137-141;
Pangle 1988, 221-229.
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standard for regulating the formation of moral ideas and
rules.

"For Words, especially of Languages already framed,

being no Man's private possession .•. Men ... must also take
care,

to apply their Words,

as near as may be,

Ideas as Common Use has annexed them to" (3.11.11).

to such
On the

basis of this apparent belief in the adequacy of common
usage as a regulatory standard, Locke the moral philosopher
might

superficially

appear

to

be

an ancestor of

Edmund

Burke, in espousing a form of moral conservatism rooted in
the conviction that there is wisdom embodied in the tested
traditions of various communities, and that therefore moral
innovations are generally to be eschewed.
that

II

He does caution

in Places, where Men in Society have already estab-

1 ished a Language amongst them, the signification of Words
are [sic] very warily and sparingly to be alter'd" (3.6.51;
also 4.4.10).
As a moment's reflection shows,

however,

from this

apparent assertion of the adequacy of common usage arises
the central difficulty in Locke's account of a "demonstrative" ethical science.

That we form moral ideas and words

according to our convenience means that we do so more-orless self-consciously according to perceived need or desire.
erable,

But if our ignorance of species essences is insupthen it would be impossible for us to frame such

ideas on the basis of a universal or natural standard of
needs or desires.

Locke admits that common usage is at
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best

relative

therefore

to

communities

provides

"but

a

or

very

cultures
uncertain

and

that

Rule ... a

it

very

variable standard" for the regulation of moral discourse
(3.11.25; also 3.9.8).

If the standard of common usage is

ultimately relativistic,
ultimately illusory;

then its regulatory capacity is

reliance upon the radically conven-

tional standard of common usage could resolve none of the
problems proceeding from the unregulated construction of
moral ideas, because it could provide no means of adjudicating the differences between opposing ethical

systems.

Insofar as our formation of substance and species ideas is
arbitrary, our formation of moral ideas must be arbitrary
as well.

It is true, of course, that Locke distinguishes

common or civil from philosophic usage (3.9.3), and thereby
suggests the possibility of improving upon the former by
appealing to the latter.

Given, however,

that mixed-mode

ideas "have no certain connexion in Nature; and so no settled Standard, any where in Nature existing, to rectify and
adjust them by" (3.9.5), it would seem to follow that this
improvement can consist in no more than an analytical clarification of the moral ideas in common use,

involving no

critical assessment of their basic content

( 3. 11. llff. ) .

If Locke indeed holds that the decisive difference between
civil

and

philosophic

usage

of

moral

language

consists

merely in the superior precision or exactness of the latter
(3.9.3),

then

Locke must

affirm the

necessarily conven-
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tional

or

historical

character

of

all

moral

discourse,

civil and philosophic alike.29
At this point it would seem that the Essay's ostensibly

reassuring

moral

conservatism

reveals

itself

to

be

merely the decent drapery of a profound radicalism lying at
the heart of Locke's adoption of the standard of common
usage. 30

His apparent counsel of deference to the accepted

usages of one's community dissolves upon contact with his
apparent affirmation of the basic conventionalism of those
usages.

What authority can be claimed for a body of common

usage that "reduces it self at last to the Ideas of particular Men''

(3.11.25)? 31

Locke's account of a demonstrative

science of ethics culminates, according to this argument,
in a

renewal of the paradoxical Hobbesian partnership of

authoritarianism and revolutionary radicalism.
conceives of moral
pure,

If Locke

and political science as a matter of

arbitrary definition,

does he not then reduce that

science to a counsel of submission to the authority of the
most powerful definer?

And if the basis of that authority

29 Absent a convincing argument for the existence of a
legislating God, according to Ashcraft, Locke's proposal of
a demonstrative science of ethics must sink into a "morass
of total relativism" (1969, 211). Cf. Parry 1978, 34.
30 cf. Strauss' objection to the ostensible conservatism of Burke (1953, 311-323).
31 cf. 3.11.12:
Immediately after recommending a
deference to common usage, Locke excepts those who "in the
Improvement of their Knowledge, come to have Ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones ... "
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is purely conventional, consisting decisively in the power
of the defining or commanding will, then could there be any
motive or ground for submitting to it, other than the timidity of those who believe themselves insufficiently powerful

to command?

tional,

Conversely,

would not a purely def ini-

conventional political science thus embolden the

rebellious or revolutionary aspirations of all those sufficiently proud or rash to believe themselves capable of
commanding?
The argument of the Essay thus reveals, in this view,
the deeply radical significance of Locke's conception in
the Second Treatise of the natural condition as a condition
of waste or unprovidedness, 32 and of his corollary description of the law of nature as "unwritten, and so nowhere to
be found but in the minds of Men" (TT II.136). 33
standing

Locke's

ostensible

reassurances,

Notwith-

it would

seem

that the constructive activity of Lockean humanity as homo
faber is if anything more prominent in the sphere of morality than

in that of physical nature. 34

Applied

in the

32 For Pangle Locke's critique of innatism or his
affirmation of the mind's natural unprovidedness thus
amounts to a "denial of all moral first principles'' (1988,
176ff). Cf. Vaughan 1925, 139,163ff; Wallin 1984, 155-156.
33cf. Strauss 1953, 226-230.
34 Thus a younger Locke observes that the laws of
nature are "hidden and unperceived," akin to wealth "which
has been hidden in the darkness" and "must be excavated
with great labor" (LN I.111; II.135). On the Lockean human
being as homo faber, see Wood 1983, 34,157ff.
On the related concept of workmanship as the central principle of
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former sphere,
rest

"in a

reach

of

Locke's apparently modest counsel that we

quiet Ignorance of those Things ... beyond the
our

Capacities"

appearance of modesty.

(1.1.4)

loses

altogether

its

All law is purely human or positive

law; no person's or party's definition of justice can be
said to be intrinsically superior, truer, than another's.
In Jeffrey Wallin's forceful distillation of the significance of this teaching,

according to Locke's Essay "the

discourse of politics, hitherto naively thought to be constituted by disputes over justice and the common good, can
be better understood as a battle of wills regarding the
question of whose mental image of justice is to prevail •i
(1984,

154). 35

viewed

in

the

The
light

naked essence
of

this

of Lockean politics,

reading

of

the

Essay.

is

nothing but will-to-power.

Lockean morality, see Tully 1980, 3,22-42,109ff,12lff.
35 see also Strauss 1953, 248-251; zuckert 1974, 561563; Miller 1979; West 1988, 21-29.

THE DEFENSE OF NATURAL HISTORY

In attempting to formulate a response to this reading,

it is worthwhile for us to begin by noticing what we

might call the strikingly "anti-Lockean" character of the
teaching thus attributed to Locke.
reading of the Essay.

In the light of this

the philosopher with a

reputation

perhaps unsurpassed as a teacher of rational liberty and of
resistance to arbitrary power appears instead to deny that
any particular conception of justice could be superior in
truth or rationality to any other, and thus to espouse the
most unrestrained moral

and political willfulness.

The

same Locke who insists against the evils of extreme partisanship that "there cannot be a more dangerous thing to
rely on" than "the Opinion of others"

(ECHU 4 .15. 6;

also

4.12.4), and who warns that it is no "small power it gives
one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles ... "

( 1. 4. 24) ,

nonetheless proposes a

science of ethics that would have the effect of reducing
all conceptions of justice to expressions of pure partisanship,

and thereby provides theoretical support for asser-

tions of absolute and arbitrary power.

The same Locke who

affirms that "civil government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniences

of

the

state

of nature"

(TT

II .13)

also

effectively undermines the distinction between the natural
116
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and political conditions by implying that in the latter no
less than in the former, the cardinal virtues are force and
fraud.

The argument of the Essay according to this view

undermines virtually all the principles Locke professes to
hold dear,

all the principles that he has gained enduring

honor by publicly defending.
Those who find in Locke's work such fundamental and
flagrant inconsistencies tend to explain them in either of
two ways.

The more traditional,

mainstream explanation

holds that Locke is simply confused; as John Dunn expresses
it, Locke's thinking is "profoundly and exotically incoherent"

(1969, 29).

Similar is the opinion of Peter Laslett,

who concludes sweepingly that "all thinkers are inconsistent," and who nonetheless finds the case of Locke extraordinary:

"Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all

the great philosophers" (1960, 103, 95).

Some commentators

imply further that Locke is not only confused, but is also
aware of and embarrassed by his confusions; Wolfgang Von
Leyden

believes,

for

instance,

that

Locke's

failure

to

elaborate fully his proposed science of ethics reflects the
fact that he was at a loss to do so (1954, 74-75), while
Dunn more recently argues that after a series of abortive
attempts at s,uch an elaboration, Locke in hopeless resignation

simply gave up

this

aspiration by 1694

( 1984,

66,
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Pursuing this reading still further,

84).36

Laslett even

suggests that the contradictory relation between the Essay
and the Two Treatises "may have been one of the reasons why
Locke was

unwilling to be known as

the

author of both

books" ( 9 5 ) .
The alternative account, recovered 37 and made prominent in recent years by Leo Strauss, explains the difficult
relation between the Essay and the Two Treatises by reference to a more coherent intention on the part of Locke to
address those works to distinct audiences:
Above all, the accepted interpretation does not pay
sufficient attention to the character of the Treatise;
it somehow assumes that the Treatise contains the
philosophic presentation of Locke's political doctrine,
whereas it contains, in fact, only its "civil" presentation. In the Treatise, it is less Locke the philosopher than Locke the Englishman who addresses not philosophers, but Englishmen.
(Strauss 1953, 220-221) 38
But if the Essay presents the truth underlying the civil
presentation of the Treatise, then it would seem to follow
that

the

latter's

accounts

of natural

laws

and

natural

36 A somewhat milder statement of the thesis that
Locke's failure to elaborate fully his proposed ethical
science reflects an incapacity on his part appears in Parry
1978, 33ff.
37 The suspicion that Locke is a self-concealed follower of Hobbes and Spinoza was widespread in the 1690s and
beyond.
See Works 1823, 4.471 for Locke's response to
Stillingfleet's charge to this effect. Cf. idem 8.420-421.
For a more general accounting of the charges leveled
against the Essay by Locke's contemporaries, see Yol ton
1956, especially 144-166; also Cox 1960, 19-28.
38For Locke's distinction between civil and philosophic discourse, cf. ECHU 3.9.3,8,15, with TT II.52, and
I.109. See also Zuckert 1974.
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rights are alike merely civil or exoteric, that the Essay's
apparent

demolition

of

ontologically

based

theories

of

morality or justice represents Locke's authentic intention:
"In a word, the law of nature is 'a creature of the understanding rather than a work of nature' ; it is 'barely in
the mind, '
(1953,

a notion,

229-230). 39

and not 'in the things themselves'"
The implication seems to be that in

place of the Locke of the traditionalists--muddled even to
the point of tragedy (Dunn 1984, vi-vii), but well intentioned and thus comparatively benign--we confront according
to the Straussian reading a positively perverse and even
nihilistic Locke, a Locke inspired by an insight into the
"demonism of values," whose public rejection of political
willfulness paradoxically represents in itself nothing more
than a self-conscious assertion of political willfulness.
As we proceed
view of Locke,

in

elaborating a

somewhat different

we will have occasion to acknowledge the

considerable merits of each of these readings; at present,
however, in beginning to lay the foundation for that alternative view,
difficulties.

it

is necessary to point out some possible
Of the more traditional

critics,

for

in-

39 strauss' references are to ECHU 3.5.12.
See also
West 1988, 3,21-29; Wallin 1984; Miller 1979. On the basis
of the natural law, Tully also reads the Two Treatises in
the light of the Essay, but he stops short of drawing the
nihilistic conclusion implicit in the Straussian reading.
In his view, Locke's employment of the language of natural
law is based upon a self-conscious historicism that circumscribes moral discourse by "the constitutive and regulative
ideas of a given culture" (1980, 22-30).
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stance, we might question the likelihood that a thinker who
is

sufficiently

competent

to

elaborate

a

thoroughgoing,

radical critique of the old Aristotelian-Scholastic epistemology and natural philosophy could be at the same time
incapable of seeing that that critique dissolved the foundation of his own ethical and political thought. 40

Or,

furthermore, if he were aware of such an inconsistency, how
likely is it that a writer so evidently fastidious about
his published work as Locke 41 would not attempt to correct
it?

And finally,

if for whatever reason Locke desired to

advance a doctrine of natural law that he knew he could not
defend, how likely is it that this desire could overpower
his respect for the truth in the writing of one work, but
not the other?
The esotericism thesis

renders

philosophically formidable Locke,
by intellectual
traditionalists.

fashion

a

subtler

and more

one far less captivated

or custom than the Locke of the

Yet here too questions linger.

Of these

the most significant concerns whether the attribution to
Locke of a fundamentally nihilistic epistemology can render
an adequate account of Locke's moral and political intentions as they are manifested both in his writings and in
his more direct engagements.

In view of the facts that he

40 cf. Strauss 1953, 220: Locke's alleged inconsistencies "are so obvious that they cannot have escaped the
notice of a man of his rank and his sobriety."
4 1 see Laslett 1960, 19-22,164.
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not only presented himself as the great enemy of all governmental

authoritarianism

and

willfulness;

that

he

not

only explicitly recognized that the power to define moral
rules implies the power to dominate; but also,

and above

all, that he placed himself in mortal danger in the service
of the cause of rational

liberty;

suggest that Locke believed,

is

it not strange to

deep down,

that

justice is

wholly definitional or conventional, or that there is ultimately no ground for any distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate government or between rational and irrational
consent?

In view

of

such

facts,

we might well

wonder

whether the proponents of the esotericism thesis in the end
view Locke as a

fully self-conscious nihilist or instead

merely find in his work a nihilistic strain that points not
to a coherent intention, but only to a deeper inconsistency
than the traditionalists allege--an inconsistency that proceeds fundamentally not from a half-hearted embrace of the
teaching of Hobbes,

perhaps tinged with a

Christian bad

conscience, but rather from a nearly whole-hearted adoption
of that teaching and therewith of its own peculiar difficulties.42
42 Though he seems at several points to imply such a
charge, Strauss does not openly accuse Locke of harboring a
nihilistic intention.
On the other hand, he does not
overtly accuse Locke of inconsistency, but one might easily
infer such a charge from the fact that in the matter of the
natural law, according to Strauss, Locke "followed the lead
given by Hobbes" (1953, 221), whom Strauss accuses of fundamental inconsistencies of his own (1953, 267-281; 1959,
182,191,196).
This ambiguity has marked some of the writ-
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It is by no means impossible, of course, that Locke's
political thought really does suffer from confusion at one
level or another, or that Locke really was a nihilist who
by

some

unaccountable

intention

espoused

exoterically

a

relatively moderate but ultimately groundless doctrine of
natural

rights

liberalism.

The

present

reconsideration

originates less in a certainty of the erroneousness of such
readings than in a kind of principled caution with respect
Nathan Tarcov maintains that "If ...

to their endorsement.

we hope to learn something from Locke, then the verdict of
confusion

ought

to be
other

only our
of

resort

and we

interpretation"

had

better

explore

200) .

To this we might add that this relegation of the

"verdict of confusion"

avenues

last

to the status of an

(1981,

interpretive

last resort should apply equally well to the verdict of
Lockean arbitrariness.
raise the question:

The ref ore,

we come once again to

Is there no reasonable alternative to

believing that the mature Locke's career-long devotion to
the cause of free government proceeded from a mere personal
or partisan idiosyncrasy,

that it represented, whether he

ing on Locke by Strauss' students or followers as well.
Thus Miller refers to the "enormous" difficulties in the
attempt at finding in Locke a coherent account of natural
law (1979, 187), and Hiram Caton views Locke's teaching as
an incoherent attempt at diluting the implications of the
philosophy of power that is the defining element of modernity (1983, 8-9); while Wallin and Thomas West clearly emphasize Locke's role as a progenitor of nihilism, and appear to attribute to him a higher degree of self-consciousness as such (Wallin 1984, especially 153-157; West 1988,
especially 22,26).
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understood
Abundant

it

or

textual

not,
and

a

mere

irrational

bibliographic

"commitment"?

evidence

establishes

clearly Locke's awareness of the diversity of moral conceptions, both theoretical and historical, among thinkers and
actual

communities,

conception. 43
either

that

and thus of alternatives to his own

Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate
he

believed

in the

short-term or

long-term

inevitability of victory for the doctrine of just government that he espoused, or that such a consideration might
have influenced him,

had he so believed.

Does this not

suggest that Locke chose, and thus preferred to espouse his
particular doctrine of justice?

And if so, then what are

the grounds for this choice? 44

Why or in what sense did

43 For some comparatively benign, theoretical examples
of such diversity, see ECHU 1. 3. 5, 4 .12. 4.
Some of the
more spectacular and grotesque examples appear in ECHU
1.3.9,10,13; TT I.54-60; LN IV.145-151, VII.177-201.
See
more generally the bibliographic information in Harrison
and Laslett 1971.
44 rt would not yet do justice to the element of choice
in his espousal of (what we now know as) political liberalism merely to establish somehow, in modification of the
arguments of MacPherson and Wood, that Locke intends to
rationalize the interests of an ascendant capitalist class.
If it is the effect of his epistemology to deny in principle that a "capitalist" conception of justice could be any
more defensible than any other conception of justice, then
his espousal of such a conception must again reduce ultimately to a mere idiosyncrasy, or to a failure to reflect
upon the accidental character of his association with that
class. Pangle suggests intriguingly that Locke's political
thought does indeed proceed from an intention to advance
the interests of a particular class, but that the class in
question comprises the philosophers; yet even this intention, according to Pangle, remains arbitrary at least from
the point of view of Locke's reader, in that Locke fails or
declines to render an account of the experience of the
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Locke apparently believe that he could erect a defensible
doctrine

of

justice or

legitimacy

on

the

basis

of his

understanding of nature or of human knowledge?
In reassessing the significance of Locke's critical
analysis of our ideas of species, it is useful for us to
begin with a

partial concession.

It is no part of the

present purpose to deny, in the face of the plain words of
his text, that Locke does emphatically reject the old doctrine of natural species.

The question of interest here

concerns not the fact that he does this but rather his
broader

intention.

Locke

places great

emphasis

on his

critique, elaborating it with unusual vigor; he gives the
impression that he considers its rejection to be of great
importance.

If

in

fact

he

intends

to

create

such

an

impression, then in order for us to understand the precise
nature,

scope and (possible)

limitations of his critique,

we must understand why he believes it important to render
this critique, what purpose he intends it to serve.
Locke believes he shall be pardoned for dwelling so
long on the question of essences, "because the Faults, Men
are

usually

guilty

of

in

this

kind,

are

greatest hinderances of true Knowledge;
thought of,

as to pass for it"

(3.5.16).

not

only

the

but are so well
As this remark

indicates, the faults with which Locke is concerned neither
originate in nor are limited to the scholastic philosophilosopher as such (1988, 264-275).

125
Nonetheless, the manner in which these influential

phers.

faults constitute such profound hindrances of the advancement

of

learning

comes

most

clearly

into

view when

we

consider his critical analyses of the doctrines of substance and natural species in the context of his more general critique of the teachings of Scholasticism.

Like his

predecessors Bacon and Hobbes, 45 Locke is uncompromising
concerning the pernicious general influence of the scholastic "Men of Argument" (3.11.3) over the universities of the
day.

Moreover, he maintains that the errors of the latter

concerning species and essences ultimately represent only
particularly important instances of the fundamental error
of the scholastic philosophy.

In holding "that the several

Species of Substances had their distinct internal substantial Forms;

and that it was those Forms,

which made the

distinction of Substances into their true Species and Genera" (3.6.10), Locke's scholastics hold that there exists a
direct

correspondence

between

the

(properly

cultivated)

understanding and the external, natural world.

They hold

that natural species essences not only exist,

but are in

principle

perfectly

definitions

of

intelligible

various

kinds

of

to

us;

our

substances

names

and

constitute

perfectly adequate representations of the order of things
articulated

in nature.

In this

respect 1 ike those who

4 5cf. Leviathan chs. 8, 46, 4 7; "The Great Instauration"; The New Organon, I, I-XXXVII (in Anderson 1960).
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possess only a purely prescientific or commonsense understanding

of

the

world,

they

erroneously

"suppose

their

words to stand also for the reality of Things" (3.2.5; also
2.13.18, 3.9.5, 3.10.14ff., 3.11.6, 4.4.17, 4.7.15;
It

is

not difficult

to

cu 29).

see why Locke blames this

supposition, however benign it may be in its everyday manifestations, for the obstruction of scientific progress.
For in treating their names of substances and species as
though they were authorized by nature itself, or in Locke's
terminology as though they were themselves "archetypes" and
not "ectypes" or copies, the scholastics must render themselves obtuse to the need to refine or correct their definitions by reference to empirical reality.
their

fundamental

error

is

then

a

The result of

particularly dogmatic

attempt at grounding natural science in "the bare Contemplation of ... abstract Ideas"

(4.12.9), or in a barren, ab-

stract rationalism according to which the careful deduction
of the consequences of applying one's "maxims" or "principles"

to

somehow

one's
yield

4. 8. 9ff.) .

received
genuine

substance
knowledge

or
of

species
nature

ideas

can

(4.7.llff.,

Given the natural variations among different

individuals' substance and species ideas,

a conception of

natural science as nothing but a body of deductions based
upon the application of maxims to those ideas is bound to
produce considerable dispute or dissensus.
virtue of its very abstraction,

or of the

Moreover,

by

fact that its
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supposed discoveries proceed purely from deductive reasoning, the scholastic natural science tends to carry an unreasonable expectation of demonstrative certainty as
Given further,

proper yield.

therefore,

its

this demand for

certainty that is a concomitant of any deductive science,
it follows that the scholastic natural science will produce
virtually infinite and endless disputes,

in direct propor-

tion to its tendency to inflate the dogmatic "confidence of
mistaken

Pretenders

to

a

knowledge

(3.8.2; also 3.6.49, 3.10.21).

that

they

had

not"

Its likely culmination, ac-

cording to Locke, will be its own collapse into a "perfect
Scepticism"

or

an

extreme

epistemological

willfulness

(1.1.7; 3.10.22). 46
What we are suggesting is that Locke

fashions his

critique of the methods and doctrines of the scholastics
with a view toward preparing a remedy for what he takes to
be their more pernicious consequences.

For such a disease

46 Nor should this account of the generally pernicious
effects of the scholastic teaching obscure its potential
for producing more particular evils as well.
Locke fears
that to be overly assured of the adequacy of one's idea of
humanity, for instance, is to be tempted all too often to
use that idea to define out of humanity beings deficient in
one quality or another.
We mentioned in the preceding
chapter his account of the alarming case of the eminently
rational Abbot of St. Martin, whose native disfigurement
brought him as a child "very near being excluded out of the
Species of Man" by those entrusted with his care (3.6.26).
At least a part of Locke's intention is clearly to insist,
on grounds of compassion or "humanitarianism," that our
ideas of species and of the human species in particular are
far from precise enough to provide a basis for deciding
questions of entitlement to baptism, let alone of life or
death (3.6.27, 3.11.20, 4.4.14ff.).
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as Locke diagnoses,

an assertion of the insuperable arbi-

trariness of all our claims to knowledge of the external
world would

surely constitute

a

highly peculiar remedy.

The present contention is rather that the therapeutic purpose he intends it to serve limits the destructive character of his critique; Locke's critique becomes fully intelligible

only

if

we

take

seriously his

stated

intention

thereby to remove the greatest hindrance of the acquisition
of "true knowledge" and to prevent the collapse of science
into "perfect Scepticism."

It is in the context of his

complaints against the philosophers of the schools that we
should understand the profession of modesty or moderation
with which he

introduces the Essay.

Repudiating as the

product of an intellectual vice the undiscriminating scholastic demand for certainty in all fields of inquiry, Locke
cautions that "we shall then use our Understandings right,
when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion,
that they are suited to our Faculties ... and not peremptorily,

or

intemperately

require

Demonstration,

and

demand

Certainty, where Probability only is to be had ... " ( 1. 1. 5) .
Similarly, with reference to the closely related quality of
abstraction in the scholastic natural science,

Locke ob-

jects to the practice of "some Philosophers" who would "believe [their) Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments
drawn

from

their

Principles)

(4.20.10; also 4.3.16).

against

their

Senses"
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The

implication

is

that

Locke's

critique

of

the

scholastic doctrines of substance and natural species is
governed by an intention not to assert a new and possibly
more virulent form of arbitrariness in place of the older
form,

but instead to facilitate a

defense of empirical,

probabilistic reasoning as the basis of a genuine science
Having denied the possibility of a

of nature.

demonstrative natural

strict,

science on grounds essentially the

same as those supporting his rejection of the doctrine of
natural species,

Locke hastens to add that he "would not

therefore be thought to dis-esteem, or dissuade the Study
of Nature"
certainty

( 4. 12. 11) .

The impossibility of demonstrative

concerning the

necessary

relations

among

some

ideas does not imply the futility of such study; it merely
means that as compared to inquiries such as mathematics
that involve ideas that are the mind's own creations or
archetypes,

the

proper

study

of

nature

differs

in

its

methods and in the type of knowledge or assent that it can
produce.

"We must therefore .•. adapt our methods of Enquiry

to the nature of the Ideas we examine,
search

after"

(4.12.7). 47

As

and the Truth we

Locke understands

it,

we

confront in the object of his critique the paradox of a
doctrine of natural species and by extension of natural
science that leads

its adherents away from nature,

away

47 Ryle holds that Locke's major contribution to
philosophy lies in his division of the sciences (1968
(1933], 38). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b.
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from the proper objects of inquiry for a true science of
He therefore insists repeatedly on the need to

nature.

return to "the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things
themselves" as the proper remedy for the hyper-rationalist
scholastic

abuses

(3.11.5;

4.4.16,18;

4.8.10).48

also

3.10.22,25;

3.11.24,25;

The proper method of inquiry into

the world of nature involves not abstract deductive reasoning about names, but rather inductive, probabilistic reasoning based upon the careful accumulation of "Experience,"
or "Observation" (4.12.12, also 14; 4.3.16). 49
employ

the

contemporary

usage,

Locke

calls

Choosing to
this

method

"Natural History."
Let us consider more carefully Locke's defense of the
legitimacy and utility of probabilistic reasoning in the
natural sciences.

In view of the fact that we cannot be

certain of cause-effect relationships,

the basic question

appropriate to the sort of natural science of which we are
capable concerns the degree of confidence with which we are
entitled to make experimental or inductive judgments.

In

his discussion "Of the Degrees of Assent," Locke affirms
48 on the revolt of the early modern empiricists or
proponents of the new "experimental philosophy" against the
scholastic "orgy of rationalism," see Whitehead 1925, 1224, 57ff.
On Locke's critique as an instance of this
revolt, see Mandelbaum 1964, 7-8,53ff; Yolton 1969, 188193; 1970, 44-75, especially 54ff; Squadrito 1979, 28-29,
126.
49 on Locke's insistence upon probabilism over against
certainty as the standard of assent proper to the natural
sciences, see Yolton 1969, 189ff; also Shapiro 1983, 3-73.
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that

in

several

degrees

evidence with it,
ment,"

"Probability ... carries

so

much

that it naturally determines the Judg-

so that assent that falls short of certainty can

nonetheless rise decisively above mere "Belief" or "Conjecture"

( 4. 16. 9) •

In the lowest of such degrees, Locke ob-

serves that with respect to "things that happen indifferently ... when any particular matter of fact is vouched for
by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there
our

Assent

is ... unavoidable."

Providing

still

firmer

ground is the corroboration of our own Experience by "many
and undoubted Witnesses."

The testimony of "History giving

us such an account of Men in all Ages; and my own Experience .. confirming it," for instance, the truth of the proposition "that most Men prefer their private Advantage,

to

the publick" is extremely probable (4.16.8,7).
Finally,

Locke

describes

the

"first ... and

highest

degree of Probability" in terms that make clear its great
significance for his account of natural science.

When "the

general consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can
be known, concurrs with a Man's constant and never-failing
Experience

in like cases," Locke holds that we can with

virtually perfect assurance make judgments concerning particular

matters

of

fact.

Probabilities

of this

degree

reach "so near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts
as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as
the most evident demonstration" (4.16.6; also 4.20.15ff.).
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Even if we do not observe the particular events,

we can

"put past doubt" the propositions that fire warmed someone
and melted lead and that a piece of iron sank in water and
floated in mercury, because they conform with our constant
experience and are never controverted.

In striking con-

trast to his emphasis in rejecting the naturalness of species, Locke maintains here that on the basis of such evidence we can infer that in the highest probability it is in
the nature of fire and lead so to behave.

When we find

certain occurrences "always to be after the same manner,"
as in the cases of "the stated Constitutions and Properties
of Bodies," we infer "with reason" that they represent "the
regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary
course

of

Nature.

11

This,

observes

Locke,

"we

call

an

Argument from the Nature of Things themselves" (4.16.6).
To what

extent does

this

account

of probabilistic

assent involve a concession to some form of the argument
for the naturalness of species?

Several commentators argue

either that Locke does not deny the existence of natural
species, 50 or more positively that Locke ultimately "admits
that

there

are

1983, 124). 51

natural

kinds"

(Mackie

1976,

88;

Colman

We must acknowledge that Locke's formulation

50 cf. Gibson 1917,
1970, 32-33.

199-201; Aaron 1955,

204;

Yol ton

51 colman plainly misreads ECHU 3.10.21 as a statement
in support of the existence of natural species, but he need
not rely on this passage alone.
As Mackie points out,
Locke provides stronger support for this reading at 3.3.13,
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may suggest an element of hesitation or ambiguity; to say
"we call" this an argument from the nature of things is
clearly less emphatic than to say "this is" an argument
Still,

from the nature of things.

the textual and bio-

graphical evidence is substantial in support of the opinion
that

Locke

is

sincere

in

his

defense

of

probabilistic

assent to propositions concerning the properties of things
in nature.

In considering the issue somewhat pragmatic-

ally, he clearly believes that such assent is indispensable
in the management of everyday living.

A complete rejection

of arguments "from the Nature of Things" or of any empirically grounded, probabilistic judgment would be not merely
unwise,

in Locke's view, but in fact simply impossible to

maintain consistently.

Let us consider,

certain vegetable or a piece of meat,

for instance,

bearing a

a

certain

color, texture, flavor, and a known (plant or animal) origin.

Let us assume further that in all or virtually all

previously

observed

instances,

such

coincident with a nutritional quality.

qualities

have

been

Must our ultimate

ignorance concerning the relevant real essence produce in
us

a

reasonable doubt of the nutritional quality of the

vegetable or meat before us?

Locke's answer is

firmly

rooted in common sense:

and especially at 3. 6. 36, 37.
Similar denials that Locke
effects a radical distinction between the real and nominal
essences of substances appear in Yol ton 1956, 139; 1970,
32-34; Von Leyden 1969, 229; Squadrito 1978, 41-59.
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He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of
nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure
of nothing in this World, but of perishing quickly.
The wholesomeness of his Meat or Drink would not give
him reason to venture on it:
And I would fain know,
what 'tis he could do upon such grounds, as were capable of no Doubt, no Objection.
(4.11.10; also 1.1.5,
4.2.14, 4.10.2, 4.11.2,3,4,8, 4.14.1; King 1830, 324)
More important for present purposes than its role in
ordinary

affairs,

however,

is

the

function

of

Locke's

defense of probabilism in preserving the possibility of a
science of nature.

Locke's seriousness on this point too

is corroborated biographically both by his fellowship in
the

Royal

Society,

and

by

the

fact

that

he

not

only

praised, but to one degree or another actively collaborated
in research with the "Master-Builders" Boyle, Sydenham, and
Newton,

all

of

whom

were

exponents

probabilistic natural science. 52

of an

experimental,

But would it be any less

difficult to conduct the research in pursuance of such a
science

than

to

manage

one's

absence of at least a tacit,

ordinary

concerns,

in the

hypothetical supposition of

the existence of real essences or natural species?

It is

difficult to see, for instance, how the chemist in Locke's
example who wishes to experiment with gold or sulphur would
52 The first Secretary of the Royal Society, Henry
Oldenburg, describes its purpose as follows:
'It is our
business, in the first place, to scrutinize the whole of
Nature and to investigate its activity and powers by means
of observations and experiments; and then in course of time
to hammer out a more solid philosophy and more ample amenities of civilization' (Quoted in Hunter 1981, 37).
On
Locke's collaborations with Boyle and Sydenham, see Cranston 1957, 88-93.
On the relationship between Locke and
Newton, see especially Rogers 1969 and 1978.
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acquire a

sample

for the experiment with out employing a

hypothetical conception of what the substance under investigation is,

or with out an

idea of a

qualities to which its name refers.
3.6.8).

set of coexisting
(See 4.6.8ff.;

also

Locke does of course grant the necessity of such a

conception, while clearly insisting that the idea in question constitutes merely a nominal, not a real essence.

The

point here, however, is that this nominal essence would be
of no help whatsoever in designing the experiment unless
one could reasonably suppose that certain ideas or qualities necessarily, naturally coexist--unless one could reasonably suppose,

that is,

sents,

imperfectly,

nature.

however

that the nominal essence reprea

real

species

essence

in

In the end it seems simply impossible to conceive

of a science of nature in any form absent a belief in the
possibility of making judgments concerning the nature of
things.

The fact that he takes seriously the possibility

of such a science would seem unavoidably to constitute on
Locke's

part

a

quiet

acknowledgment

of

the

limits of a

strict empiricism, or to put it another way, of the indispensability and hence reasonableness of adopting as a condition of all further knowing a certain epistemic faith in
the ultimate orderliness or lawfulness of nature. 53

53 cf. Whitehead's observation that "there can be no
living science unless there is a widespread instinctive
conviction in the existence of an Order of Things, and, in
particular, of an Order of Nature" (1925, 5).

136
Alongside his emphatic arguments for the purely suppositional or hypothetical character of substance ideas and
for the

false,

useless,

and pernicious character of the

doctrine of natural species,

Locke yet insists that we do

not and should not form our ideas of substances and kinds
simply arbitrarily. 5 4
But though these nominal Essences of Substances are
made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily,
as those of mixed Modes ... the Mind, in making its
complex Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature; and
puts none together, which are not supposed to have an
union in Nature ... For though Men may make what complex
Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they
will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak
of Things really existing, they must, in some degree,
conform their Ideas to the Things they would speak of:
Or else Men's Language will be like that of Babel; and
every Man's Words, being intelligible only to himself,
would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary
Affairs of Life...
(3.6.28)
And the same necessity of conforming his Ideas of
Substances to Things, without him, as to Archetypes
made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he would not
wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever
since under too.
(3.6.51)
If the premodern doctrine of natural species or sorts were
completely groundless, then an epistemological willfulness
in

determining

or

imposing

would be unavoidable.

order

in the

external

world

That Locke insists with respect to

our ideas of the species of substances that it is possible
and necessary to correct our definitions by reference to

54 As Grant points out (1987, 36), when Locke uses the
term "arbitrary" to describe the manner in which we form
some of our complex ideas, he generally means something
like "non-necessary" as opposed to "unreasonable" or
"willful." Cf. ECHU 3.4.17 and 3.5.3 with 3.5.6,7.
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the standard of nature, that "to define their Names right,
natural History is to be enquired into; and their Properties

are,

(3.11.24;

with
also

care

and

3.9.11,

examination,

4.4.12),

would

to

be

seem to

found

out"

indicate,

unless he were guilty of the grossest self-contradiction,
that he does not

intend his critique to

imply a

root-and-branch rejection of that doctrine.

total,

If our defini-

tions of substance and species names were wholly and necessarily conventional,

products of purely arbitrary agree-

ments, then how could they be capable of correction or
refinement by reference to a standard in nature?
It would seem that this appeal to nature or natural
history as the measure of our definitions is tantamount to
an admission on Locke's part that the doctrine of natural
species has at least a partial basis in experience.

As

Locke explains it, this basis lies in the fact that "Nature
in the Production of Things, makes several of them alike:
there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of
Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed"
3.4.17; 3.6.30,36,37).

(3.3.13; also

Locke concedes not only that there

are phenomenal likenesses among things in nature, but also
that these phenomenal likenesses probably represent internal or ontological likenesses:

"Nature makes many particu-

lar Things. which do agree one with another, in many sensible Qualities,

and probably too,

and Cons ti tut ion ... "

( 3. 6. 3 6) .

in their internal frame

The probability that some
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causal

necessity lies beneath the considerable degree of

order manifest in the natural world provides the legitimate
basis of our arguments "from the Nature of Things. 1155

This

does not necessarily mean that Locke resurrects in a different form the doctrine of natural species.
and

cannot

concede

the

legitimacy

of

any

He does not
probabilistic

inference of the adequacy of our ideas, constructed out of
phenomenal likenesses, as representatives of real essences
themselves; for our ignorance of the real essences or internal constitutions of things coupled with the virtually
infinite number of ideas that may constantly coexist in a
given substance render it at least as a practical matter
impossible that our species ideas could adequately represent the things to which we refer them. 56

It is for this

55 Ayers maintains that "Locke's recognition of natural
resemblances is not a concession of any kind in the
argument against natural species," and accordingly that
Locke's insistence on the possibility of correcting our
species definitions expresses merely his desire for greater
precision in our construction of nominal essences ( 1981,
257,264-266).
Once again, however, it seems to me wholly
mysterious how Locke could insist that the "Properties" of
species "are, with care and examination, to be found out"
(3.11.24), i.e. how he could believe in the possibility of
refining our nominal essence ideas by observation unless he
acknowledges the possibility that nature produces things in
kinds, with constantly coexisting qualities in common.
56 An exception appears at 3.6.37, where Locke states
that species essences are "of Man's making," and not never,
but "seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the Things
they are taken from." Because Locke provides no example of
a species idea that is adequate to the internal nature of
its referent, it is difficult to explain this exception.
At no point, however, does he elaborate any of its possible
implications or modify the thrust of his critique on this
basis.
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reason that Locke urges us to give up the aspiration toward
final, complete knowledge of natural species essences.

But

the resemblances or "similitudes" of things do make it possible for us to make more-or-less rough judgments concerning the

likelihood that

a

given

set of similar natural

beings are constituents of a natural species whose precise
boundaries are unknown to us, and they also make it possible for us to judge the adequacy of our species ideas relative to one another,

according to their greater or lesser

accounting of coexisting ideas (3.6.31,

Nothing

4.6.13).

in Locke's argument prevents us, for instance, from judging
on the basis of our observation of the regular coexistence
in

certain

Sense,

beings

of

the

ideas

spontaneous Motion,

(3. 3 .10)

or

qualities

of

"Life,

and the Faculty of Reasoning"

that such beings are very probably members of a

common natural

species.

The real

difficulty that moves

Locke to emphasize the conventional element of species definition concerns not the existence of an "ordinary course
of Nature,"

but rather the fact that nature seems "very

liberal of these real Essences" (3.6.32), or as Mackie puts
it,

that

nature

"supplies

far

more

(similitudes

among

things] than we use" (1976, 136).5 7
57 Locke's eager references to the irregularities of
nature's production--once again, "sit fides penes Authorem"--for the most part represent only especially striking
instances of the fact that nature produces a virtual infinity in number and degrees of resemblances among particulars.
The key to settling the boundaries among species
lies in selecting which of these resemblances it is impor-
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However firm, therefore, may be Locke's refusal simply to resurrect the doctrine of natural species on the
basis of his defense of probabilism and natural history, it
is clear that the resemblances or "similitudes" among nature's productions provide the proper foundations for our
formation of substance and species ideas, and by implication

for the empirically oriented improvement of natural

science.
able

to

Locke's suggestion that it is possible and desircorrect experimentally our substance or species

definitions seems based upon a conception of the relation
of

nominal

to

real

essences

as

asymptotic,

such

through diligent experimentation and observation,

that

we are

entitled to hold our nominal essences as ever-closer,
always
real

imperfect,

essences.58

approximations
Therefore,

the

of

their

fact

of

if

corresponding
our

ultimate

uncertainty about the existence of necessary combinations
or repugnancies among ideas or qualities in nature does not
liberate us from any natural discipline in the formation of
these

ideas .

Indeed to the contrary,

Locke reasons,

underlines the need for such discipline:

it

"our Ideas of

Substances ... must not consist of Ideas put together at the
tant or useful for us to select and denominate as species
(cf. 3.6.38). As again Mackie observes, it is this selectivity that above all constitutes the element of human
workmanship in the construction of species ideas (1976,
136).
To the problem of the grounds for selecting and
ranking species, especially as it applies to the human or
moral species, we will return in chapters V and VI.
58 cf. Colman 1983, 124-125.
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Pleasure

of

our Thoughts,"

but

"must

he

such,

and such

only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature."

Thus fanned on the basis

of careful attention to "Experience and o}::>servation," our
ideas

of

substances,

"though

not,

pe:rbaps

very

exact

copies" of things in nature, "are yet th~ Subjects of real
( as far as we have any) Knowledge" of theln'' ( 4. 4. 12) . 59
We are now in a position to summatiie, to draw some
more general conclusions,

and to dispel at least some of

the obscurity with which Locke admittedly treats the issue
of our classifications of substances (3.6.43).

To repeat,

Locke clearly holds that the doctrine of natural species is
useless as an explanation of how we actua11Y classify natural substances;
ignorant of real

he clearly holds that we are ultimately
natural

essences,

and clearly wants

at

least to render questionable the existence of such essences.

But if we consider this critique in abstraction from

its intended object, or from Locke's opinion of the importance in delivering it, then we are unah1e to explain his
defense of a natural science based upon natural history or

59 According to this reading, Lock~,~ own intention
comes fairly close to the epistemologiccu moderation that
Wallin views as an anti-Lockean element iP the thought of
Madison.
Affirming according to Wallin tbe naturalness of
error in the study of both nature and politics, Madison yet
contents himself with proclaiming our ignorance of "only
the precise delimitations of natural and human things," and
thus disposes of "both naive certitude al'ld radical skepticism, the theoretical antecedents of a politics of the
will" (1984, 161-163).
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of the

credibility of probabilistic arguments

from

"the

Nature of Things" other than by reference to his own confusion or to a purely rhetorical intention on his part.

The

suggestion here, however,

is that the ambiguities or even

apparent

in

inconsistencies

Locke's

critique

of

natural

science do not compel us to conclude either that he

is

simply confused in this matter or that he is an esoteric
teacher

of

a

willfulness.

radical

epistemological

conventionalism

or

In this view his apparent inconsistency and

radicalism are best explainable by reference to a

third

alternative, namely that they actually proceed from a consistent, moderate and constructive intention that appears
most clearly in the light of his objections to the pernicious consequences of the methods and doctrines of scholasticism.

That Locke employs his apparently radical argu-

ments in the service of an overarching moderate intention
appears most likely when we view those arguments in the
context of his more general objection to the arbitrariness
implicit in the scholastic doctrine of natural species and
in its entire conception of natural science.
Locke believes it important to discredit the scholastic account of classification for much the same reason that
he believes it important to reject their doctrines of innatism:
adequate
inscribes

the claim that nature authorizes as perfectly
our

ideas

of

species,

like

the

claim

that

it

in our minds propositional knowledge at birth,
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encourages us to hold those ideas dogmatically and arbitrarily,

as

though they were

simply

required no empirical measurement.

self-validating and

Given this belief,

it

would be obvious folly for Locke to argue for a radical
disjunction

between

nominal

essences

and

such that our construction of species

essences,

ideas were wholly

liberated from any empirical foundation.
he does not so argue,

real

We contend that

and that recognizing the ultimate

kinship between the extreme alternatives of the scholastics'

naive naturalism and a

seeks

to

clear

a

middle

radical conventionalism,

ground.

Locke's

rejection

certainty as the appropriate criterion of assent

he
of

in the

natural sciences implies a denial that the basis of classification is an all-or-nothing proposition.

That we cannot

be certain of the precise natural grounds for our classifications

of

substances

does

thoroughgoing conventionalism.

not

compel

us

to

embrace

a

On the basis of his defense

of probabilistic assent, Locke seeks to promote a more genuinely empirical science of nature.

He therefore fashions

his critique of the doctrine of natural species so as to
emphasize that such a science is both necessary and possible--necessary because nature's provision to the understanding is imperfect, thus forcing us to labor to gain knowledge that is in the far greater part neither intuitive nor
obvious,

and possible because nature provides the founda-

tions for our efforts at classification, thus ensuring that
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those efforts need not collapse into arbitrariness as a
result of our ignorance of real essences.
Central to the ambiguity in Locke's argument is his
conception of the proper general basis of our classifications as partly natural and partly conventional.
ideas,

to repeat once more,

Species

are "the Workmanship of the

Understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude
of things" in nature (3.3.13; also 3.4.17; 3.6.30,36,37).60
Given his apparent estimate of the influence of the uncritical naturalism that he opposes,
to

emphasize

strongly the

it makes sense for Locke

element

of

conventionalism or

laboring in the acquisition or construction of human knowledge.61

We can thus understand his insistence on the un-

derstanding's alienation from, or at best mediated acquaintance with the external world of nature; his insistence on
the inadequacy of our nominal essences, based on natural,
phenomenal likenesses, relative to real essences; and even
his
even

occasional
the

denigrations

results

of

"wary

sophisticated guesswork,

of

probabilistic

Observation"

as

assent,

of

more-or-less

amounting "only to Opinion"

and

lacking that "certainty, which is requisite to Knowledge"
60 cf. Locke's more general observation that human
knowledge is "neither wholly necessary. nor wholly volunary" (4.13.1).
61 Yolton aptly observes that "So important was it for
Locke to deny the possibility of a science of nature in the
rational sense of 'science'--in order to show the need for
a careful experimental science of nature--that he takes
frequent opportunity of stressing the point" (1969, 189).
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( 4. 6. 13; also 4. 2. 14, 4. 3. 14, 4. 12. 10, 4. 15. 4) .

Acting on

the principle that a sense of desire or uneasiness stimulates industry (2.21.34; STCE 126), Locke seeks to unsettle
our

ideas

in

order

to

somewhat paradoxically,

stimulate

more

careful

inquiry.

he occasionally denigrates proba-

bilism because his very defense of probabilism requires it;
for in seeking to prevent the dogmatic reification of our
ideas, to maintain the sense of their openness and incompleteness that is necessary to any serious empirical inquiry, 62 it is important for Locke to maintain clearly in
view

both

the

requisites

of

perfect

knowledge

and

the

extent to which we fall short of attaining it. 63
62 For this reason I believe that Ayers overstresses
the significance of Locke's insistence on the precision of
species boundaries as "an extremely important and explicit
principle of his philosophy" (1981, 256). As we have seen,
it is true that Locke cites nature's apparent imprecision
in defining species boundaries as an important reason for
doubting the doctrine of natural species; and it is also
true that at several points he insists upon precision in
defining such boundaries as a requisite of clarity in communication.
But just as Locke refuses simply to divorce
nominal essences from real essences or from their patterns
in nature, so he must also insist that we regard our nominal species definitions as somewhat open-ended, balancing
the desideratum of clear communication with that of scientific advance. See ECHU 4.6.6-10.
63 r am thus inclined to disagree mildly with the
judgment of Margaret Osler, who sees in Locke's thought a
reflection
of
the
"crisis"
in
seventeenth-century
philosophy of science, and more particularly an unresolved
tension between its inheritances of Cartesian rationalism
and the empiricism of Boyle and Newton among others.
Thus
according to Osler, Locke's "intellectual crisis" consists
in the fact that though "he recognized that certainty was
no longer a possible or appropriate ideal for empirical
science," he nonetheless "continued to regard certainty as
the earmark of genuine knowledge" ( 1962, 10-11) .
My own
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Moreover, Locke hopes by teaching us to "moderate our
Perswasions"

(1.1.3)

not only to

stimulate

inquiry,

but

also to move us in our "fleeting state of Action and Blindness ... (to)
4. 14. 2) .

be

less

imposing

on

others"

(4.16.4;

also

He intends by his emphasis on the conventional

element of our species constructions to provide a sobering
reminder of the naturalness of human error, of the insuperable uncertainty that darkens so many of the objects of
human inquiry, and therewith of the need for toleration and
compromise in the pursuit of intellectual consensus.

At

the same time, he remains sensitive to the danger of overvaluing consensus as such, at the cost of losing sight of
the ultimate goal of rational consensus, and therefore does
not in the final analysis espouse an extreme epistemological conventionalism.
be a

In denying that natural science can

strict demonstrative science and thus affirming its

ultimately hypothetical
the total

character,

Locke does not affirm

arbitrariness of our conceptions of the world

external to the mind, and does not deny that some hypotheses or some conceptions of that world are truer, or more
probably true,

than others (4.12.13).

One must "not make

his own Hypothesis the Rule of Nature ... For no definitions,
view is that while Locke does hold certainty superior to
probability as a general mode of knowing, his intermittent
application of it to natural science represents not a moreor-less confused response to a surrounding crisis, but
rather an intention to preserve the salutary modesty that
accompanies a sense of the limits of a probabilistic
natural science.
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that

I

know,

enough

to

no Suppositions of any Sect,

destroy

constant

Experience"

are of

force

(2 .1. 21, 19;

also

In espousing a qualified, moderate conventional-

4.8.10).

ism, in insisting that our species ideas properly conceived
do

not

represent perfectly definable

real

essences,

but

rather derive from the imperfect likenesses observable in
nature,

Locke seeks only to replace an abstract,

hyper-

rationalist, barren natural science with one solidly grounded in a genuine empiricism.
ness,

but to the contrary an unprecedentedly disciplined

investigation
values

He counsels not arbitrari-

most

rational

of

the

highly

consensus

"natural

not
based

history"

consensus
upon

refined by experimental science.

as

common

of

such,
sense

things.
but

He

instead

observation

He intends his moderate

conventionalism not to promote peace at the price of truth,
but rather to promote "Truth, Peace, and Learning" together
(3.5.16).

He destroys only in order better--less arbitrar-

ily--to construct.
work to perform a

Having promised at the outset of the
critical,

destructive,

ground-clearing

operation that would remove "the Rubbish, that lies in the
way to Knowledge," Locke subsequently and less prominently
declares it his intention "in the future part of this Discourse ... to raise an Edifice uniform,

and consistent with

it self, as far as my own Experience and Observation will
assist me ... " (1.4.25; also 1.4.23).

CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL SCIENCE II:
THE CORPUSCULARIAN HYPOTHESIS
It may seem consistent with the Essay's empiricist
agnosticism concerning cause-effect relations in particular
and natural science in general that Locke at several points
renounces any intention to pursue "Physical Enquiries" into
the natures of the mind,

of the ideas in its perception,

and by implication of the objects that those ideas represent (2.8.22; also 1.1.2, 2.8.4, 2.21.73).
rect, however,
permissive
mere

in attributing to Locke a relatively loose,

empiricism

data-gathering

crudities"

If we are cor-

that

to

recognizes

produce

the

"nothing

propensity
but

a

heap

of
of

(CU 13), and thus recognizes the legitimacy of

probabilistic assent to experientially well grounded, partial hypotheses concerning the natures of things that exist
external to the mind, then there is in principle no reason
for a strict renunciation of such inquiries.
reason,

in other words,

There is no

for Locke to insist upon a strict

segregation between the "empirical" and the "rational," or
more precisely between "the 'historical'

(or descriptive)

and the philosophical

in the study of

(or explicative)"
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nature. 1

If Locke's defense of the historical study of

nature encourages us to infer from the ordinarily observable similarities among things their probable ontological
kinship as members of the same species, then why would it
not encourage us to go further, if we could, and to pursue
hypotheses concerning the causal relations among things, in
order to place our judgments on the firmest ground possible?
In

order

to

gain

a

full

understanding of

Locke's

account of natural science, it is necessary for us to draw
forth

the

affirmative

implication

that

lies

within

his

apparently modest.description of his own task as that of a
mere "Under-Labourer."

For it is clear that Locke's pro-

fessed modesty is the modesty of a fellow-traveler in an
intellectual

revolution,

consisting

only

in

an

admiring

acknowledgement that this revolution has been spearheaded
by others, 2 that his role consists

in consolidating its

gains and perhaps in preparing its further advance.

Both

his professed preparatory intention and his acknowledgment
of the "Builders" of the sciences imply a belief in the
1 Romanell 1958, 316, quoted approvingly by Givner
1962, 345.
Cf. the distinction between the problems of
classification and of explanation in Woolhouse 1971, 81-95.
2 In addition to the corpuscularian masters to whom he
refers in the Essay's dedication, Locke acknowledges the
influence of the "justly admired" Descartes, to whom he
bears "the great obligation of my first deliverance from
the unintelligible way of talking of the philosophy in use
in the schools in his time ... " (Works 1823, 4.48).
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possibility and indeed at least the partial actuality of
philosophy or philosophic knowledge.

Thus Aaron holds that

while Locke's own analytical work represents in itself no
more than "a preliminary concern," it derives its justification as a preparation for the advance of true philosophy,
exemplified in Locke's view in the "synthetical" works of
masters such as Newton, Boyle, and Sydenham (1955, 74-75).
Yolton argues similarly that Locke's.main objective in the
Essay is "not to extend our knowledge of things but to show
us some of the ways of doing so, even to explain how Boyle,
Newton, Sydenham were extending human knowledge."

Locke's

achievement is to give "a philosophical foundation for the
new science"

(1970, 16,75; also 1969, 183).

and lending focus

to this reading

is the

Corroborating
fact

that the

Essay's treatment of explanatory natural science contains
much more than exposures of errors and agnostic renunciations

of

science.
confidence,

the

possibility

In particular,

of

a

complete,

demonstrative

and often with notable apparent

Locke moves beyond his indefinite description

of particular substances as something "supposed, I know not
what" (2.23.15), permitting himself not only to suppose the
existence of causally primary qualities that inhere in the
real

essences or internal constitutions of material sub-

stances, but also to offer somewhat more specific descriptions of their natures as causal agents.
descriptions,

In offering such

Locke endorses what he calls the "corpuscu-
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larian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest
in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies"
(4.3.16; also STCE 193).

Thus it is the view of numerous

commentators that in his specific capacity as underlaborer,
"Locke set himself the task of developing in a coherent,
systematic and rational way what he took to be the fundamental tenets of the corpuscularian philosophy ... "

(Harre

1964, 93) . 3
Those who adopt this view commonly hold also that
Locke's endorsement of the corpuscularian hypothesis and
his insistence on the historical method of natural science
are of a piece, or more precisely that the latter derives
from

the

former. 4

The question

arises,

however,

as to

whether these two elements of Locke's treatment of natural
science are in the end mutually compatible.

In the very

process of facilitating his defense of the possibility of a
partial science of nature against formidable epistemological objections, Locke's relatively permissive empiricism may
3 rn the words of Peter Alexander, "the 'lasting monument' of the master-builders which most impressed Locke was
the corpuscular philosophy, " especially in the form in
which Robert Boyle proposed it (1977, 63-64).
Givner
( 1962, 340-42, 346) and Mandelbaum ( 1964, 1-15) claim that
Locke simply presupposed or accepted without questioning
the truth of the corpuscular theory. Cf. in general Yolton
1970, 5-43; Woolhouse 1971, 91-101, 111-114; Curley 1972;
Laudan 1977.
4 Thus Givner claims that "Boyle's corpuscular
thesis was the assumption on which Locke based his
that language cannot represent the real nature and
ture of things ... " (1962, 340). Cf. Alexander 1977,

hypobelief
struc66.
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open itself to at least equally formidable ontologically
oriented objections.

Can Locke espouse the corpuscularian

hypothesis without thereby negating even the partial intelligibility of nature upon which his defense of natural history and experimental philosophy depends?

In the final ac-

counting, what is destroyed in the course of the revolution
with which Locke associates himself, and what constructed?
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine,
again with particular reference to the problem of species,
the

relation between Locke's

defense

of

the descriptive

method of natural history and his apparent endorsement of
the corpuscularian theory as the foundation of an explanatory science of nature.
view of that theory,
porting to

We will begin with a brief over-

and then present two arguments pur-

show . that

the

consequence

of assent to that

hypothesis would be indeed to render impossible a consistent, intelligible account of nature.

Finally, in respond-

ing to these arguments, we will attempt to show that while
Locke's apparent assent to this hypothesis is by no means
free from difficulty,

he does not endorse it in a manner

that commits him to the ultimately nihilistic implications
that some commentators find in it.
The

corpuscularian

hypothesis

as

Locke

employs

it

represents an attempt at explaining "the Nature of Sensation"

( 2. 8. 2 2)

(4.3.16).

and

therewith

"the

Qualities

of

Bodies"

Our perceptual experience contains a tremendous
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diversity
odors,

of

ideas,

textures,

of

shapes,

motions,

and

colors,

so

sounds,

forth.

tastes,

In seeking an

explanation of this experience, we wonder what real beings
in nature correspond to these ideas.
tion,
ideas;

we

wonder what

"Quality,"

qualities

as he defines

In Locke's formula-

in nature produce
it,

these

refers generally to

"the Power to produce any Idea in our mind"

(2.8.8).

Our

natural or initial response to such wondering, according to
Locke, is simply to posit a power or quality to correspond
to each of our ideas; our idea of the shape of a red ball
is then produced by its quality of roundness, for instance,
as our idea of its color is produced by its quality of redness.

But this for Locke is merely to restate the ques-

tion, not to explain or render intelligible the nature of
sensation or of bodies.

When we consider further the ques-

tion concerning how bodies produce ideas in us,
conclude that it is "manifestly by impulse,
which we can conceive Bodies operate in"

we must

the only way

(2. 8 .11).

Our

experience requires us to suppose the existence in nature
of

no

more

causal

qualities

than

those

necessary

to

a

body's capacity to act by impulse, by direct physical contact,

on other bodies. 5

The corpuscularian theory holds

that all material objects or "natural Things ... have a real,
5 cf. Mackie 1976, 18-20, on the economy of postulated
qualities. According to Aaron, "primary qualities are just
the concepts which the scientist of the seventeenth century
found it necessary to presuppose if his science was to be
possible" (1955, 125-126).
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but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts,

from

which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another" (3.3.17).

These insensible

parts or "Corpuscles," as the primary constituent parts of
all externally existing objects or "Bodies," are "the active parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature"
(4.3.25).

When we perceive objects at a distance, accor-

ding to this theory, "'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes,
convey

to

the

Brain

some

Motion,

which

and thereby

produces

these

Ideas, which we have of them in us" (2.8.12).
This

corpuscularian

hypothesis,

by

virtue

of

its

explanation of the production of sensory ideas by impulse,
yields a perplexing distinction between two kinds of qualities or powers, which Locke designates "primary" and "secondary" qualities. 6

Corpuscles are "active," according to

Locke, manifesting "active powers, 117 in that their "primary" or "real qualities" represent the causal bases of all
the ideas that such objects present to our perceptions.

In

6A brief discussion of the history of these terms appears in Aaron 1955, 121ff. For a more extended discussion
of the forms in which this distinction appears in the works
of various early modern scientists, see Burtt 1932, 67-71,
83-90, 115-121, 130-134, 180-184.
7 cf. 2.21.2:
"Power thus considered is twofold, viz.
as able to make, or able to receive any change:
The one
may be called Active, and the other Passive Power."
But
see 2.21.4,72, and 2.23.28, for the suggestion that active
power may be an attribute only of "Spirits" or thinking
beings, not of material substances.
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the most fundamental sense, primary qualities are

causally

primary; and if (efficient) causation occurs by impulse, it
follows

that

primary

qualities

"are

utterly

inseparable

from the Body, in what estate soever it be" (2.8.9).

They

are qualities without which a thing could not conceivably
have bodily existence, and therewith a capacity for communicating motion by impulse.

Hence the primary qualities

include the "Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation ... Motion, or
Rest," and "Texture" of objects or their constituent parts
(2.23.28,10). 8

Secondary qualities are then causally sec-

ondary or epiphenomena!, and are qualities without which a
thing could conceivably have bodily existence.
include colors,

tastes,

Examples

sounds, and odors (2.8.10,13,

and

passim).
There is a certain ambiguity in Locke's description
of secondary qualities.

We have noticed his definition of

qualities as powers,

which would seem to imply a certain

equivalence

secondary

between

and

primary

merely different forms of quality or power.

qualities

as

Yet he also at

times implies a distinction between qualities and powers,
such that only primary qualities exist as real qualities or·
properties of things as they are in themselves, while secondary qualities are in strict usage not qualities at all,
8 Locke's specifications of the particular primary
qualities tend to vary; I have here presented an inclusive
listing of those qualities that he commonly, though not
invariantly, refers to as "primary."
Cf. especially
2.8.9-26 and 2.23.8-19,30-32.
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but only powers
will

return

to

2.23.8-10;

2.31.2). 9

We

significance of this

ambiguity;

but

(2.8.10,13-17;
the

whatever the proper terminology, the basis of Locke's distinction seems to lie in his peculiar usage of the relative
concept of resemblance (2.8.7,15,22,25).

A thing or sub-

stance manifests a primary quality or power, according to
Locke, when it produces an idea that resembles its causal
ground, or that resembles a quality without which a thing
cannot be conceived to have a material or bodily existence.
A thing manifests a secondary quality when it produces, !2y
virtue of its possession of primary qualities, an idea that
does not resemble any primary quality.

The significance of

this usage of "resemblance" has provoked considerable controversy among commentators; 1 0 but a few examples may pro9 Jackson (1929; cf. Mandelbaum 1964, 19-20) thus
regards the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities as a distinction between qualities and powers,
while Curley (1972, 443-445, 450-454) explains it in terms
of a difference between two forms of power.
For Curley,
Locke's ambiguity on this point proceeds from the genuine
difficulty in rendering a precise definition of "quality."
While I do not discount the difficulty Curley describes, I
believe that this ambiguity reflects a more fundamental
tension in Locke's thought, of which Locke is well aware,
between natural science and common sense.
See below, pp.
179-186.
lOThe following questions provide the substance of
much of the controversy. Is Locke referring to the primary
qualities of observable objects, or of insensible particles?
Do the primary qualities in question resemble their
ideas as "determinates" (e.g. a particular shape) or
"determinables" (e.g. shape in general)?
How, in any
event, is it possible to compare an idea with a quality
existing in nature, if only ideas are present to our minds?
For various answers to such questions, see the discussions
in Jackson 1929; Aaron 1955, 116-127; Mandelbaum 1964, 16-
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vide sufficient clarification for present purposes.

Sup-

pose that the actual shape or texture of a thing were decisive in determining our idea of its shape or texture; we
could then say that there is a kind of family resemblance
between an idea and its determining quality.

Suppose, on

the other hand, that by virtue of its shape or texture, a
thing could produce in us an idea of its color or taste; we
could then say that there is no such resemblance between
the idea in question and its determining quality.
explanation perhaps

provides

as

Mackie's

much clarity as Locke's

discussion permits:
Essentially what he must be claiming is that material
things have, for example, shapes which are determinations of the same determinable or category, shape in
general, as are the shapes seen, felt, or thought
of ... The contrast that Locke is drawing is with, for
example, colors. It is not that we sometimes make mistakes about colors •.. but that even under ideal conditions ... colors as we see them are totally different ...
from the ground or basis of these ~owers in the things
that we call coloured.
(1976, 14) 1
Locke readily acknowledges that however useful this
account may be in resolving some of the apparently puzzling
facts in our ordinary perceptual experience (2.8.19,20,21),
the

distinction

remains

between

primary

and

in some sense unintelligible;

secondary

qualities

in particular,

"we

can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of
28; Yolton 1970, 47-49, 130-131; Mackie 1976, 13-27.
11 similar explanations of Locke's concept of resemblance appear in Mandelbaum (1964, 16-30) and in Curley
(1972, 450-454).
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any Particles,

can possibly produce in us the Idea of any

colour, Taste, or sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable
connexion

betwixt

the

2.8.14,25, 4.3.28) . 1 2

one

and the

other"

( 4. 3. 13 ;

also

It is due to this inconceivability

that we tend reflexively to posit real qualities in things
that correspond directly to our ideas of secondary qualities.
that

The implication of Locke's distinction, however, is
the

peculiar

appearance

of

secondary

qualities

as

somehow essentially or qualitatively distinct from ideas of
primary qualities derives in the decisive respect not from
the causally primary qualities themselves, but instead from
the manner in which we experience them.

As we experience

them in the richness and diversity of their appearances, as
we ordinarily conceive them by reference to the seemingly
nonmaterial aspect of their existence, secondary qualities
depend decisively upon a

relation or interaction between

object and perceiver (cf.

2.21.3), or between the minute,

insensible parts of objects and our own sensory organs.
The existence of such apparent "qualities" as sweetness as
a particular taste or buzzing or ringing as a particular
12 Thus in Leibnitz' New Essays On Human Understanding,
Theophilus suggests the replacement of the distinguishing
criterion of resemblance with that of intelligibility:
"when a power is intelligible and admits of being distinctly explained, it should be included among the primary qualities, but when it is merely sensible and yields only a
confused idea it should be put among the secondary qualities" (II.viii.lo).
As we will see, however, even the
relation between primary qualities and their corresponding
ideas is scarcely more intelligible, according to Locke,
than relations involving secondary qualities.
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sound depends no less than the existence of pleasure or
pain (2.8.16) upon the presence of a perceiver whose sense
organs

interact with certain primary qualities so as to

produce the ideas in question.

In the absence of such a

perceiver, such "qualities" would exist not as the colors,
sounds,

tastes

experience,
variously

or

smells

proper

to

our

ordinary

sense

but instead only as the peculiar motions of
constituted

insensible

corpuscles;

they

would

"vanish and cease," as Locke puts it, "and [be] reduced to
their

Causes,

i.e.

Bulk,

Figure,

and

Motion

of

Parts"

(2.8.17; also 2.8.23, 2.23.11, 4.6.11).
Locke's account of the corpuscularian theory and of
its application to the process of perception has received
considerable

attention

from

professional

philosophers

in

particular, many of whom have found it fraught with serious
difficulties.

Inasmuch as we too

seek,

like Locke,

to

avoid entanglement in extended "Physical Enquiries," however, it is beyond our present purposes to attempt to resolve
or even to explicate all such difficulties.

Our purpose in

presenting this brief description is to provide the context
for

raising some very troubling questions concerning the

apparently destructive implications of Locke's account of
the relation of secondary to primary qualities.
or both of two ways,

In either

assent to the corpuscularian theory

might be destructive of the possibility of a coherent account of nature as an intelligible order:

it might imply a
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direct negation of nature itself as mere chaos or flux, and
it might imply a more indirect negation of the human understanding's capacity to comprehend anything external to itself.

We turn now to a more detailed consideration of each

of these possible difficulties.

CORPUSCULARIANISM AND COMMON SENSE

Whatever their compatibility in other respects, it is
possible to argue that there is at least in one important
respect a kinship between Locke's empiricist critique of
the doctrine of natural species and his employment of the
corpuscularian
qualities.

distinction between primary and

According to Michael Zuckert,

secondary

the common root

of these two branches of Locke's thought is an intention to
effect a "radical break with the common-sense understanding" of the world, an understanding that was expressed and
refined especially in traditional or premodern philosophy's
doctrines of natural species and natural virtues and vices
(1974,

562).

Locke makes no attempt to deny that at least

on one level, his doctrines must appear strange to people
of ordinary common sense.

After all, we do not commonly

believe that we directly perceive only ideas of coexisting
qualities and not things,

or that the qualities that we

observe in things are in reality no more than "mechanical
Affections of the minute parts" of those things
But there is far more to it than this.
tion

is

what

all

accept

not merely that
philosophizing

uncritically

the

(4.3.26).

Zuckert's conten-

Lockean philosophizing requires
requires,
reports

namely

of common

a

refusal

to

sense or the

opinions common (or for that matter not so common) to one's
161

162
It is rather that Locke knowingly effects a rad-

society.

ical and dangerous break with common sense.

Zuckert holds

for instance that Locke's corpuscularian teaching, in conceiving

of

secondary

qualities

as

perceiver-dependent,

ultimately reduces them to a status of unreality or mere
subjectivity.

As opposed to primary qualities, which in-

here necessarily in the "internal Constitution,

and true

Nature of Things" (2.23.32; also 2.8.9,15,17,23), secondary
qualities are merely relational or "imputed," but not in
the things themselves (2.8.22; also 14,18,19). 13
that

in our ordinary experience,

nonetheless
guish

"those,

Substances

And given

secondary qualities are

which ... serve principally to

one

from

another,

and

distin-

commonly make

a

considerable part of the Idea of the several sorts of them"
(2.23.8; also 2.8.22,26), it follows, according to Zuckert,
that the doctrine of the unreality of secondary qualities
must

have

a

radically

unsettling effect.

Whatever the

mischiefs generated by the abusive subtlety of scholastic
13 zuckert's reading is similar to that of Gibson on
this point:
"Behind the theory, as Locke understood it,
lay the metaphysical assumption that the qualities which
really belong to a substance must belong to it 'in itself,'
apart from any relation in which it stands to anything
else, including our organs of sense and the perceptions
which are mediated by them ... On the other hand, any apparent characteristics of a thing, which it possesses at one
time but not at another, cannot be attributed to the thing
as it is 'in itself,' but are merely indications of accidental and temporary relations in which it stands to other
things, or to our minds" ( 191 7, 1 O1) .
Cf. Mandelbaum:
" .. ordinary perceptual experience, while useful in all the
concerns of life, does not for Locke reveal the nature of
material objects as they are in themselves" (1964, 40).
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philosophers who "proved," as Locke charges, that snow was
black (3.10.10),
self,

they did not go so far as did Locke him-

"who proved not that snow was black but that it has

no color at all" {1974, 562).

In overreaction against the

dogmatic naturalism of the scholastics, Locke seeks in this
view not to refine or to deepen the ordinary, reflexive way
in which we experience the world, but instead to discredit
it as fundamentally misleading or illusory.

The ambigui-

ties that mark so much of Locke's presentation should not
surprise us,

inasmuch as

they proceed from an awareness

that such a fundamental break effected overtly and unambiguously would tend to be destructive of the ends of civil
society (ibid., 563).
But why, we might ask, would the undermining of this
understanding of common sense and its doctrines of natural
virtues and vices have such an effect?

Could not the tran-

scending of common sense thus understood prepare the acquisition of a new, more adequate, more critical or scientific
understanding of an essentially orderly natural world, one
that

contained

vices?

its

own

doctrine

of

natural

virtues

and

The radicalism that zuckert finds in Locke's most

serious teaching consists in its capacity to undermine not
merely our ordinary conception of the world,

but in fact

any possible conception of an orderly natural world.

In

order to see the depth of the question raised here concerning the relation of Lockean philosophy or science and com-
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mon sense, therefore, it is necessary for us to consider a
bit further the implications of Locke's apparent conception
of the world that lies behind what is present in our ordinary experience.
Writing with a more immediate concern for the problems of technical philosophy than for those of morality or
politics,

Michael

Ayers

zuckert' s

contention.

nonetheless

Ayers

implicitly

supports

indeed pushes the thesis of

Lockean radicalism nearly to its limits, arguing that Locke
at least at times is willing to carry the principle of the
natural fluidity or anarchy of species boundaries to truly
nihilistic
Locke's

extremes.

He

argues

more

specifically

rejection of the doctrine of natural

that

species or

kinds is "much more metaphysical, and less dependent on any
assumption
(1981,

about

249).

directly,

meaning,

than

modern

writers

suggest"

Locke's rejection of that doctrine follows

in other words,

puscularian ontology.

from his acceptance of the cor-

The crucial premise of Ayers' read-

ing is that in seeking an explanation of natural phenomena
in terms of material and efficient causation, Locke adopts
the mechanistic conception of matter characteristic of the
seventeenth century's "New Philosophy," and thus holds that
matter is the only universal nature:
ic or substantial forms,
motions,

etc.

"there are no specif-

only the different shapes, sizes,

of particular quantities of matter ... "

In

this mechanistic world, there really is no great chain of
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being,

for there

are no 1 inks to compose such a

chain;

nature's production must be anarchic not only across species,

but

even

over

time

for

particular

individuals.

Locke's reduction of nature to its causal core means not
only the banishment of secondary qualities from the realm
of nature,

but also the discrediting of the

commonsense notion of a plurality of natures:

fundamental
"all differ-

ences are differences of degree, and everything is in principle indefinitely mutable" (1981, 250,258,255, also 263).
In the 1 ight of this assumption regarding the nature of
matter appears the true,

radical significance of Locke's

observation that
All Things that exist, besides their Author, are all
[sic) liable to change; especially those Things we are
acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under
distinct Names or Ensigns.
Thus that, which was Grass
to Day, is to Morrow the flesh of a Sheep; and within a
few days after, becomes part of a Man ... " (3.3.19; also
2.26.1).

According to Ayers' reading, Locke holds that change
is the pervasive,

predominant fact of natural existence.

The natural chaos manifests itself in the fact of mortality
or perishability--and this means not only in the fact that
natural beings, living beings in particular, are subject to
regular cycles of generation and decay,

but most clearly

and powerfully in the fact of natural predation.

What is

normal, in this view, what best indicates the character of
the natural condition,
one another.

is that natural beings metabolize

For what reason can we hold it any more nat-
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ural, any more in accordance with nature's intention, that
the stuff of which we are made should exist in the form of
speaking, rational beings, rather than, say, as minerals in
the soil or as flesh in the teeth of some other predatory
animal? 14
This understanding of the significance of the fact of
change

or perishability becomes more accessible when we

view it, once again, in the context of Locke's critique of
scholasticism.

For the scholastic or premodern doctrine,

the fact of material things' perishability need not pose
much of a difficulty.

By explaining that things possess a

common species membership by virtue of partaking somehow in
a

common "substantial

form,

11

the adherents of this view

could conceive of the essential change or perishing of a
thing as a transformation, as a cessation of its partaking
in its previous

form,

without considering such change a

danger to the existence of the form or the principle of
classification

itself.

unintelligible"

this

cause,

But
appeal

upon
to

rejecting

some

as

mysterious

"wholly
formal

Locke reasons that we could gain a clearer under-

standing of the question of species distinctions in nature
by recasting it in terms of material and efficient causation:

What material and efficient causes make it necessary

that certain qualities constantly coexist--to the extent
14 As Locke makes clear, we should count our. fell ow
humans among the natural predators, in the most literal
way. See TT I.56-59; ECHU 1.3.9.
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that

they do--or that

nature

regularly produces certain

distinguishable forms or kinds of things?

The essences of

things are to be conceived not as ideal forms, but instead
as "internal constitutions," as physical and probably corpuscularian entities. 15

The

fact

of physical

change or

perishability therefore creates a difficulty for this conception in that it seems to imply that the essences themselves are perishable.

The fact that such physical consti-

tutions are subject to change would seem to imply that the
observable coexistence of qualities is not strictly necessary at all, and therefore that there are no real essences
in nature, neither of species nor of individuals.
According to other commentators, a still more general
observation subsequently confirms the nihilistic implication of Locke's view of natural science.

The preceding

examples of natural flux can be taken also to illustrate
more generally the principle of the ultimately contingent
existence of all natural or nondivine beings, or of their
dependence for the integrity of their beings upon myriad
environmental conditions that are wholly or mainly beyond
their own control.

"For we are wont," observes Locke,

to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them,
as an entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities
in it self, and independent of other Things; overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids, they are encompassed with; and upon whose
15 on
the
distinction
between
real
essences
as
substantial forms and real essences as corpuscularian
constitutions, see Woolhouse 1971, 91-98, 101-114.
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Motions and operations depend the greatest part of
those qualities which are taken notice of in them ...
Things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for
that which they are most taken notice of by us.
(4.6.11)

Gibson comments that "Such reflections clearly require the
rejection of the conception of material

things as self-

contained substances, each with an essence from which all
its properties and operations flow ... " (1917, 199) . 16

The

contingent character of our natural condition as Locke here
describes it is perhaps more pervasive and profound than we
are capable of realizing.

For we depend for the integrity

of our being not merely on our freedom from the earthly
dangers of starvation, exposure, disease, and predation of
one sort or another, but more radically upon cosmic conditions

such as the relative positions and motions of the

earth and the sun, and perhaps others of which we are unaware.17

How would the material or chemical constitution of

16 Gibson goes on to observe that "Locke refrains from
drawing so revolutionary a conclusion," explaining that the
"conception of essence, like that of substance ... is clearly
a presupposition which Locke has never thought of calling
in question" ( 1917, 199,198) .
Aaron notes "the curious
relativism" of ECHU 4. 6 .11-12, but does not elaborate his
view of the significance of these passages (1955, 204).
Cf. also Von Leyden (1968, 159):
Although "advanced by
Locke almost as an afterthought," the doctrine in question
is "remarkable" in that it draws very near "to Spinoza's
doctrine of God or Nature as the only substance of which
all particular things or persons are modifications."
17 Cf. again 4. 6. 11:
" ... perhaps, Things in this our
Mansion, would put on quite another face, and cease to be
what they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies
incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or
move as it does."
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human beings behave, what "powers" it would manifest, given
a radically altered cosmic environment?
tive of this principle of contingency,

From the perspecit would appear at

least probable that there are as many "human natures" as
there are possible environments for them, or alternatively,
that our experience of a finite plurality of stable natures
rests ultimately upon a mere prejudice, a groundless faith
that those earthly and cosmic conditions favorable to their
existence are somehow more "natural" than those unfavorable.

And if we take into consideration the fact that these

conditions too "are all liable to Change"--that there have
been, and for all We know could be again, very long periods
of time in which no life at all, let alone intelligent life
existed on earth or perhaps anywhere else in the universe-then we must raise the question of flux or mutability from
the earthly to the universal level.
of things,

Taking a general view

perhaps we should simply say then that nature

itself is nothing other than a ceaseless, aimless, universal process of creation and destruction. 18
Far from placing it on a
fore,

according to this

firmer foundation,

reading Locke's

there-

adoption of the

corpuscularian or mechanist principle compels him to dispense entirely with the supposition of the existence of a
plurality of real natural essences and to conceive of an
utterly chaotic natural world, a world radically in flux in
18cf. Nietzsche, The Will To Power aph. 1067.
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which any of a virtually infinite number of possible configurations of matter or energy could become actual at any
In this view, in the wake of his adoption of the

moment.

corpuscularian hypothesis,

Locke's professed intention to

advance the experimental improvement of our knowledge of
nature must ultimately collapse into absurdity.

Whatever

order or lawfulness nature may manifest to our unimproved
senses

is ultimately a

mere semblance,

an

illusion that

serves at best to conceal the dangerous truth about the
human condition.

The human race is by nature no more than

another link in an unbroken food chain;

or,

truer still,

human beings are as all other natural beings, no more than
accidental and fleeting configurations of matter-in-motion,
doomed to a fate of endless, meaningless mutation.

Nature

thus understood can no more provide guidance for us in our
search for moral principles or valuations than it provides,
absent any improvement by human labor,
comfort.

for our safety and

The ontologically oriented critique thus returns

us in the end to the conclusion of the epistemologically
oriented critique:
order,

the idea of "nature" as a

however necessary to our well-being,

governing

represents at

bottom an act of self-deception, a projection of the human
will. 19
It seems, therefore, that in considering the implica1 9 cf. 1. 3 .14: "Morality and Mechanism," Locke remarks
somewhat cryptically, "are not very easy to be reconciled,
or made consistent."
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tions of Locke's employment of the corpuscularian theory,

we come to face a by-now familiar alternative.

If we con-

cede that the fact of change or mutability does indeed pose
a genuine difficulty for Locke's attempt at reformulating
the problem of classification in corpuscularian or mechanistic terms, must we then concede too that Locke's employment of that theory admits of no moderate treatment of the
problem?

Does

Locke's

employment of

the corpuscularian

hypothesis commit him to accept the nihilistic conclusion

we have described?

If he refuses to accept that conclu-

sion, must we conclude that Locke's thinking on the crucial
question of natural science is ultimately incoherent?
With respect first to the question of Locke's intentions,

it

is worthwhile once again to take note of the

strangeness of the implications of the doctrine his critics
ascribe to him.

"There is no doubt something wrong with

Locke's view," Ayers observes, "since there does seem to be
something more than physically odd in the supposition that
a horse should become a cow" (1981, 270).

To this we might

add that something seems at least equally wrong with the
proposition that only imperishable,
can have natures.

indestructible things

We do not suggest that proving a given

doctrine "strange" or contrary to common sense can suffice
to prove that Locke could not espouse it; Locke repeatedly
acknowledges that some of his doctrines must appear strange
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or contrary to ordinary habits of thinking. 20

But the fact

remains that Locke himself does not explicitly draw the
nihilistic conclusion from his discussion of natural sciWe have noted in the previous chapter his acknow-

ence.

ledgments of the possible existence of real natural essences

(3.6.30,36,37),

his

affirmative

references

to

the

"ordinary course of Nature" (4.16.6; also 2.26.2,4; 4.6.13;
4.3.28; TT II.60), and to the possibility of gaining partial but reliable knowledge of "the Reality of Things" or
of "the several sorts of natural Bodies" through a careful
accounting

of their

observable characteristics

2.11.15;

3.10.22;

3.11.5,24;

( 3 .10. 25;

3.11.25;

also

4.4.16,18;

4.8.10).

To these we now add the fact that not even from

his discussions of the fact of change and the principle of
contingency does Locke explicitly derive the extreme conclusions that some commentators find implicit in them.
From his discussion of change,

for instance,

Locke

explicitly derives only the somewhat ambiguous conclusion
that the "Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences, proves
them to be only abstract

Ideas"

(3.3.19).

The

fact

of

change may mean no more than that real, corpuscularian constitutions or essences cannot be "ingenerable, and incorruptible."

As Locke presents it here,

it need not mean

20 In addition to the passages discussed above concerning the intuitive difficulty of the distinction of primary
from secondary qualities, see ECHU 2.27.27; 3.6.38; also TT
II.9,13,180.
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that there are no real essences, or that the existence of
the internal constitutions of things is so unstable as to
afford no legitimate basis for our constructions of essence
and species ideas.
the

principle

of

His explanation of the significance of
contingency

Stated somewhat reducti vely,

is

similarly

restrained.

that principle amounts to a

reminder that in conceiving of the natures of humans and
other earthly beings, we must take as a premise the presence of certain environmental conditions that bring forth
and sustain those natures in their ordinarily observable
modes of existence, growth and development.

Our ideas of

nature thus proceed from a perspective--anthropocentric in
its

focus

on

those

qualities

accessible

to

our

sensory

capacities, geocentric in its presumption of the normality
of the present material,

climatic and atmospheric condi-

tions of the earth, and perhaps as well comprehending the
present constitution of the whole solar system or even the
galaxy in which the earth is situated.

Given the limits

inherent in any perspective however broadly conceived,

it

follows that our knowledge of the natures of things is very
incomplete, "that we have very imperfect Ideas of Substances."

This is the conclusion Locke draws from his discus-

sion of contingency:
hopes

of

(4.6.12).

ever having

We should "put an end to all our
the

Ideas

of their real

Essences"

He never states or implies that our environment

really is radically unstable or mutable--that there is any
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significant likelihood that the atmosphere could suddenly
become

unbreathable,

for

instance,

or

that

there

could

occur a sudden alteration in the proximity of the earth to
the sun.
the

In accordance with this apparent confidence in

regularity

of the

course of

nature,

he affirms the

reasonableness of experimentally framing our conceptions of
earthly natures by reference to those forms of being that
the earth's normal environmental conditions bring forth.
As we will see still more clearly in the following
chapter, Locke indeed holds that the natural condition is
in very important respects one of unprovidedness for human
beings.

Our intent here is only to point out that he does

not claim that this natural unprovidedness is so extreme as
to negate the legitimacy of conceiving of normal conditions
for the existence,
ings.

growth and development of natural be-

But if Locke himself does not draw the extreme con-

clusions that some commentators draw from his employment of
the corpuscularian theory, then it becomes necessary for us
to reconsider the manner and degree of his assent to that
theory.
We recall that Locke claims to find the corpuscularian account useful for explicating the "Nature of Sensation"
(2.8.22)"

and the Qualities of Bodies"

quite clear,
theory

in

however,

the

form

(4.3.16).

It is

that he does not believe that that
in

which

he

finds

it

contains

any

finally adequate explanation of these phenomena, and there-
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fore that his assent to it in its present form is at best
provisional;
thought

to

for him it is merely that theory "which is
go

farthest"

toward

an

adequate

account.21

Locke's assent rests to a considerable extent upon the fact
that we can only conceive of bodies operating on us,
presenting to us
(2.8.11).

ideas of their qualities,

or

"l2Y impulse"

He never attempts a corpuscularian explanation

of the real essence of any particular substance,

subse-

quently acknowledging not only that we have no comprehension of the the specific processes in which primary qualities

produce

secondary

qualities

(4.3.12ff), 22

but

also

21 cf. STCE 193:
" ... the Modern Corpuscularians talk,
in most Things, more intelligibly than the Peripateticks,
who possessed the Schools immediately before them. "
We
should not disregard the context of this remark, i.e. a
discussion of what should be "taught a Young Man as a
Science," inasmuch as Locke may be especially concerned to
stress the limitations of materialist explanations to a
youthful (or parental) audience. He does take care, albeit
briefly, to recommend the study of "Metaphysicks" or
"Spirits," to be gleaned from "a good History of the Bible"
(190), as a preface to the study of natural philosophy.
Cf. Bluhm et al. 1980, 437. Nonetheless I believe that the
evidence present in works intended for more learned audiences, notably the Essay. conf inns that the opinion Locke
expresses here concerning the adequacy of the corpuscularian theory reflects his most serious thinking. My own discussion of the limits of his assent to that theory draws
heavily from the discussions in Yol ton 1970, 56-64, and
Wilson 1979.
22 rn his "Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of
Seeing All Things in God," Locke reiterates his opinion of
our ultimate ignorance of the process of perception:
"Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I
understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain
may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our
minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible ... The ideas it is certain I have ... but the manner how I
come by them, how it is that I perceive, I confess I under-
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that even the manner in which bodies communicate motion to
each other is wholly mysterious to us
important, however,

(2. 23. 28). 23

Most

is the consideration that in order for

it to be truly useful in explaining the qualities and proprties of both individual substances and species essences,
the corpuscularian theory would have to provide an explanation not only of the causal relations between primary and
secondary

qualities,

but

relatively stable union,

also

of the

or

the

of the insensible particles that

constitute observable bodies.

And here again, the corpus-

cularian theory notwithstanding,

we "can as little under-

stand how the parts of Body cohere,
perceive, or move"

coherence,

as how we our selves

(2.23.25; cf. 2.23.23-27).

Locke thus

summarizes the natural phenomena that resist any corpuscularian explanation:
... the coherence and continuity of the parts of Matter;
the production of Sensation in us of Colours and
Sounds, etc. by impulse and motion; nay, the original
Rules and Communication of Motion being such, wherein
we can discover no natural connexion with any Ideas we
stand not" (Works 1877, II.421-422).
23 In connection with the claim that a nonimpulsive
sensation is inconceivable to us, it is therefore useful to
bear in mind Locke's denial that the inconceivability of a
given proposition can in itself justify assent to its contrary (4.3.6, 4.10.19).
Indeed this is especially pertinent for the inconceivability of action at a distance, in
view of the fact that the phenomenon of gravity seems precisely to contradict this principle.
Locke holds the corpuscularian hypothesis useless for explaining gravity (STCE
192; "Elements of Natural Philosophy," Works 1877, II.474),
and admits in his controversy with Stillingfleet that Newton's work has convinced him to discard the opinion that
bodies can operate only by impulse (Works 1823, 4.467-8).
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have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will
and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect.
(4.3.29)
Locke's failure to endorse the more extreme implications

of

a

strict

reading of the corpuscularian theory

appears directly related to his estimate of
explanatory power.

its

limited

Most fundamentally, his merely quali-

fied assent to that theory is consistent with his professed
openness

to

the

exist in nature.

possibility

that

real

species

essences

The key to this openness is his agnostic

reserve in conceiving of the nature of matter.

He does

concede that in "speaking of Matter, we speak of it always
as one, because in truth, it expresly contains nothing but
the Idea of a

solid Substance,

same, every where uniform.

11

which is every where the

But this does not entitle us

to make inferences about the real world of nature, because
it merely means that matter as we thus conceive it is a
pure abstraction:
Extension,

" ... since Solidity cannot exist without

the taking Matter to be the name of something

really existing under that Precision" can produce nothing
but

disputation

conjecture,

and

obscurity

(3.10.15). 24

In

Locke's

al though "our general or specif ick conception

of Matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all

2 4The difficulty in conceiving of matter as a pure
abstraction may account for the differences between the
Essay's definition and the following, with which Locke
begins his more introductory "Elements of Natural Philosophy":
"Matter is an extended solid substance; which being
comprehended under distinct surfaces, makes so many particular distinct bodies" (Works 1877, II.472).
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Matter

is

not

one

individual

thing"

(4.10.10);

matter

exists

in the world only in particularized parcels that

combine and recombine with one another in mysterious ways
to produce an enormous diversity of transient yet relatively stable and regular forms of existence.

The abstract

conception of the unity or sameness of matter may enable us
easily enough to account for the element of flux or mutability in the physical world; but so long as we cannot account as well for the facts of cohesion and continuity, for
the order and stability amid the flux, we will remain ignorant of "the Substance of Body" (2.23.30; also 4.3.22). 25
It appears then that Locke draws no sweeping conclusions concerning the degree of mutability in physical
bodies or the existence or nonexistence of real essences in
nature,

because in his view we simply do not know enough

about whatever is the fundamental stuff of which natural
bodies

are

composed

to

infer

with

any

reliability

its

capacity to assume an infinite diversity of forms or con25 Ayers agrees that in contrast to Descartes, Hobbes,
and Boyle, Locke is agnostic concerning the nature of matter, yet remains convinced of its reality:
"Hence material
substance is extension for Descartes, but something we know
not what for Locke" (1981, 250). It seems to me that since
the notion of substance-in-general, unlike that of particular substances, is necessarily a pure abstraction, the
reasoning that Ayers attributes to the "New Philosophers"
and to Locke amounts to this:
Suppose the fundamental
sameness of things in the world, and the conclusion of radical mutability is inescapable.
But for Locke the fundamental sameness or difference of things is precisely what
is in question; the procedure that Ayers attributes to
Locke amounts to simply supposing a problem out of existence.
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figurations,

let alone its likelihood at any given moment

to undergo spontaneous, radical mutation.

The most we can

say is that we are ignorant of anything that necessarily
prevents

natural

(3.6.22;

4.3.10).

beings

from

undergoing

such

mutations

Locke does not assume the truth of the

corpuscularian theory in its current form and then inf er
from it the nonexistence of real essences in nature,

nor

does he employ it to absolutize the sway of change or transience,

to the dogmatic exclusion of the phenomena that

indicate a degree of order in the world.
imputation of an nihilistic ontology,

Contrary to the

it seems to be the

case that its incapacity to explain the degree of observable order in nature, most clearly represented by the relative

cohesion

and

continuity

of

things, 26

is

of

major

importance in preventing Locke's assent to the corpuscularian theory in more than a qualified and provisional manner.
One further clarification is required.

We have ar-

gued that Locke's assent to the corpuscularian theory does
26 cf. Yolton 1970, 85:
"Cohesion seems to have held
the secret of nature for Locke, in the sense that only with
that could our knowledge of body cease in any way to be
observational and become conceptual. "
It seems doubtful
that knowledge of cohesion in itself could facilitate the
method of "deducing from essences" that Yolton is here
concerned to explicate.
However that may be, my own
suggestion is that knowledge of cohesion does hold an
important part of the secret of nature for Locke, but in
the sense that it could lay bare the ground of the fact
that things are manifestly not so radically mutable as the
mechanist thesis narrowly conceived would lead us to
expect; that Locke regards such knowledge as a desideratum
indicates that he takes seriously the degree of stability
or order that is manifest in our ordinary observation.
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not compel him simply to assume a natural chaos, but instead is qualified in a manner that permits him to retain
an openness to the existence of a ground for whatever degree of orderliness his inquiries into natural history may
reveal to him.

The fact remains, however, that even thus

qualified, his assent commits him to the view that, whether
the basic causal entities are the corpuscles that he describes

or

instead

Comprehension"

"something

(4. 3 .11),

the

yet more

causal

remote

ground

for

from

our

whatever

order exists among natural bodies must lie in their internal, physical constitutions.

He must then accept some form

of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
What requires clarification is the status of the secondary
qualities.

In what sense does Locke assert the unreality

of such qualities,

in contrast to primary qualities?

If

the real essences or internal constitutions of things are
in principle inaccessible to the human understanding,

and

if the secondary qualities of observable objects provide
the basis of our ordinary classifications of such objects,
then does Locke's assertion of the unreality of such qualities

imply that

in his view we are radically alienated

from the truth about the natural or external world?
Locke
charge,

indeed

hold,

as

we

have

seen

some

Does

commentators

that whatever order may exist in the real world,

the world of secondary qualities that appears to our common
senses or to our prescientific understandings is essential-
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ly subjective or illusory?
Occasionally

though

not

consistently,

Locke

does

identify the "true Nature of Things" with their "internal
constitution" or causal core (2.23.32; also 2.23.29).
this

internal

constitution

consists

in

those

If

qualities

"which every Thing has within it self, without any relation
to any thing without it"
follow that

( 3. 6. 6) ,

secondary qualities,

then it would seem to
which depend

for their

peculiar existence upon the presence of a perceiver, constitute no part of the real nature of things.

Yet in his

description of secondary qualities, Locke does not simply
deny their reality or assert their mere subjectivity, nor
does his notion of the nature of a thing as the nonrelational "thing in itself" strictly require it of him.

He

says that secondary qualities "in truth are nothing in the
Objects themselves,
tions in us ... "

but Powers to produce various Sensa-

(2.8.10, 14-24; emphasis supplied).

Leav-

ing aside the question whether primary qualities, which are
after all themselves powers as well, are by nature any less
relational than secondary qualities, we need only reformulate the status of secondary qualities in order to show
that they too can be thought of as nonrelationally,
stantly present in bodies.

con-

If we conceive of secondary

qualities as powers or dispositions in things to produce
certain sensations in beings like us, i.e. beings possessing certain sensory organs, then we can think of such pow-
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ers or dispositions as constantly present in things even in
the absence of any particular perceiver.

Thus Curley holds

that although Locke has not achieved a sufficiently sophisticated dispositional theory, his occasional apparent suggestions of the unreality of secondary qualities represent
inconsistencies
(1972,

that

are

not

essential

to

his

doctrine

464,440) _27

In fact such a conception seems implicit in Locke's
frequent
gaining
things

references
some

to the

partial

through

a

possibility and

acquaintance

careful

accounting of

characteristics.

As

nature

of

themselves, '

Essay,

almost

things

Yol ton

never means

with

observes,
which

'the

necessity of

the

natures

of

their observable
the

runs

internal

"phrase,

'the

throughout the
cons ti tut ion of

objects' ... It refers to the objects of observation" (1970,
124) .

Observable properties

or secondary

qualities can

then be included in the nature of things as well as the
primary qualities of insensible corpuscles.

But if Locke's

27 curley distinguishes "individual" powers, or "the
capacities of individual objects, or classes of objects, to
affect or be affected by a given individual object, " from
"sortal" powers, or the powers of individuals or classes of
objects "to affect or be affected by all individual objects
of a certain kind." Sortal powers, unlike individual powers, can be regarded as intrinsic to their objects (447449). My argument is that without naming it, Locke does in
fact make use of the distinction Curley describes; the
ambiguity in his usage of it derives not from his failure
to grasp it, but rather from his awareness of the difficulty involved in employing a concept of dispositional qualities for the purpose of defining precisely a given substance or kind.
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corpuscularianism permits him to distinguish the nature of
an object from the causal ground of its properties,

then

why does he sometimes identify the two?
With this question we return to the fundamental purpose of Locke's account of natural science.

By occasion-

ally identifying the "true Nature" of a thing with only its
internal constitution and primary qualities, and therewith
calling attention to the (merely) dispositional reality of
its secondary qualities, Locke calls attention to the fact
that the secondary qualities or observable properties of
things

are

reason it

in

principle

infinite

in

number.

is not possible to define a natural

For

this

substance

with perfect adequacy and precision by reference only to
its observable properties, and therefore it would seem to
make

sense

for

Locke

to

restrict his conception of the

nature of a thing to the finite number of qualities inhering in its causal core.

But the fact that according to

Locke the knowledge of the causal core required for a perfect definition is inaccessible to us implies that there
must be a further reason for him to make this identification.

We concluded the preceding chapter with the observa-

tion that Locke's intention to defend the historical,
probabilistic study of nature against the arid,

dogmatic

rationalism of the scholastics requires him not only to
defend the possibility of empirically based judgments concerning the natures of things, but also to maintain in view
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the

requirements

of

a

strict,

demonstrative

science

of

nature in order to preserve a salutary sense of the necessary imperfection of our knowledge.

The ambiguity under

present consideration appears to proceed in part from the
same design;

Locke's hypothetical

description of

a

real

corpuscularian essence from which we could deduce a thing's
properties

(4.3.25)

represents

an

elaboration

of

the

unattainable requisites of a perfect, demonstrative science
of nature.

The fact that knowledge of this "true Nature"

is in principle unattainable compels us to classify things
historically or descriptively rather than scientifically,
while the recognition that only such knowledge is perfect
prevents

us

from

reifying

our

own

classifications

as

finally adequate.

A single principle seems to govern the

major

of

ambiguities

both

Locke's

epistemology

and

his

ontology:

Only through a sense of the ultimate hiddenness

of

can we gain what

nature

knowledge

of

nature we

are

capable of. 28
But

this

application

of

the

corpuscularian

theory

does not simply reiterate Locke's epistemological argument
for a sense of openness with respect to our classifications
of things in nature; it carries a further implication for
the manner in which we should pursue our historical inquiries.

If secondary qualities do not inhere "in" things as

a fixed number of constantly manifest, wholly nondisposi28cf. LN I.111; II.135; CU 3.
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tional

or nonrelational qualities,

then their number and

character must be functions of changing environmental conditions

(4.6.11).

Moreover,

if they are epiphenomena of

the primary qualities that Locke describes, it would follow
that their number and character are functions especially of
changes in their physical environments.

We can then under-

stand Locke's identification of the true natures of things
with their corpuscularian constitutions as primarily intended not to call into question the reality or naturalness of
secondary qualities, but rather to stimulate active experimentation

aimed

at

the

discovery of

new properties

in

things as the most productive mode of historical inquiry.
The attitude of openness he recommends toward our classifications reflects not only our merely probabilistic knowledge of the relation between observed properties and real
essences,

but

also

a

conception

of

natural

harboring undiscovered powers whose discovery,
of

"that

one

contemptible

mineral"

closer to the truth of nature,

iron,

things

as

like those

must bring us

and for all we know may

produce in the process incalculable practical or material
benefits.

By

encouraging

us

continually to

expand the

sphere of the observable, as it were to force to the surface qualities hidden by nature from our unimproved senses,
the corpuscularian hypothesis facilitates the simultaneous
improvement of "Knowledge and Plenty, " that is,

of know-
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ledge and power (4.12~11).2 9

29 Thus it seems to me to miss the point to object, as
Yost does, that Locke is uninterested in hypotheses concerning sub-microscopic events because he holds that we can
only classify things and formulate hypotheses of causal
relations by reference to observables (1951, especially
120-130) .
The very concept "sub-microscopic" is relative
to the power of our instruments of observation; without
hypotheses concerning originally sub-microscopic events,
there could have been no reason to attempt to bring some of
those events into the sphere of human observation and control.
Yelton similarly stresses the "middle path" that
Locke follows in his estimate of the utility of hypotheses,
arguing that Locke conceives of the specific value of hypotheses only as means of explanation, not of discovery
(1970, 68,57-75). Contrast Laudan 1977.

THE FREEDOM OF THE MIND

To this point we have conceived of the danger that
Locke's

reductionistic

commonsense

corpuscularianism

intelligibility

of

nature

as

poses

for

the

in

the

lying

doctrine of the uniformity of matter and the illusory or
radically mutable character of its modifications.

But it

is possible to begin by acknowledging the relative stability of natural beings and yet discover a similar potential
danger in the principle of reductionism itself.

Let us

take Locke at his word, and accept as genuine his professed
admiration for the accomplishments of the corpuscularian
"Master-Builders" in advancing the natural sciences.

Let

us thus attribute to him the belief that nature is ultimately lawful and intelligible, and that its physical operations can best be discovered through historical inquiry,
complemented or completed by experiments designed to bring
us closer to the primary qualities of its primary constituents,

whatever they might be.

As we have noted,

Locke

appears to express enthusiasm about such a conception in
the anticipation that it will facilitate advances not only
in knowledge as such, but also in "profitable Knowledge" or
technology

(4.12.12).

conception of physical

It is not difficult to see how a
nature

as matter-in-motion,

as a

realm of sheer determinacy ruled solely by laws of mater187
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ial and efficient causation, can facilitate great advances
in human power over nature,
manipulate

nature's

causation.
"powers II

processes

by enabling human beings to
of

material

and

efficient

By conceiving of the properties of things as
and

testing

hypotheses

concerning

their

bases, we are able to make nature's powers our own.

causal
But we

might well wonder whether this is not ultimately a Faustian
bargain.

For questions

inevitably arise

concerning the

status of human beings in the corpuscularian theory.

Are

human beings to be included among the "bodies" whose behavior that theory seeks to explain?

If so, can we conceive

of

manipulable

other

natural

bodies

as

mere

matter-in-

motion without thus conceiving of ourselves as well?

Must

we conceive as mere powers, as epiphenomena of the primary
qualities of our own insensible constituent particles, not
only those qualities whereby we are perceptible to others,
but also the powers whereby we ourselves perceive and reflect upon ideas?

Can we adequately explain the human phe-

nomena of consciousness, of reason and volition, merely by
reference to material and efficient causation?
At

this

point

questions merge.

the

ontological

and

epistemological

To assert that the mind itself is a mere

epiphenomenon of the material or bio-chemical structure of
the brain would be to imply that thought can be determined
decisively only by its internal conditions, by the material
constitution of the brain, and not by the external reality

189
that it attempts to comprehend.
imply that all

This would indeed be to

thought is subjective,

or in other words

that we are incapable of genuine knowledge of any kind,
whether of secondary or of primary qualities.

It would be

to imply that we are inescapably imprisoned in a kind of
perceptual solitary confinement,

in a condition of solip-

sism or privacy such that there is no common world intelligible to our common senses.

It would then be beside the

point to protest that the epiphenomenal character of secondary qualities does not in itself imply their unreality or
subjectivity;

asserted in this comprehensive manner,

the

principle of reductionism inherent in the corpuscularian
theory

would

ultimately

efface

subjectivity and objectivity,
unintelligible

the

distinction

between

and therewith render wholly

its own foundation and that of any other

theory as well.
The ultimate question raised by Locke's employment of
the corpuscularian hypothesis concerns the freedom of the
mind.

In keeping with what Aaron calls the Essay's "se-

verely practical" orientation

(1955,

77),

or its aspira-

tion to serve at once the causes of "Truth and Usefulness"
(ECHU "Epistle to the Reader," Nidditch ed. 1975, 9), Locke
expresses an interest in the freedom of the mind less for
its own sake than for its function in facilitating freedom
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of action, 30 and, as we will see, for its relevance to important theological issues.

Notwithstanding the fact that

his extended treatment of this issue does not appear in the
context of an explicit discussion of morality--to repeat,
no chapter title

in the entire Essay announces a

direct

concern with morality--it is clear that Locke regards the
issue as fundamental to morality.

It can suffice for the

moment to recall that the vital connection of freedom of
thought and moral action is already manifest in his working
definition of "moral Man," of the proper subject of law or
morality,

as

What we seek,

"a

corporeal

therefore,

rational

Creature"

( 3. 11. 16) .

is Locke's explication of this

concept of "moral man," or of the relation between our corporeal and rational qualities.

We need to know how or to

what extent we can explain our mental experiences of thinking and willing by reference to the nature of the mind, or

30 cf. 2.22.10:
"For Action being the great Business
of Mankind, and the whole matter about which all Laws are
conversant, it is no wonder, that the several Modes of
Thinking and Motion, should be taken notice of ... "
We
have noted above (chapter III, p. 99 n.17) the complaints
of some scholars concerning a general scholarly tendency to
devote insufficient attention to the moral-practical significance of the Essay. Pang.le agrees that the Essay is of
great political importance in its own right, and even argues that in a sense its major defect consists in its insufficiently philosophic orientation;
Locke's apparent
emphasis of the primacy of action to thought signifies a
failure or refusal to account for the specifically philosophic eros (1988, 212ff). In this and the following chapters, I will argue that though Locke evidently refuses in
public to elevate philosophizing to the summit of human
experience, he does not deny in principle the possibility
of a truly free mind or a pure desire for truth.

191
of the substance in which those powers inhere.
Present purposes do not require a complete elaboration of Locke's account of these mental phenomena; the following chapter will include a more detailed discussion in
particular of his account of volition.

Here it is essen-

tial only to indicate briefly Locke's view that we do not
experience

our

prior or more

mental

faculties

as

fundamental cause.

epiphenomena

of

any

There are two genef:-al

data of common experience that cast doubt on this application of the doctrine of epiphenomenalism.
sists

in the

The first con-

fact that however hidden to us may be the

comprehensive truth

concerning the

order of

nature,

and

however natural among human beings may be. a condition of
dissensus on many issues,

our fundamental epistemological

experience is not one of solipsism or privacy.

The clear-

est indication of this lies in the fact that we "seldom
mistake ... the Use and Signification of the names of simple
Ideas,"

which

"carry

a

very

obvious

meaning with

them,

which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives
he is ignorant of ... " ( 3. 9. 18) . 31
31 cf. 2.32.15:
"I am nevertheless very apt to think,
that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike." Moreover, on this opinion of the objectivity
of secondary qualities depends to a considerable extent
Locke's strong suspicion that "the greatest part of the
Disputes in the World, are ... meerly Verbal, and about the
Signification of Words" (3.11.7; also 3.9.16ff).
As Wood
observes, according to Locke "Conflict among men comes not
so much from the contradictory testimony of the senses as
it does from the fictional fabrications of the intellect"
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The second of these data consists in our more direct
experience of mental faculties as the conditions of agency.
Near the beginning of the Essay's longest chapter,
explains his twofold conception of power:

Locke

"Active" power,

"which is the more proper signification of the word Power,"
is the power to effect change, and "passive" power is the
power to receive it (2.21.2,3,4).

Through sensation well

considered, we can gain clear and abundant ideas of passive
powers.

Given, on the other hand, that there are "but two

sorts of Action, whereof we have any Idea,

viz.

Thinking

and Motion," ideas of active powers seem to derive mainly
if not exclusively, and much more clearly, from "reflection
on the Operations of our Minds" (2.21.4; 2.23.28ff.).
flecting on our mental experience,

Re-

we find more particu-

larly that we have a power to abstract from our present
concerns, enabling us to frame general conceptions of happy
or well-lived lives (2.11.11, 2.21.51,56,61); that we have
a power to suspend the present determination of our wills
in order to consider present alternatives in relation to
our general conceptions of happiness
that we have a

(2.21.47,52,71);

and

power to reflect on and to adjust these

conceptions of happiness, even self-consciously to refocus
our desires, in accordance with new thoughts or experiences
(2.21.45,46,53,69).

By these means we can guide our voli-

(1975, 68).
In the following chapter, we shall discuss in
more detail Locke's doctrine of the naturalness of dissensus among human beings.
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tions

by

thought,

and

events ( 2 . 21 . 5 , 7) .

can therefore

begin

sequences

of

We thus experience ourselves as free,

self-mastering, self-determining beings, the owners of our
actions (2.21.15,48ff.,53).
Locke appeals repeatedly to our ordinary reflective
experience, to "every one to observe in himself" (2. 21. 38;
also 2.21.7,32,35,36,44,47,53,69)
count is accurate.

He remains,

to see whether his acthat is,

more-or-less on

the level of commonsense experience; nowhere in this discussion does

he

attempt

a

corpuscularian

explanation of

volition or of the thought that guides it.
determine why this is so.

We need to

Perhaps he simply excludes such

an attempt from the subject matter of the Essay; we have
seen that Locke at times disclaims any concern with ontological issues.

In the Essay's introductory chapter,

he

declares more specifically that he
shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine,
wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our
Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have
any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no.
These are Speculations, which, however curious and
entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way,
in the Design I am now upon.
(1.1.2)
It would seem that we should look upon such disclaimers
with considerable suspicion, however,

in view of the per-

fectly obvious faQt (which he readily acknowledges) that in
elaborating the corpuscularian hypothesis and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Locke does to
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some extent engage in "Physical Enquiries" and thus violates his stated delimitation.

The exception is necessary,

as we have seen, in order for Locke to render somewhat more
intelligible the nature of sensation and the qualities of
bodies.

Why then could not a similar exception be made in

order to clarify the nature or qualities of the mind?

Just

as Locke employs the corpuscularian hypothesis as the most
plausible interpretation of the nature or cause of ideas
that we experience in sensation, why does he not employ it
to provide a similar interpretation of ideas that we experience in reflection?
necessary

to

Why or in what sense does he find it

distinguish

between material

and

spiritual

substances (2.23.5,23-32,36)?
In fact

Locke does at several points consider the

propositions that the soul could be a material entity and
that thought could be a power or attribute of matter.

On

the basis of these considerations, it is perhaps safest for
us to conclude that in the end he gently urges upon his
readers

a

position

of

agnosticism

on

the

issue

of

the

nature of the mind, as in his suggestion that whoever will
"look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis,
will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly
for,

or

against

2.23.28ff.,

the

Soul's

2.27.17,27).32

Materiality"

(4.3.6;

Such agnosticism may

also

not be

32 such remarks would appear to complicate Aaron's
opinion that Locke simply "accepts the usual dualism, the
'two parts of nature,' active immaterial substance and
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altogether evenhanded, however, inasmuch as Locke does not
seem to believe that his audience most urgently requires an
openness to the possible truth of the immaterialist thesis;
to advance the position of agnosticism on this issue requires him first and foremost to show the nonabsurdity of
the materialist view.

It is not impossible then that this

profession agnosticism is merely provisional, that Locke is
actually a materialist of a certain sort.

In any event, in

order to facilitate such a spirit of openness, he proposes
to replace the distinction between material and immaterial
beings with that between cogitative and incogitative beings
(4.10.9) . 33

passive material substance" (1955, 142; also 104-105, 143).
Still, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Locke
accepts some kind of dualism, reflecting a qualitative difference between cogitative and incogitative natures.
Gibson holds that although Locke "begins by taking for granted
the current categories for interpreting the real," he
employs them less rigidly than does Descartes:
"In place
of two substances from whose clearly defined essences the
whole of the ii:; further determinations are conceived as
deducible, body and mind are only knowable as objects of a
partial and therefore imperfect existence" (1917, 226,2245). Cf. Alexander 1977, 75-76.
33 wilson argues that Locke offers no good reason for
adopting even as a matter of probability the opinion of the
immateriality of the mind or the soul: "Locke does ascribe
sensation and even 'thought' to animals; yet he shows no
inclination to attribute immaterial souls to them.
It
seems to follow that on Locke's principles thought not only
can inhere in a corporeal subject but in many cases actually does" ( 1979, 145; also 150) .
Similarly, Ayers attributes to Locke the opinion that thought is a "perfection" no
different in kind from animal or vegetable life ( 1977,
247); Pangle suspects, along with Locke's vigilant contemporary the Reverend Edmund Stillingfleet, that Locke denies
the existence of any noncorporeal substance ( 1988, 209;
Works 1823, 4.5ff., and passim).
The fundamental distinc-
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Adopting

the

latter

distinction

would

carry

the

benefit of directing our attention to what seems to be the
real issue for Locke, which is not the substantive nature
of the soul, but rather the status of its power of thought.
And on this issue Locke seems to speak more definitely.

He

claims to accept the possibility that the soul or the mind
could be a material substance, only on the assumption that
the power of thinking could inhere in matter by virtue of a
divine

superaddition;

matter

"is

evidently

nature void of sense and thought" (4.3.6). 34

in

its

own

Thus reject-

ing the possibility that thinking could be a natural power
of or could arise as it were spontaneously from "senseless
Matter"
vance

(4.10.5), he rejects with some emphasis the releof

the

corpuscularian

hypothesis

for

explaining

mental phenomena.
For it is as impossible to conceive,

that ever bare

tion would then seem to be not between cogitative and incogitative, nor even between animate and inanimate, but
simply between living and nonliving beings.
34 The notion of superaddition in the Essay seems to
correspond to the Second Treatise' notion of an "appeal to
heaven," in its application to cases beyond rational decision.
In attempting to explain how the motions and collisions of bodies can produce perceptions, e.g. of pleasure
or pain, "we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our
Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our
Maker" (4.3.6; also 2.8.13, 4.3.28,29, 4.10.10, STCE 192).
Cf. Bluhm et al.:
The notion of 'God' for Locke simply
"refers to natural causes as yet unknown to science" (1980,
437).
In what follows, however, I shall argue that whatever Locke seriously thinks of the principle of superaddition, it is most likely that he doubts the capacity of
human science ever to explain materially or reductionistically the phenomena of the mind.
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incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce
Matter ... Divide Matter into as minute parts as you
will ... vary the Figure and Motion of it as much as you
please ... and you may as rationally expect to produce
Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by putting together in a
certain Figure and Motion, gross particles of Matter,
as by those that are the very minutest, that do any
where exist ... So that if we will suppose nothing first,
or eternal; Matter can never begin to be:
If we suppose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; Motion can
never begin to be:
If we suppose only Matter and
Motion first, or eternal; Thought can never begin to
be.
(4.10.10; also 16)
It

is

true

that

even

this

apparently

definitive

statement, occurring in the midst of a discussion "Of Our
Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, " comes not without a
measure of Locke's characteristic ambiguity.

He argues in

effect that matter could not of its own power generate intelligence, because it is impossible for us to conceive how
matter could generate intelligence.

But at the close of

the discussion, he raises and does not directly answer an
objection to this mode of inference.

"We cannot conceive

how any thing but impulse of Body can move Body," he observes, "and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us
deny it possible, against the constant Experience, we have
of it in our selves,

in all our voluntary Motions, which

are produced in us only by the free Action or Thought of
our own Minds" (4.10.19; also 4.3.6).

We cannot infer from

the inconceivability of a proposition either its falseness
or the truth of the contrary proposition.

So it would

seem, then, that we cannot infer the immateriality of the
soul from the fact that we cannot conceive of its material-
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ity, nor can we infer the impossibility of matter naturally
generating thought from the fact that we cannot conceive of
its possibility.35
Upon considering the implications of this denial of
the legitimacy of inferences from the principle of inconceivability, therefore, we come to confront the possibility
that our experience of mental freedom or agency,
"constant," may be nonetheless illusory.

however

Why is it legiti-

mate for us to interpret volition as an active, initiating
power,

as

a

capacity to

interrupt

events and begin a new one?

a

causal

sequence of

If it is possible that our

thinking and volition are reducible to materialist causes,
then how do we know that a self or a unitary source of our
actions even exists?

How do we know,

that is,

that the

claim of self-dominion does not represent at bottom an act
of usurpation or covetousness on the part of whichever of a
number of competing wills or desires happens to gain a kind
of mental hegemony, thus producing a mere illusion of freedom or personhood similar to our uncritical attribution of
ontological primacy to secondary qualities? 36

In the pen-

35Bluhm et al. argue that this rejection of inferences
from the principle of inconceivability constitutes one
among several indications that Locke intends the argument
in ECHU 4.10 to serve a merely exoteric purpose (1980, especially 419-423).
This may well be the case; but on this
principle, we might also infer the nonphilosophic character
of Locke's corpuscularian explanation of sensation.
36cf. Nietzsche's conception of the "'soul as social
structure of the drives and affects' ... Willing seems to me
above all something complicated, something that is a unit
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ultimate

section of the

chapter

"Of

Power, "

immediately

following the close of his discussion of human liberty,
Locke remarks that "Grammar, and the common frame of Languages" may lead us sometimes to mistake for active powers
what are really passive powers,

as in the case,

for in-

stance, of a so-called "act" of perception (2.21.72).

What

justifies the opinion that these mistakes are limited in
number,

or that not all of our "actions" ordinarily con-

ceived are really semblances of passions?
It may seem at times that despite the fact that his
own arguments give rise to them,

Locke's response to such

questions is simply dismissive.

With respect to the fun-

damental question of our knowledge of our own existence, he
repeats

the

Cartesian argument

other Things,
Existence,

that

"If

that very doubt makes

I

doubt of all

me perceive my own

and will not suffer me to doubt of that," and

adds that "He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or
no,

I

speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure

nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were
something"

( 4. 9. 3, 4. 10. 2; also 4. 3. 6) .

But in fact Locke

does have something more to say to the skeptic on this
point.

His argument against the reduction of intelligence

to purely materialist causes derives not simply from the
commonness of our apparent experience to the contrary, nor

only as a word ... "
19) •

(Beyond Good and Evil, aphorisms 12,
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from the inconceivability of a reductionistic materialism,
but more compellingly from the absurdity of its consequences.

Locke recognizes that among the consequences of a

conception of thought as an epiphenomenon of "the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter" would be that "Freedom,

Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or

acting will be quite taken away"
vealed as merely illusory.

( 4 .10 .17),

would be re-

A comprehensively reductionist

materialism would thus yield the opinion that certain configurations of matter-in-motion produce by their very motions a

process of conscious cognition that somehow con-

tains an illusory experience of its own independence.

The

fact that an epiphenomena! or caused process could somehow
come to consider itself as a self, as an agent or active
power independent of any causation, must then signify that
it is ignorant or oblivious of its own causal bases.

The

absurdity in this appears upon consideration of the implication that this ignorance or obliviousness is necessary.
that it cannot be overcome.
all,

or a

Locke,

"it

Let "this thinking System be

part of the Matter of the Universe,"
is

impossible

either know its own,

that

any

one

Particle,

reasons
should

or the motion of any other Particle,

or the Whole know the Motion of every Particular; and so
regulate its own Thoughts or Motions,
Thought resulting from such Motion"

or indeed have any

(ibid.).

Let us sup-

pose that thought does thus reduce to the motion of parti-
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cles, and suppose further that it presently achieves selfconsciousness, such that it loses its semblance of independence and becomes aware of its material bases.

It would

thus become aware not only that those material bases had
hitherto produced an

illusion of

independence,

but that

they are also producing the present reductionist proposition.

On what grounds could we conclude that the content

of the present thought is any less illusory? 37

Unless we

wished simply to assume that the present moment were somehow privileged to provide a revelation of the true grounds
of intelligence--unless, that is, we wished to make a pure
leap

of

faith,

foundation--we

utterly without
would

have

to

rational
concede

or experiential

that

the

present

thought could be no less illusory than its predecessors,
that for all we know there may be some other causal entity
producing the illusion of material or corpuscularian causality, and so forth in an infinite regress.

To become con-

scious of a possible causal ground of thought is necessarily to doubt not only the possibility of any correspondence
between mind and world, but also the reality of that ground
itself; to attempt to explain thought or intelligence as a
mere accidental effect or epiphenomenon of nonintelligent
37 Locke raises a similar question at ECHU 4.11.8:
"But yet, if any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust
his senses ... and therefore will question the Existence of
all Things, or our Knowledge of any thing:
I must desire
him to consider, that if all be a Dream, then he doth but
dream, that he makes the Question; and so it is not much
matter, that a waking Man should answer him."
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causes is to commit oneself to an endless search for the
ever-elusive

nature

of

those

causes

(cf.

4.10.19).

To

embrace such an explanation and all its consequences would
therefore

present

the

remarkable

spectacle

of

thought

denying its own possibility, by tracing its existence to a
nonintelligent cause whose existence as cause remains at
bottom purely conjectural. 38

Than this,

Locke maintains,

"there can be nothing more absurd" (4.10.16). 39
Granting the extreme unlikelihood that a seventeenthcentury writer with Locke's sensitivity to the prevailing
climate of opinion would openly and straightforwardly pub38 In this respect Locke's argument can be viewed as a
continuation of his rejection of the theory of innatism,
present here in a much more radical form.
Just as he objects to the notion of dispositional innatism that certain
principles or propositions can be naturally inscribed in
our minds of which we are yet unaware, so too he objects to
the more radical notion that our thought can be determined
by principles or causes of which we can never be adequately
aware (cf ECHU 1.2).
39 I believe that Locke is in this decisive respect in
agreement with the following statement by Harry V. Jaffa:
"While plants, and animals other than man, may without
self-contradiction be conceived as forms which are epiphenomena of some more fundamental sub-human reality, man
cannot be so conceived. Intelligence cannot be regarded as
a by-product of unintelligence.
The 'what' of man, his
self-consciousness ... cannot be conceived as the effect of
an unintelligent cause.
For in that case man's intelligence would, like the secondary qualities, be regarded as
an illusion, corresponding as it would to nothing in a
reality outside man's brain.
But the doctrine of an unintelligent primary reality, being itself a product of man's
brain, would also have to be regarded as an illusion.
The
doctrine that man, the intelligent being, is 'caused' by an
unintelligent first principle, cannot then escape selfcontradiction.
Intelligence is an irreducible reality"
(1957, 61). Cf. Lowenthal 1978, 96.
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lish arguments certain to provoke accusations of materialism or atheism,

we have attempted to remain open to the

possibility that Locke's rejection in this context of a
materialist explanation of thought does not represent his
most serious thinking on this issue.

Having thus consid-

ered the relevant evidence, however, we conclude nonetheless that Locke fails to present a corpuscularian explanation of mental phenomena not out of considerations of mere
prudence,

but

instead

attempted

explanation

phenomena

intelligible.

because he believes that no
could

succeed

Whatever

in

his

rendering
ultimate

such
those

opinion

concerning the substantial nature of the mind or soul, or
concerning the reality of the distinction between material
and spiritual substances,

Locke does not go so far as to

counsel an openness to the question of the reduction of
thought to material and efficient causation.
believes

that

he

can

safely

counsel

an

Indeed he

openness

with

respect to the former question precisely because neither
possible resolution need carry the destructive consequences
of the reductionist principle.

It is "not of such mighty

necessity to determine one way or t'other" the question of
the

substantial

nature of the mind

waste of intellectual labor to try),

( and is therefore a
according to Locke,

because "All the great ends of Morality and Religion, are
well enough secured,

without philosophical Proofs of the
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Soul's Immateriality" (ibid.; also 2.27.17) . 40
The corpuscularian hypothesis may very well be the
basis

of

a

true

explanation of

the behavior of bodies,

Locke seems to hold, but if it is to be usefully applied to
the thoughts and actions of human beings, it must be able
to account for the

facts

that we do not experience the

world as solipsists and that we are able somehow to reflect
upon and therefore to exercise influence over the conditions of our own thinking and action.

If the corpusculari-

an hypothesis or something like it is to be comprehensively
true, in other words,

it must be true in such a way as to

respect the essentially irreducible character of the powers
of

the mind.

Locke declines

to offer a

corpuscularian

explanation of thinking and volition because he simply has
no clear idea of what such an explanation might involve;
mind and body do not necessarily belong to two separate or
wholly distinct worlds,

but are related and conjoined in

some mysterious way that defies any simple reduction of one

40 It is true that in the immediate context Locke is
concerned to show that one can discard this doctrine of
immateriality without thereby discarding the doctrine of
the soul's immortality, which supports our sense of moral
obligation by placing before us the prospect of reward or
punishment in an afterlife.
(Cf. 1.3.6:
" ... the true
ground of Morality .. .-can only be the Will and Law of a God,
who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and
Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the Proudest Offender.") But in referring not merely to one, but to
all the great ends of morality, he implies that the notion
of human agency, indispensable for any notion of obligation, would be similarly undisturbed by the doctrine of the
materiality of the soul or the mind.
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to the other (2.23.28).

We can proceed best in this area,

Locke implies, by simply analyzing and attempting to render
an

internally consistent account of our own and others'

mental experiences, not by attempting to force such experiences

into

conformity

with

a

preconceived

hypothesis.

There can be no doubt that as a problem, the problem of the
relation between mind and body or between the cogitative
and incogitative parts of nature survives Locke's philosophizing.

The point here is not to suggest that he succeeds

in resolving the issue, but rather that there is virtue in
his agnosticism.
lem in this

In respecting the legitimacy of the prob-

relation,

Locke refuses to reduce matter to

mind or vice versa, and refuses also to posit their radical
separation;

rather

he

simply

insists

that

a

successful

resolution must account satisfactorily for all the relevant
phenomena present in our common experience.

CONCLUSION:

NATURAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL HISTORY

We have seen in these past two chapters that Locke's
conception of the proper method for the study of nature is
twofold.

Against the scholastics' abstract rationalism, he

insists strongly on a historical or descriptive approach,
while in his awareness of the uselessness or even absurdity
of a totally naive empiricism, he retains a clear interest
in explanatory hypotheses.

We have been concerned in the

present chapter to ascertain whether Locke's employment of
one such hypothesis, the corpuscularian hypothesis, has the
effect

of

undermining

the

possibility

of

a

genuinely

historical approach to the phenomena, or to "the nature of
things themselves."
view

We have found that while he seems to

corpuscularianism

available

of

certain

as

the

kinds

most

intelligible

of natural

phenomena,

account
he

is

clearly aware of its deficiencies; as Margaret Wilson puts
it, Locke's various qualifications of his assent amount to
an acknowledgement "that most of what goes on in the world
is incomprehensible from the point of view of Boylean mechanism"
fully

(1979,

149).

explaining

the

He does not believe

it capable of

natures

substances

of

material

or

bodies, nor does he find in it any justification for conceiving of nature comprehensively in terms of matter- or
bodies-in-motion.

Therefore his employment of it does not
206
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commit him to an endorsement of the extreme and even dangerous implications that some commentators allege.

That he

assents to it at all proceeds in large part from his general sense of the superior intelligibility of explaining the
behavior of observable bodies by reference to the motions
of their fundamental constituents, 41 rather than by obscure
references to their substantial forms or occult qualities.
But the point is that Locke neither offers nor endorses any
systematic, comprehensive explanation of natural phenomena;
he employs the corpuscularian theory in a moderate,

some-

what pragmatic manner, as a hypothesis useful both in providing partial explanations of the phenomena gathered in
natural histories and

in suggesting promising directions

for further experimentation.

By this we do not mean to

suggest that Locke's qualified assent to a corpuscular ian
or mechanistic natural science is perfectly benign, carrying no dangers whatsoever.

We mean to suggest only that

such dangers as this assent may carry do not proceed from
dogmatism,

or

from

any

procedure

of

excluding g

priori

certain phenomena from consideration.
The moderate manner in which Locke employs the cor-

41 Locke's assent to the corpuscularian theory seems to
involve less an acceptance of its details than an agreement
with the general principle of explaining physical events by
the motions of insensible particles.
The spirit in which
Locke accepts the corpuscularian account of perception appears in his confession that
"I understand not" how we
perceive, "though it be plain motion has to do in the producing" of sensory ideas (Works 1877, II.10; also 14).
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puscularian hypothesis,

and in addition his assessment of

both the promise and the essential danger of the new natural science are rather strikingly illustrated in a remarkable digression occurring within his
Complex Ideas of Substances."

discussion

"Of our

Having elaborated again the

hypothesis that the observable qualities of material substances have their causal bases in the primary qualities of
the

insensible corpuscularian constituents of those sub-

stances,

Locke digresses,

reassurance.
tion

the

apparently to sound a

note of

The corpuscularian theory calls to our atten-

inadequacy

of

our

scientific study of nature,

fa cul ties

for

the

genuinely

insofar as we would require

"Microscopical Eyes" or senses "much quicker and acuter"
than those naturally given us,

in order to "penetrate ...

into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies"
( 2. 2 3. 12) •

But perhaps we should not lament our deficien-

cies in this respect; Locke seems to reassure us that the
possession of senses improved in the manner he describes
would be "inconsistent with our Being,

or at least well-

being in this part of the Universe," in that in all probability it would overwhelm us with sensory minutiae, undermining our capacity to make the ordinary identifications
and distinctions

whereby we

order our daily lives.

We

should therefore rest secure in the belief that the "infinite wise Contriver of us ... hath fitted our Senses, Faculties,

and Organs,

to

the

conveniences

of Life,

and the
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Business we have to do here" (ibid.).
Yet

in the

immediate

sequel

he

cleverly qualifies

this affirmation of the providedness of our natural mental
condition, proposing now that only "in our present State,"
i.e. one wherein we possess "unalterable Organs," would the
possession of sense organs thus improved be of no advantage
to us.

What we would find disorienting would not be our

perception or knowledge of ordinarily insensible particles
as such, but rather a condition in which we could perceive
only the primary qualities of microscopic bodies, without
any conception of them as constituents of the larger bodies
manifest in the world of common or unimproved sense experience.

Faced with the choice of living exclusively either

in the world of improved or the world of unimproved sense
experience, it would therefore be rational for us to choose
the latter.

But Locke is not content simply to let the

matter

here.

rest

Immediately

after

illustrating

the

disadvantages of living exclusively in a world of improved
sense experience, he proposes an "extravagant conjecture"
according to which,

like angels assuming bodies, we could

alter our organs of perception so as "to suit them to (our]
present Design."

What wonders might we discover, he con-

tinues enthusiastically,

if we could view at our pleasure

"the

in

Figure

and

Motion

the

minute

Particles

of

the

Blood, and other juices of Animals,

as distinctly as ... at

other times,

of the Animals them-

the

shape

and motion
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selves"--if we could pass at pleasure between the worlds of
minute particles and of observable objects, or between the
worlds

revealed

to

senses

(2.23.13)?

our
Now,

improved

and

to

our

unimproved

however "wild a Fancy" it may be

with respect to the "Beings above us," Locke's conjecture
is

clearly

beings.

not

at

all

extravagant

as

applied

to

human

The microscopes of the late seventeenth century

were already capable of "augmenting the acuteness of our
Senses" to a degree sufficient to bring to sight a world of
ordinarily hidden phenomena,

often strange or incongruous

from the perspective of the unimproved senses; and Locke
explicitly imagines the advent of far more powerful microscopes, and perhaps by implication also that of similarly
powerful instruments for the augmentation of other senses
(2.23.11,12) . 42

In such means we

already possess to a

considerable extent the power of "Spirits"
perceptive organs, and thereby,

to alter our

so it would seem, to pass

at pleasure to and from the worlds of improved and unim-

42 Locke seems thus to believe it in principle possible
for us actually to observe the basic constituents of physical reality: 11 • • • if that most instructive of our Senses,
Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or 100000 times more acute
than it is now by the best Microscope ... he would come
nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get Ideas of their internal Constitutions" (2.23.12).
Cf. Yolton 1970, 45-46. We should note that this does not
necessarily contradict his denials of our capacity for
knowledge of real essences; the decisive distinction is
between observing the constituent corpuscles of a given
internal constitution and being able to deduce observable
properties from their qualities.
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proved sense experience.
In thus referring to the wonders that artificially
improved perceptions might manifest to us, and by implication to the greater comprehension of nature that they might
facilitate,

Locke expresses clearly the promise that his

"extravagant conjecture" holds forth.
this

expression

by

recalling

his

We might complete

emphasis

of the

close

relation between "Knowledge and Plenty," or of the technological
(4.12.11).

dimension

of

the

promise

of

modern

science

What we should not overlook in this, however,

is the significance of his acknowledgment of the danger.
Because nature reveals itself at best only partially to our
unimproved senses, the task of the natural historian must
involve not simply the faithful recording of experiences,
but

further the augmentation of our senses,

in order to

raise to the level of phenomena things or events that lie
beneath or beyond those ordinarily perceptible.

In order

to expand our knowledge of nature, we must to some extent
transcend our commonsense experience.

For Locke the danger

lies in the fact that an attempt to do so completely, to
live exclusively in a world of microscopic corpuscles or
perhaps

things

"yet more

remote

from

our Comprehension"

(4.3.11), would be an attempt to live "in a quite different
World from other People"
disorienting.

(2.23.12),

and would be wholly

Locke's hopefulness concerning the sci en-

tific value of enlarging our sensory capacities and gaining
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admittance

into a

world of hitherto hidden phenomena

is

anchored by a recognition that at the close of the day, as
it were, we must return home to live in the prescientific
world of common sense experience.

It is anchored, in other

words, by an acknowledgment of the reality of the prescientific world.

The possession of the unalterably acute sen-

ses in Locke's digression is the equivalent of the hypothetical supposition of the exclusive reality of insensible
corpuscles and their primary qualities.

To make this sup-

position is in effect to suppose the banishment of human
beings with their ordinary sensory organs
world. 43

from the real

But natural science in Locke's view must be nat-

ural science for human beings, for beings constituted as we
are; our artificial enhancements of our sensory endowments
and

our

hypotheses

concerning

insensible

corpuscles

are

useful insofar as they render the natural world, the world
in which we must live, more intelligible to us and therewith more manipulable by us.

There can be no doubt that

Locke finds the corpuscularian hypothesis partially useful,
perhaps necessary but not sufficient,

for the achievement

of these aims; but it is crucial that having once resolved
the

ordinarily

observable

minute particles,

bodies

the modern

of

the

universe

scientist must

into

somehow put

43 cf. Hannah Arendt's description of the demand of
modern science for "the renunciation of an anthropocentric
or geocentric world view." The "miracle of modern science"
consists in the fact that "the purging was done by men"
(1968, 265,269). Cf. Burtt 1932, 89-90.
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them back together.

The physicist's concern with explana-

tion must somehow be reconciled with the concern of the
taxonomist. 44

Once again,

in maintaining that the proper

basis of natural science lies in natural history or in a
careful observation of "the nature of things themselves, "
Locke urges observation at both levels of reality; he does
not imply that nature appears exclusively at the corpuscular level.
In this respect Locke's critics on this
well

be

justified

in

finding

a

danger

to

issue may

common

implicit in this conception of natural science.

sense

For the

simple reason that so much of the relevant data lie outside
the realm of our ordinary experience,

inherent almost by

definition in Locke's "extravagant conjecture" or in the
modern enterprise of experimental natural
unpredictability of its results;

science is the

no matter how sound the

hypothesis, surely the attempt at observing hitherto unobservable data must with some frequency produce surprises,
thereby

generating

further

questions

and

directions

for

further research, calling forth the invention of ever-more
powerful instruments of observation and measurement, enabling scientists in turn to uncover further surprises, with
the whole process continuing ad infinitum.

It is diffi-

44 whitehead implies that in his greater empirical concern for issues of classification over mathematical explanation, Locke stands in relation to Descartes and Newton
roughly as Aristotle stands in relation to Pythagoras and
Plato (1925, 43-44). Cf. Givner 1962.
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cult to say how seriously Locke regards the possibility
that the discoveries of the new natural science could ultimately render our ordinary experiences,

and in particular

those responsible for our belief in the natural foundations
of our species classifications, less rather than more
intelligible.

In suggesting our ability to

imitate the

"Spirits" who can pass at pleasure between the worlds of
science and common sense, he seems to assume that whatever
we discover through, the augmentation of our natural senses
will be compatible with what we know through ordinary experience,

will leave our ordinary world intact.

Viewing

this suggestion from a contemporary perspective, surveying
the yield of the intervening three hundred years of intellectual laboring, we might perceive in Locke's enthusiasm a
measure of naivety,

in proportion to the difficulties in-

volved in reconciling with common sense experience the many
perplexing and paradoxical discoveries of contemporary natural science.45
45 Thus Arendt writes concerning the contemporary
consequences of this enterprise that scientists' "most
cherished ideals of necessity and lawfulness ..• were lost
when the scientists discovered that there is nothing
indivisible in matter, no a-tomos, that we live in an
expanding, non-limited universe, and that chance seems to
rule supreme wherever this 'true reality,' the physical
world, has receded entirely from the range of human senses
and from the range of all instruments whereby their coarseness was refined. From this, it seems to follow that causality, necessity and lawfulness are categories inherent in
the human brain and applicable only to the common-sense
experiences of earth-bound creatures" (1968, 273).
It is
certainly fair to wonder whether Locke could have conceived
in such terms the "quite different World" that he believed
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The

danger

thus

inheres

in

the

possibility

that,

Locke's apparent confidence to the contrary, we may not be
able to regain our commonsense orientation,

once we begin

to ponder the significance of the discoveries we make by
adopting the perspective of the microscope or telescope or
any other instrument for detecting things ordinarily imperceptible.
philosophy,

This danger is not a peculiar product of Locke's
and in struggling with the specific contempo-

rary instances of the problematic relation between natural
science and common sense experience, we can expect little
assistance from Locke's texts.

But the purpose here is not

to suggest that Locke is capable of resolving the problem
inherent in this relation,
fundamentally

the

but instead to emphasize more

significance

of his

insistence

on the

necessity of reconciling the findings of natural science
with the reality of the commonsense, prescientific world.
If Locke suggests no resolution of this difficult relation,
neither does he adopt g priori any set of explanatory principles that would render such a resolution impossible.
Locke explains as

follows his understanding of the

proper employment of hypotheses:
.•. my Meaning is, that we should not take yp_ any one
too hastily ••• till we have very well examined Particulars, and made several Experiments, in that thing which
we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it
will agree to them all; whether our Principles will
carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with
one Phenomenon of Nature, as they seem to accommodate,
we would gain access to through modern natural science.
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and explain another.
And at least, that we take care,
that the name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose
on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable
Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful
conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of
the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy.
(4.12.13) 46
Locke's extravagant conjecture indicates that he employs
the corpuscularian hypothesis not as a dogma but as a genuine hypothesis, to be assented to or rejected in proportion to its usefulness in explaining, not explaining away,
the data of our ordinary experience.

Within the perspec-

tive of that hypothesis as Locke understands it,

it would

appear that the natural facts of intelligence and of the
plurality of natures must either be denied or accepted as
simply

inexplicable.

It

is

to

Locke's

credit

that

he

chooses the latter, although his apparently pragmatic distrust of comprehensive, systematic explanations of the natural world may not be itself entirely free of difficulty.
What is essential is that hypothetical or explanatory natural science for Locke must aspire to be the completion of
natural history,

or of certain fields of natural history.

It cannot be its replacement.
Finally, having thus elaborated Locke's defense of an
experimental,
"historical,

probabilistic
plain

method"

natural
of

science

studying

rooted

nature,

we

in

a

can

reformulate the question of ultimate interest for our study
46 For a still more emphatic condemnation of the
misuse of hypotheses in natural philosophy, see Locke's
fragment "De Arte Medica," in Fox Bourne 1876, I. 222227.
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as a whole.

Of what relevance is this defense of a natural

science grounded

in natural

history to

concerning morality and justice?

Locke's teaching

The argument in defense

of Locke's epistemological moderation remains inconsequential in the most important respect, at least until we have
gained a clearer idea of the relation between the abstract
idea of
Locke

"moral man" and actual,

natural human beings as

is able to observe them in the course of his own

natural-historical

inquiry.

If Locke holds that partial

but reliable knowledge of nature is indeed accessible to
the human understanding, to what extent does he hold that
such knowledge can be enlisted in support of a teaching of
morality or justice?

What remains,

therefore,

for us to

consider are the relations between the Essay's account of
natural science and its proposed demonstrative science of
ethics,

and between each of these and the Two Treatises'

theory of natural rights.
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